ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS, District Judge.
Before the Court in this employment discrimination suit is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant AT&T Mobility Services LLC ("AT&T") [Doc. No. 36]. Pursuant to its motion, AT&T seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Luciana Lawson's claim of race discrimination. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
Luciana Lawson ("Plaintiff") is a former employee of AT&T, who brought this suit in the 16
Plaintiff Luciana Lawson is an African-American woman who worked for AT&T as a retail sales consultant in its New Iberia, Louisiana store.
Plaintiff testified that she did not recall any instances which would cause her to conclude that either Ms. Bonnet or Mr. Reed were prejudiced against African-American individuals. She believed that her termination was motivated by race due to the fact that, prior to this incident, two white employees were accused of theft and were only given written warnings, but were not terminated.
In the spring of 2015, two white employees, Amber Mire and Laney LeBlanc, had been suspected of theft.
At the time of these incidents, Berenice Lewis was the Human Resources manager who provided advice to Mr. Sellman. According to Ms. Lewis, where there was neither video evidence nor eye witnesses of theft, human resources recommends that the matter be treated as a performance issue, which is subject to a lower level of discipline than termination.
"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Service Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010). As summarized by the Fifth Circuit:
Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted).
When reviewing evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, "the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, and should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached." Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir.2001); see also Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (court must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party). "Credibility determinations are not part of the summary judgment analysis." Quorum Health Resources, L.L.C. v. Maverick County Hosp. Dist., 308 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2002). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof." Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. McCoy at 557. The employer's burden is only one of production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment. Id. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the plaintiff must then either: (1) offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the employer's proffered reason is not true, but instead is a pretext for a discriminatory purpose (the pretext alternative), or (2) demonstrate defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (the mixed-motive alternative). Id.; Vaughn at 636; Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
In the instant case, AT&T does not dispute the first three requirements of Plaintiff's prima facie case and only challenges the fourth requirement, namely that Plaintiff was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside of the protected group. AT&T asserts that the two white employees who Plaintiff claims were treated more favorably than her were not similarly situated in that there was no video evidence which AT&T could rely upon to conclude that one or either of them had committed a theft. Accordingly, their case was judged as a "performance issue" not subject to termination. In contrast, Plaintiff's case was judged under a "business conduct" standard because video and corresponding documentary evidence showed Plaintiff opening the drawer and not putting cash into the drawer during a documented cash transaction, which supported a finding of employee theft.
"Disparate treatment occurs where an employer treats one employee more harshly than other `similarly situated' employees for `nearly identical' conduct." Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 637 (citing Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009)); see also Turner v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 892-93 (5th Cir. 2012) (In work-rule violation cases, a plaintiff can demonstrate disparate treatment by showing that employees outside of his protected class who engaged in similar acts were not punished similarly). "[C]ritically, the plaintiff's conduct that drew the adverse employment decision must have been `nearly identical' to that of the proffered comparator who allegedly drew dissimilar employment decisions," because "[i]f the difference between the plaintiff's conduct and that of those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in treatment received from the employer, the employees are not similarly situated for the purposes of an employment discrimination analysis." Lee at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turner at 893.
In the instant case, AT&T argues that the difference in the treatment between Plaintiff and the two while employees was the difference in their conduct. In Plaintiff's case, AT&T reviewed all transactions performed by Plaintiff and located a cash transaction where the video evidence shows Plaintiff opening the cash drawer but not placing any cash in the drawer. The transaction was $0.26 different than the amount missing from the register. With regard to Ms. Mire and Ms. Leblanc, the two white employees, there was no specific transaction with a customer but rather a nightly deposit where the two employees were preparing the deposit together. AT&T reviewed video surveillance of the employees preparing the deposit and could not determine based on that video whether either one or both of the employees had taken the missing money. According to the declaration of Berenice Lewis, the employee relations manager for AT&T at the time, "[u]nder circumstances such as these, when we did not have either video evidence or a witness who could confirm that theft occurred, we would treat it as a performance issue."
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 36] filed by Defendant AT&T is GRANTED.