TERRY A. DOUGHTY, District Judge.
Pending here is Defendant Baker Hughes, Inc.'s ("Baker Hughes") Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 43]. Plaintiff Chad Landreneau ("Landreneau") filed an opposition [Doc. No. 50]. Baker Hughes filed a reply to the opposition [Doc. No. 51].
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Baker Hughes' motion for summary judgment and dismisses Landreneau's claims in their entirety.
Landreneau was employed by Baker Hughes from July 2011 until his termination on January 18, 2017. From 2013 until his termination, he worked in the human resources department in Broussard, Louisiana, as an HR Generalist, an HR Generalist Senior, and, finally, as an HR Business Partner. [Doc. No. 43-3, p. 65]
Landreneau received annual evaluations each year he was employed by Baker Hughes. In 2011, his supervisor, Kathryn Bell (female), rated him as "meets expectations," or a "3." In 2012, 2013, and 2014, his supervisor, Jill Shelton (female), also rated him as "meets expectations," or a "3." In 2015, he was rated by his supervisor, Brandy Buzzelli (female), as "exceeds expectations," or a "4." [Doc. No. 43-3, pp. 81-98].
Landreneau's 2016 evaluation was conducted by a new supervisor, Angela McPherson ("McPherson"), who rated him as "partially meets expectations," or a "2." [Doc. 43-3, p. 68-71]. Baker Hughes contends this lower rating was based in part on the fact that Landreneau had received a verbal warning and a written warning from McPherson during 2016.
Landreneau received the verbal warning from McPherson for his alleged role in the improper handling of the termination of an employee on a leave of absence. A termination letter, for that employee issued in June 2016, but a COBRA notification letter was backdated to March 2016. This action resulted in a legal demand being made against Baker Hughes by the employee alleging that his right to receive COBRA notice was violated. Landreneau, however, contends that McPherson wrongly placed the blame on him for an error that was made by a separate department in Houston. [Doc. No. 50-1, p. 3]
Landreneau received the written warning from McPherson because of his alleged role in the mishandling of a Reduction in Force ("RIF") involving an employee named Clydia Olivier. According to Baker Hughes, Landreneau incorrectly documented the RIF as a position elimination, when, in fact, two other employees took over her job duties as a result of the RIF. He also allegedly failed to include the two other employees with Olivier as "comparators", i.e., other employees considered along with Olivier during the decision-making process. A total of four (4) employees, including Landreneau, received discipline for their roles in the incorrectly handled RIF. Two employees received verbal warnings, and a third employee received a final written warning [SEALED Doc. No. 47, P. 112]. According to Landreneau, McPherson was the person responsible for these errors, yet she wrongly shifted the blame [Doc. No. 50-1, p. 4].
Landreneau contends that McPherson made these false accusations against him in her quest to have the human resources department to be 100% female. He contends that McPherson hired only females; that the persons that she supervised were 95% female, whereas the national average for a Human Resources Department is 74% female; and that McPherson rated every single person that worked for her no less than a "3," except for himself, the only male working for her. [Doc. No. 50-1, p. 2]
As a result of declining business in the oil and gas business during Landrenau's last few years of employment, Baker Hughes conduced hundreds of RIFs of employees. Landreneau was involved in handling many of these RIFs.
Due to restructuring in the HR department, a new HR Manager position was created at the Broussard location. Baker Hughes decided that the restructuring should be a headcount neutral or headcount reduction activity. This meant that a HR Business Partner position had to be eliminated at the Broussard location to offset the creation of the HR Manager position.
By the end of December 2016, McPherson had been transferred to a different position in the company; therefore, the recruiting and interviewing for that new position was conducted by Shawna Shelor ("Shelor"), who had replaced McPherson as supervisor over the Broussard location [Doc. No. 43-3, pp. 12, 13, 14, 79]. However, McPherson spoke to Landreneau about that new position and suggested that he not apply because of his recent disciplinary actions and the fact that he might not be ready for that promotion. Landreneau agreed [Doc. No. 43-3, pp. 10, 44-45].
Two females, Da'Nae Fox ("Fox") and LaTonya Hawkins ("Hawkins") went through the interview process for the new position, and Fox was selected.
To keep the headcount neutral, Baker Hughes needed to terminate one HR employee at the Broussard location under its RIF procedure. Baker Hughes asserts that, even though Fox's new position as HR Manager was a higher, supervisory position than Landreneau's HR Business Partner position, it nevertheless used her as a comparator to Landreneau in conducting the RIF process. [Doc. No. 43-3, p. 18-26].
Baker Hughes selected Landreneau to be terminated, effective January 18, 2017.
On April 19, 2017, Landreneau filed suit against Baker Hughes in the 15
He further contends that McPherson manufactured bogus disciplinary write-ups and initiated bad faith disciplinary actions against him because of his gender. He asserts that McPherson's actions were entirely without merit and were intended to effect and keep in place a policy of gender discrimination within the human resources department.
On June 16, 2017, the suit was removed to this Court.
On April 1, 2019, Baker Hughes filed this motion for summary judgment, contending that Landreneau's sex discrimination claim should be dismissed with prejudice because he cannot show that female employees were treated more favorably, as is required under La. R.S. 23:332, and because Landreneau cannot show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination were pretext for intentional discrimination based on his gender. Landrenau opposes the motion.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (AA party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court must accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, "a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence." Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.)
Landrenau argues that he was terminated due solely to the actions of McPherson, resulting in the department becoming 100% female, which, he asserts, was McPherson's intent all along. He further asserts that, prior to McPherson becoming the supervisor of the HR Department in Broussard, he was "on his way up." [Doc. No. 50-1, p. 6]. He states that during the year 2016, he had performed admirably, doing something that no one else wanted to do, laying off employee after employee in what were very hard times. [Id.] Despite all of this, when McPherson came along, according to Landreneau, she sabotaged his chances of getting the position as manager of the HR. [Id.] He contends that he would have been given an evaluation of at least "3," if not "4," by an objective supervisor. [Id.] Further, her efforts culminated in his termination. [Id.]
Landreneau alleges sex discrimination claims under Louisiana's Employment Discrimination Law, La. R.S. 23:332. Since this statute is similar to Title VII, Louisiana courts have availed themselves of decisions found in federal jurisprudence when interpreting claims under La. R.S. 23:332. Artigue v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013-537 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14); 154 So.3d 1 (citing Hicks v. Cent. La. Elec. Co., Inc., 97-1232 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 712 So.2d 656)).
If a plaintiff has no direct evidence of sex discrimination, Louisiana courts apply the burden-shifting paradigm set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Alleman v. State of Louisiana, Department of Economic Development, 698 F.Supp.2d 644 (M.D. La. 3/1710). As such, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by demonstrating that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position at issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse employment action, and (4) he was treated less favorably than other similarly-situated employees who were not members of the protected class, under nearly identical circumstances. McDaniel v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp., 705 Fed. Appx 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007)); (see also Kimble v. Georgia Pacific Corporation, 245 F.Supp.2d 862 (M.D. La. 11/7/02)).
If a plaintiff meets his prima facie burden, then a defendant may articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse employment action. Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2005).
Once a defendant meets this burden, which is one of production only, a plaintiff is not entitled to an inference of discrimination at the third stage. Instead, "the plaintiff must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that either (1) the employer's reason is a pretext or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another `motivating factor' is the plaintiff's protected characteristic. Brown v. Mississippi State Senate, 548 F. App'x 973, 976 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Group, Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir.2007)) "Even if the plaintiff presents such evidence, summary judgment against the plaintiff may still be appropriate depending on a number of factors, including `the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered,' if `no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.'" Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)).
Here, there is no direct evidence of sex discrimination. Baker Hughes contends that Landreneau cannot establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination using the McDonnell-Douglas test because he cannot show that he was treated less favorably than women because of his gender. Baker Hughes asserts that the only adverse employment action that Landreneau experienced was the RIF that resulted in his termination because the verbal and written warnings that were respectively issued to Landreneau in 2016 for the COBRA incident and the Olivier incident do not qualify as adverse employment actions for Title VII purposes, citing Montgomery v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. CIV.A. 09-0584, 2010 WL 4781438, at *7 (W.D. La. Oct. 14, 2010), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. CIV.A. 09-0584, 2010 WL 4777896 (W.D. La. Nov. 17, 2010) (citing King v. Louisiana, 294 Fed.App'x. 77, 84 (5th Cir.2008) (holding that "allegations of unpleasant work meetings, verbal reprimands, improper work requests and unfair treatment do not constitute adverse employment actions ... as retaliation"); see also Anderson v. McDonald's Restaurants of Louisiana, Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-992, 2012 WL 5878731, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2012) (citing Harrison v. Corrections Corp. of America, 476 Fed.App'x. 40, 43 (5th Cir.2012) ("With respect to claims of discrimination, in accordance with Title VII's language, [Fifth Circuit] precedent only recognizes ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating as actionable adverse employment actions.")
Baker Hughes further argues that, in the context of a RIF, to show that a female was treated more favorably, Landreneau must show that a female held the same position as Landreneau and retained her job after the RIF. See Brown, 548 F. App'x at 977 (Plaintiff who was black held the position of Committee Assistant and was terminated established her prima facie case for Title VII race discrimination claim, when another Committee Assistant who was white was retained during the RIF.).
In support of this argument, Baker Hughes asserts that in December 2016 it initiated the reorganization of its human resources department in its North American South Geomarket. The reorganization consisted of the creation of a HR Manager position at Baker Hughes's Broussard location. The HR Manager position was a supervisory position, whereby the HR Manager supervised Baker Hughes's human resources department for the entirety of the Gulf of Mexico region. Because of continued challenges in the oil industry, Baker Hughes decided that the reorganization should be a headcount neutral or headcount reduction activity — i.e., an HR Business Partner position must be eliminated at the Broussard location to offset the creation of the HR Manager position.
At the time of the RIF in January 2017, Landreneau was the only person at the Broussard location who held the position of HR Business Partner. Thus, according to Baker Hughes, there was not a female HR Business Partner who retained her position at the Broussard location through the RIF. Therefore, Baker Hughes argues, Landreneau has failed to show that a female was treated more favorably than him with regard to the RIF.
In his opposition, Landreneau primarily argues that the verbal warning and the written warning he received from Ms. McPherson were unfair and were rooted in her desire to have an all-female human resources department.
Even if the Court assumes arguendo these reprimands were sufficient to constitute adverse employment actions, Landreneau has failed to identify any females who were treated more favorably. He has further failed to show that he was treated less favorably because of his gender than other similarly-situated employees who were not of the same gender, under nearly identical circumstances. Therefore, Landreneau has failed to establish a prima facie case for sex discrimination. Accordingly, Baker Hughes is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
However, even if it is assumed that Landreneau has established a prima facie case for sex discrimination, his claim nevertheless fails because he cannot show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons Baker Hughes cites for his termination were pretext for intentional discrimination based on his gender.
As noted above, a new HR Manager position was created at the Broussard location and the RIF required an offset of another position in Broussard to keep it headcount neutral. The HR Manager position had been filled by Fox. Even though her HR Manager position was a higher, supervisory position than Landreneau's HR Business Partner position, Baker Hughes nonetheless used Fox as a comparator to Landreneau in its RIF process. [Doc. No. 43-3, p. 18-26]
Landreneau was informed of the RIF and elimination of his position on January 18, 2017.
Baker Hughes's guidelines in deciding who should be selected for the RIF process included the following criteria: performance rating and rankings; critical qualifications and expertise; key positions; recent hire, promotion or transfer. [SEALED Doc. No. 47, p. 27] Fox's longer and more significant experience, the differences in the criticality, reorganization and redundancy of her position supported the elimination of Landreneau's position and his termination, according to Baker Hughes.
Comparing their experience, by the time of Landreneau's RIF in January 2017, Fox had over twenty years of experience in human resources [Doc. No. 43-3, p. 20], whereas Landreneau had twelve years of experience. [Doc. No. 43-3, pp65-67]. Additionally, Fox had multi-faceted HR experience, including prior supervisory experience and international experience, neither of which Landreneau had. [Doc. No. 43-3, p. 16].
The factor of criticality of the positions and the factor concerning reorganization and restructure both favored elimination of Landreneau's position. Fox's position of HR Manager was the position created by Baker Hughes in connection with the reorganization it did of the Human Resources department in December 2016. Additionally, Fox's HR Manager position would, along with being a supervisory position, subsume the duties and responsibilities of Landreneau's HR Business Partner position. Thus, the HR Manager position that Fox held was a key position, was a combining of positions, and was more critical to Baker Hughes's operations than was Landreneau's lower-ranked position of HR Business Partner.
Finally, Baker Hughes performed the restructuring as a headcount neutral event, so that with the addition of the HR Manager position at the Broussard location, another position had to be eliminated. With Fox receiving the promotion to HR Manager and thereby assuming the duties of Landreneau's HR Business Partner position, Landreneau's position became redundant and unnecessary.
Therefore, Baker Hughes established that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to eliminate Landrenau's position and terminate his employment.
The burden then shifts back to Landrenequ to produce "evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that either (1) the employer's reason is a pretext or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another `motivating factor' is the plaintiff's protected characteristic." Brown, supra. Landreneau contends that McPherson wanted to sabotage his career and that he received a "hatchet job' as part of her scheme to get an "all-female group." [Doc. No. 50, pp. 2, 8]
Landreneau's only evidence to support his conspiracy claim is that he "just feel[s] like that's what she wanted." [Doc. No. 43-3, p. 40]. Speculation and unsupported allegations fail to show pretext of sex discrimination and do not survive summary judgment. Jackson v. Principi, 275 F.3d 47 (5th Cir. 2001) (Plaintiff failed to show employer's decision to demote him was pretextual, as Plaintiff "offer[ed] only his own speculation and unsupported allegations of sex discrimination.... Such speculation will not preserve his [reverse sex discrimination] claim on summary judgment.").
Further, Landreneau ignores the fact that Shelor had replaced McPherson as his supervisor in December 2016, it was Shelor who interviewed the candidates and selected the person who would fill the newly created HR Manager position, and it was Shelor who ultimately terminated Landreneau. [Doc. No. 43-3, p. 13, 14].
Merely "disputing the underlying facts of an employer's decision is not sufficient to create an issue of pretext." McDaniel., 705 Fed. Appx. at 247(citing LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2007)). "Employment discrimination laws are not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of business decisions, nor ... to transform the courts into personnel managers." McDaniel., 705 Fed. Appx. at 246 (citing Bryant v. Compass Grp., USA, Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Discrimination laws do not afford employees protection "from erroneous or even arbitrary personnel decisions, but only from decisions which are unlawfully motivated." Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir. 1988) (case arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Allen v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 2000) (case arising under the American with Disabilities Act).
Landreneau's claim therefore fails because he has failed to show that Baker Hughes' legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination were either pretext for intentional discrimination based on his gender, or, that Baker Hughes' reasons, while true, were only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another "motivating factor" was Landreneau's protected characteristic. Accordingly, Baker Hughes is entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing Landreneau's claims.
For the foregoing reasons, Baker Hughes's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 43] is GRANTED. Landreneau's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety.
