MEMORANDUM RULING

PATRICK J. HANNA, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Before the Court is the Government's Motion Requesting Extradition Certification. (Rec. Doc. 11). Defendant, Marius Andrei Porumb, opposes the Motion (Rec. Doc. 32), and the Government has replied (Rec. Doc. 37). For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

Factual and Procedural History

Marius Porumb has been an established resident of the United States since this country granted him asylum status from his native country of Romania in 2002. Since that time, he has led a respectable life, first in the construction industry and more recently as a business owner, running a mechanic shop in Lafayette, La. He has raised two daughters here with his long-time partner. He owns property, employs people, and has no criminal history in the United States. (Rec. Doc. 18, at 27-72).

Mr. Porumb is a native Roma—or Gypsy —who, like other Romas, suffered discrimination and persecution in Romania. His history in his home country and the disturbing facts leading to his grant of asylum were well-documented in his asylum proceedings. (Rec. Doc. 32-1). Particularly relevant to these proceedings are Mr. Porumb's own predictions in 2002 about the future actions he anticipated by the Romanian government. In his 2002 Declaration in Support of Application for Asylum, Mr. Porumb detailed ongoing encounters with Romanian law enforcement wherein they routinely falsely accused him of theft and attempted to elicit bribes from him because he was a Gypsy who had managed to become successful. Mr. Porumb explained that in 2000, the police threatened to "get [him]" on multiple occasions. He was "terrified that the policemen were going to accuse [him] in a false case and detain [him]," and he "was afraid that the police would eventually stay true to their word and accuse [him] in a false case." (Rec. Doc. 32-1, at 13-14). Based on his detailed account of the discrimination and persecution he had undergone throughout his life and his fear that the Romanian government would falsely prosecute him, the United States granted him asylum on September 23, 2002. (Rec. Doc. 32-5).

On June 23, 2003, over a year and a half after Mr. Porumb had come to the United States, the Romanian Government charged him with "using false documents," "swindle," and "indirect participation to forged documents." The charges arose from Mr. Porumb's alleged unauthorized use of his then-wife's separate property (referred to herein as "Apartment 4") as collateral for a loan in 2000. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 9-10). In 2005, Mr. Porumb was tried in absentia, convicted, and, after the appeal process, sentenced to serve 1 year for using false documents, 4 years for "swindle," and 1 year for indirect participation to forged documents. The Romanian court cumulated the sentences, ordering Mr. Porumb to serve a 4 year term of imprisonment. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1-2).1

The Romanian Government did not first seek to extradite Mr. Porumb until December 2, 2011, over five years after the conviction became final. The U.S. Government received Romania's request on February 21, 2012. (Rec. Doc. 32-6). Over the next several years, Romania provided additional information in support of its extradition request, including statements of Mr. Porumb's ex-wife, Liliana Porumb, and the party who allegedly loaned Mr. Porumb money, Petru Rusu, a copy of a notarized document between Mr. Porumb and Liliana's mother regarding Liliana's purchase of the apartment, an identification report, a copy of the June 23, 2003 indictment, and copies of applicable Romanian laws. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 51-135). The Romanian Government did not provide a copy of the power of attorney or loan agreement upon which it claims Mr. Porumb forged Liliana's signature and upon which its claims chiefly rest. Neither did it provide a copy of the technical reports whereby the police purportedly matched Mr. Porumb's handwriting to the forged document, or transcripts of the various witnesses' testimony at trial.

The Government did not file the Complaint seeking a warrant for Mr. Porumb's arrest until January 25, 2018, nearly six years after receipt of Romania's initial request for extradition. (Rec. Doc. 1). The Government subsequently filed a Memorandum of Extradition Law and Request for Detention Pending Extradition Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 4) and a Motion Requesting Extradition Certification. (Rec. Doc. 11). This Court conducted a detention hearing on February 6, 2018. (Rec. Doc. 18). After testimony from several of Mr. Porumb's friends regarding his establishment in the Lafayette community, the Court ordered that Mr. Porumb be released on an unsecured bond pending certification of extradition. (Rec. Doc. 17; Report and Recommendation affirmed at Rec. Doc. 29). Mr. Porumb opposed the Government's Motion Requesting Extradition, (Rec. Doc. 32), and the Government replied (Rec. Doc. 37).

Applicable Law

When the United States has entered into a treaty for extradition with a foreign country, this Court is empowered by 18 U.S.C. § 3184 and W.D. La. Local Rule 73.4K to certify to the Secretary of State whether an individual is extraditable. In its determination, the Court must consider the evidence of a crime charged against a person in the United States by the foreign government and determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the applicable treaty. The magistrate judge's determination is limited to the questions of 1) whether the court has jurisdiction; 2) whether the offense charged is within the treaty; and 3) "whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1980), citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 S.Ct. 970 (1925).

Intrinsic in the Court's unique role in extradition proceedings is the obligation to determine whether the extradition would violate the individual's constitutional rights or established federal law. See discussion in Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 672-73 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Mironescu IV"). Thus, and because the Court is uniquely qualified to interpret and apply the law, it cannot permit an illegal extradition to proceed. As will be further explained, the Court appreciates no valid reason that it cannot make the legality determination in certification proceedings under § 3184, just as it can in subsequent habeas corpus proceedings, without having subjected the individual to detention and the costs of extended legal proceedings, all to obtain the same end which can be properly had at the beginning. The Court will first address the legality of Mr. Porumb's proposed extradition under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1), and, second, the issues of jurisdiction, criminality, and probable cause.

I. Whether Mr. Porumb's proposed extradition would violate federal law.

A. The Court's jurisdiction to determine legality.

The Government urges the Court to restrict its determination in these certification proceedings to the questions of jurisdiction, criminality under the Treaty, and the existence of probable cause. Although the Court's role is typically limited to these three inquiries, the Court is not aware of any binding precedent which precludes the Court from determining whether the extradition would violate the individual's constitutional rights or established federal law. To the contrary, the Court is obligated to enjoin an extradition when the detention is determined to be unlawful. Mironescu IV, 480 F.3d at 670, citing Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 347-51 (4th Cir. 1983).

The Government relies heavily on the Mironescu case for the proposition that the Court cannot consider Mr. Porumb's asylant status in certification proceedings; however, careful analysis of the history of Mironescu and the Fourth Circuit's opinion actually support that this Court has jurisdiction to preliminarily determine the legality of extradition, in addition to the three primary inquiries of jurisdiction, criminality, and probable cause.

Much like the instant proceedings, the procedural saga of Mironescu began when the Romanian Government requested extradition of Petru Mironescu, a Gypsy leader, to serve a sentence after he was convicted in absentia of alleged theft crimes. In re Extradition of Mironescu, 296 F.Supp.2d 632 (M.D.N.C. 2003) ("Mironescu I"). During the initial certification proceedings, Mironescu challenged his extradition on the grounds that his extradition would violate the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), as implemented in the United States by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARR). CAT and FARR prohibit the United States from extraditing "any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture ..."2 Mironescu argued that if he was returned to Romania, he would be subject to torture. The district court found that it did not have jurisdiction "to consider human rights conditions of the country requesting extradition," and certified the extradition. Id. at 635-37.

In the next chapter of Mironescu, after the district court certified the extradition, but before the Secretary of State made a determination under CAT/FARR, Mironescu filed a petition for habeas corpus, again challenging his detention pending extradition based on CAT/FARR. Mironescu v. Costner, 345 F.Supp.2d 538 (M.D.N.C. 2004). ("Mironescu II"). The court denied the petition, finding that the issue was premature, as the Secretary of State was first compelled to determine the likelihood of torture, as required by CAT/FARR, and notify Mironescu of its determination, at which point he could then seek habeas relief. Id. at 541. As further discussed below, this is the opinion on which the Government relies for the proposition that asylum status cannot be considered in extradition proceedings.

Following Mironescu II, the Secretary of State determined that CAT did not bar Mironescu's extradition, and Mironescu filed a second habeas corpus petition. The district court remanded the case for preparation of an administrative record, finding that Mironescu's remedy was limited to an administrative review of whether the Secretary's determination was arbitrary and capricious. Mironescu v. Rice, 2006 WL 167981 (M.D.N.C. 2006) ("Mironescu III").

The Fourth Circuit overturned Mironescu III, holding that the court was obligated to determine whether extradition would violate Mironescu's constitutional rights or violate federal law. The Government argued, as it does here, that the rule of non-inquiry prevents the courts "from examining the penal systems of requesting nations, leaving to the Secretary of State determinations of whether the defendant is likely to be treated humanely." Mironescu IV, at 668, citing Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit rejected the Government's non-inquiry argument—the same argument the Government asserts here—reasoning:

In addition to rejecting the Government's non-inquiry arguments, the Fourth Circuit also rejected the Government's argument that delays caused by habeas review could trigger concerns regarding international comity.

The court nevertheless went on to hold that Mironescu was not entitled to habeas review based specifically on Section 2242(d) of the FARR, which precluded judicial review for CAT claims until raised after issuance of a final removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The latter part of the opinion, grounded in procedure, is inapplicable to this case, because the basis for illegality of Mr. Porumb's extradition is not CAT/FARR, but, rather, § 1158(c), which does not contain any such provision limiting judicial review. The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. Mironescu v. Costner, 552 U.S. 1135, 128 S.Ct. 976, 169 L.Ed.2d 799 (2008). In short, the Fourth Circuit in Mironescu IV affirmatively held that, despite the rule of non-inquiry, the judiciary has jurisdiction to consider the legality of an extradition, in addition to the typical inquiries of jurisdiction, criminality under the Treaty, and probable cause. This Court agrees.

The Court does not purport to delve into the propriety or constitutionality of Romania's laws and procedures. Rather, the Court finds that it is permitted to determine whether the extradition would violate the laws of the United States. Interpretation and application of United States laws are tasks constitutionally delegated to the judiciary. Patchak v. Zinke, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 897, 904, 200 L.Ed.2d 92 (2018), citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 S.Ct. 1078 (1923).

Neither does the Court attempt to second-guess decisions of the Executive Branch, as the Government argues, relying on Munaf v. Geren, which is factually and legally distinguishable. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008). Munaf and Omar were American citizens who voluntarily travelled to Iraq and committed crimes there. After they were detained by a multi-national task force, they sought, not mere release, but "shelter" from the Iraqi justice system by filing habeas petitions. Id. at 694, 128 S.Ct. 2207. In rejecting their claims, the Court relied largely on the particular facts of that case, where U.S. citizens voluntarily travelled to Iraq and committed crimes there, noting a sovereign's right to prosecute individuals for crimes committed on its soil. Id. Further driving the Munaf decision was the Court's recognition of its traditional reluctance to intrude on the Executive Branch's authority in military and national security affairs, neither of which is an issue in this case. Id. at 689, 128 S.Ct. 2207. Finally, the Court specifically distinguished the underlying concerns in that case from those of extradition cases. Id. at 704, 128 S.Ct. 2207. In holding that Mr. Porumb's extradition would violate federal law, this Court does not attempt to step into the Executive Branch's role. Determination of legality is a uniquely judicial task.

No known precedent limits the Court's review of extradition legality to post-certification proceedings, such as habeas corpus. Indeed, a contrary holding would raise serious constitutional concerns. If a defendant is detained after a court's certification determination limited only to the three primary inquiries of jurisdiction, criminality, and due process, without a preliminary determination as to whether extradition would violate federal law, the defendant could be deprived of his liberty until a later, post-certification finding that the extradition violates federal law. Accordingly, the Court finds that it must undertake a legality determination at this stage of the proceedings.

B. Whether federal law permits extradition of an asylant.

Having found jurisdiction, the Court next addresses whether Mr. Porumb's extradition would violate federal law. The analysis begins with the 1951 Refugee Convention, a United Nations multi-lateral treaty. Article 33 states in pertinent part:

The Third Circuit explained the United States' historical involvement with the 1951 Convention as follows:

The Refugee Act is found at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 sets forth the procedure for an individual to obtain asylum status. Congruent with the United States' obligation to abstain from refouler under the 1967 Protocol, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) states:

Unlike other provisions (including § 2242 of the FARR, which Mironescu analyzed, and the political offense exceptions contained in many treaties), § 1158(c)(1)(A) does not contain any exceptions, limitations, or room for discretion by the Attorney General.3 § 1158(c) is absolute in its mandate that aslyants shall not be returned to their country of nationality. Extradition is a return of an individual to his country of nationality. Hence, to extradite one who has been granted asylum back to his native country is to violate a federal statute and the 1967 Protocol and to render the extradition illegal. This Court will not certify an illegal extradition.

The Court's holding that asylum status under § 1158(c) precludes extradition is not contrary to any binding precedent. The only Mironescu opinion to discuss extradition in light of § 1158(c), Mironescu II (upon which the Government relies), was implicitly overruled by the Fourth Circuit in Mironescu IV insofar as that court found it had jurisdiction to determine whether the extradition would violate federal law. Further, the magistrate judge's commentary in Mironescu II regarding § 1158(c) is not supported by any jurisprudence and was not discussed or adopted by its own reviewing court. In Mironescu II, Mironescu argued that the Romanian Extradition Treaty did not apply to him, because he was protected by § 1158(c). In disregarding the mandatory language of the non-refouler provision, the magistrate judge did not cite any law or jurisprudence other than one law review article, The Political Offense Exception: Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public Order, for the proposition that "An individual who had been granted political asylum ... may subsequently be subject to extradition." Id. at 547, fn. 5, citing, Michelle N. Lewis, The Political-Offense Exception: Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public Order, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 585, 587 (1995). This Court disagrees with the Mironescu II magistrate judge's reasoning and reliance on the foregoing law review article, which focuses exclusively on the political offense exception incorporated into many extradition treaties, which is not applicable here, and which likewise cites no supporting law or jurisprudence.

Mr. Porumb further distinguishes Mironescu II on the grounds that the court relied upon the 1924 Treaty, which has since been replaced by the 2007 Treaty applicable to this matter. Mr. Porumb argues that the provision of the 1924 Treaty which allowed for extradition of asylum seekers was specifically deleted. (Rec. Doc. 32, at 26).4 The Government argues that the current Treaty could have included a specific provision regarding the effect of one's asylum status. (Rec. Doc. 37, at 8). The existence of § 1158(c) could explain the Treaty's silence on the issue; however, faced with two competing, yet plausible explanations, the Court makes no definitive finding on legislative intent, absent evidence or citation to supporting authority from either party.

The Government appears to concede that no precedent has held that an asylant may not be extradited under § 1158(c), and instead relies on case law holding that extradition and immigration proceedings are separate and independent procedures. (See Rec. Doc. 37 at 4-5). The Court finds that the Government's cited cases are distinguishable and/or inapplicable. See e.g. Fejfar v. United States, 724 F. App'x 621, 622 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 286, 202 L.Ed.2d 189 (2018) (With minimal discussion, the court affirmed staying of immigration proceedings pending resolution of extradition proceedings.); Sandhu v. Reno, No. CIV. A. 96-1620(EGS), 1996 WL 451053, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1996) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to allow the detainee an opportunity to apply for asylum once extradition had been certified and extradition proceedings begun.); In re Extradition of Sarellano, 142 F.Supp.3d 1182, 1190 (W.D. Okla. 2015) (finding that the defendant did not have a right to commence asylum proceedings prior to extradition); Masopust v. Fitzgerald, No. 2:09-CV-1495-ARH, 2010 WL 324378, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2010) (deferring removal proceedings pending resolution of extradition proceedings). Each of these cases considered the effect of contemporaneously pending asylum and extradition proceedings, a situation which is not present here. The distinction is significant, because § 1158(c) operates as an absolute bar to extradition of an individual who has already been granted asylum. Pending asylum claims do not implicate § 1158(c).

Another common thread among the Government's cited cases is reliance upon the First Circuit's discussion in Castaneda-Castillo v. Holder, an opinion the Government also cites for the proposition that immigration and extradition proceedings should not coexist. Castaneda-Castillo v. Holder, 638 F.3d 354 (1st Cir. 2011). This First Circuit case is not binding on this Court. Regardless, the unique factual circumstances of that case do not warrant extending its discussion to cases such as this. In Castaneda-Castillo, the First Circuit held that the defendant's pending asylum claims were to be adjudicated prior to resolution of extradition proceedings. Castaneda-Castillo's asylum claims (based on his unwitting participation in a massacre in Peru resulting in threats of revenge from the group massacred) had been pending for eighteen years and affected his wife and daughter as beneficiaries. Id. at 362. Contrarily, extradition proceedings had only recently commenced, and the Government did not issue the formal complaint until a year and a half after Peru's request. Id. at 359. In reasoning that "specific and compelling interests" weighed in favor of giving deference to the defendant's asylum proceedings, the court set forth the "separate and distinct," rationale upon which the Government and its cited cases rely. Id. at 360.5 Neither the application nor the effect of § 1158(c) was raised or discussed. Indeed, that provision was inapplicable, given the status of Castaneda-Castillo's asylum proceedings as pending. Thus, the First Circuit's holding should not be extended to a case such as this, where the Court must consider the effect of a previous grant of asylum on a request for extradition in light of § 1158(c).

The Castaneda-Castillo opinion is thought-provoking insofar as it gave deference to asylum proceedings, based upon "specific and compelling interests." It is not a far leap to find that this Court's holding merely gives deference to already concluded asylum proceedings, especially when considering the "specific and compelling interests" involved. In his 2002 Declaration in Support of Application for Asylum, Mr. Porumb detailed ongoing encounters with Romanian law enforcement wherein they routinely falsely accused him of theft and attempted to elicit bribes from him. Mr. Porumb explained that in 2000, the police threatened to "get [him]" on multiple occasions. He was "terrified that the policemen were going to accuse [him] in a false case and detain [him]," and he "was afraid that the police would eventually stay true to their word and accuse [him] in a false case." (Rec. Doc. 32-1, at 13-14). Romania's conviction arises from charges which arose in 2000, the same time period in which Mr. Porumb predicted false prosecution. Probable cause for the conviction is further discussed below, but the Court emphasizes that the U.S. Government granted Mr. Porumb asylum status based on facts bearing uncanny resemblance to the facts underlying Romania's request for extradition. As such, the Court finds that specific and compelling interests support giving deference to the Government's previous grant of asylum over the currently pending extradition proceedings.

While extradition and immigration proceedings may, in the typical sense, be separate and independent procedures governed by different provisions of federal law, § 1158(c) creates an exception and requires the Court to consider the effect of previously granted asylum status on any subsequent proceedings regarding removal or return of the asylant to his country of nationality, including extradition. The Court cannot ignore one provision of the law merely because it falls under a different title. To do so would be to engage in non-inquiry of our own federal laws—a preposterous notion. In granting Mr. Porumb asylum status, the Government has already decided that Mr. Porumb is non-extraditable. Pursuant to § 1158(c), this Court, like the Government here, is bound by that decision. Thus, the Court finds that the proposed extradition would violate federal law and declines to certify the extradition.

II. Criminality under the Treaty and Probable Cause

Although the Court finds that Mr. Porumb's extradition would violate federal law, the Court next addresses the three traditional certification inquiries of jurisdiction, criminality under the Treaty, and probable cause. Mr. Porumb does not challenge that this Court has jurisdiction or that the U.S. — Romania Treaty was in full force and effect. (Rec. Doc. 18, at 15-16).

A. Criminality under the Treaty.

This prong of the certification analysis requires the Court to determine whether the offense charged is an extraditable offense under the Treaty. Article 2(1) defines an offense as extraditable if the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty. (Rec. Doc. 1-3, at 27). Mr. Porumb does not challenge that the charged offenses qualify as extraditable offenses under the Treaty. Rather, Mr. Porumb argues that the charged offenses are not extraditable because they are time-barred under Article 6 of the Treaty, which states:

Whether extradition may be denied on these grounds depends upon a determination of whether prosecution or execution of the penalty would be time-barred under Romanian law. The Government urges the Court to forgo analysis of whether Romania's extradition request is time-barred, because that inquiry is for the Secretary of State. Absent binding precedent, the Court reviewed how other Circuits have resolved this issue and agrees with the Ninth Circuit's explanation of the interpretation of extradition treaty exceptions:

In Patterson v. Wagner, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Vo in its consideration of a lapse of time exception in the U.S. — South Korea Treaty with identical language as in the U.S. — Romania Treaty. Patterson v. Wagner, 785 F.3d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 2015). The court held that the exception was discretionary, and thus a determination of whether the extradition was time-barred under the treaty was for the Secretary of State, rather than the court. Id. at 1283.

This Court is mindful of the prolonged and unexplained lapse of time between Mr. Porumb's Romanian conviction in October 2005 (five years after the alleged offense) (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1-2; 9-10), Romania's formal request for extradition which the U.S. Government did not receive until February 2012 (over six years after the conviction) (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 32-6), and the Government's complaint to certify the extradition, which was not until January 2018 (over seven years after Romania's initial request, thirteen years after the final conviction, and eighteen years after the alleged offense) (Rec. Doc. 1).6 The Court is appreciative of Mr. Porumb's legal expert's opinion that the extradition is time-barred under the laws of Romania. (Rec. Doc. 32-13; 32-18). The Court is perplexed by the Romanian Government's prolonging of the underlying criminal proceedings. Nearly eighteen years after the alleged crime, thirteen years after the conviction became final, and four years after the Romanian Government requested extradition, the Romanian Court dismissed the charges against Mr. Porumb on March 28, 2018, stating: "the court considers the limitation period fulfilled for the enforcement of the 4 (four) year imprisonment," and "hereby cancels the enforcement documents..." (Rec. Doc. 32-16). Yet, the Romanian Government stated in April 12, 2018 correspondence, without any supporting documentation, that it had appealed the Romanian Court's dismissal of the charges. (Rec. Doc. 34-1). The Government has provided no further information regarding the pendency of the underlying criminal case. Notwithstanding this Court's grave concerns regarding the timeliness of Romania's extradition attempt, the Court lacks the authority to assist the Secretary in making discretionary determinations under the Treaty. See Vo, 447 F.3d at 1247. Hence, although the Court finds that the criminality prong is satisfied, the Court strongly urges the Secretary to consider the circumstances and lack of competent evidence presented herein.

B. Whether the evidence warrants a finding of probable cause.

The third inquiry in the certification analysis focuses on "whether there is any competent evidence tending to show probable cause." Balzan v. United States, 702 F.3d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 2012) (Citations omitted.) "[A]uthenticated documents may serve as competent evidence." Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3190. Unauthenticated documents are not competent evidence to support extradition. In re Rojas, 859 F.Supp.2d 203, 206 (D. Mass. 2012). In making a probable cause determination, "[s]ufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

Article 8 of the U.S. — Romania Treaty mandates multiple documents be submitted in support of requests for extradition, including documents regarding the identity and location of the person sought, information describing the facts of the offense and procedural history, and relevant text of applicable laws, inter alia. (Rec. Doc. 1-3, at 30). In addition, in the case of a person who has been convicted in absentia, the requesting party must also include a copy of the warrant, charging document, and "such information as would provide a reasonable basis to believe that the person sought committed the offense for which extradition is sought." (Rec. Doc. 1-3, at 30-31 — Article 8, Section 4(d), referencing Section 3). Article 11 requires that all supporting documents be translated into the language of the requested state (the United States in this case). (Rec. Doc. 1-3, at 31).

The Court has reviewed the evidence presented by the Romanian Government in support of its request for extradition, which, in addition to copies of translated laws, consists of the following:

The Romanian Government did not provide a copy of the power of attorney, the allegedly forged document which initiated the charges and which is at the heart of Romania's request. This missing evidence is critical, because the Court is unable to ascertain from the documents presented the date on which the alleged forgery occurred and whether it is probable that an actual forgery occurred. Neither did the Romanian Government provide copies of the loan agreement (the second most important document after the power of attorney), the Brasov police's two technical and scientific findings reports purporting to show forgery, transcripts or synopses from the witness testimony at trial, or any of the several other documents identified in the Indictment. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 125-130).

The most the Court can glean from the evidence presented is that on some unknown date in the spring of 2000, Mr. Porumb obtained a translation of a German document whereby Liliana had agreed to secure a loan with the apartment, and that on May 5, 2000 Mr. Porumb "legalized the submitted document." The documents presented, which do not include the quintessential documents, ask the Court to assume that the alleged forgery occurred at the same time as the translation in spring of 2000, when there is no evidence before the Court supporting this fact. (Rec. Doc. 1-3, at 125). Alternatively, it could be that the Romanian forgery charges arose out of the May 5, 2000 document, but it is unclear, and, nevertheless, the Court cannot ascertain any foul play from the documents presented, which merely state that Mr. Porumb "legalized" the document. Absent the actual documents and the technical and scientific reports which the Romanian Government claims link Mr. Porumb to the forgery, it is unclear to the Court that Mr. Porumb's alleged translation of the German document amounts to forgery. The Court questions why the Romanian Government failed to provide the chief documents upon which the conviction was based; yet, it provided a notarized document between Mr. Porumb and Liliana's mother regarding Apartment 4.

Considering the unique facts of this case, and particularly that Mr. Porumb predicted that in 2000 certain members of the Romanian Government would attempt to fabricate evidence and bring false charges against him, and that the Romanian charges arose in 2000, the Court is warranted in requiring more to show probable cause than the Romanian's Government's presentation of two statements and summaries of its own legal proceedings. The Romanian Government could have provided the allegedly forged power of attorney and loan document. It could also have provided the alleged handwriting reports, but it instead provided only the report regarding Mr. Rusu's alleged identification of Mr. Porumb, including rather odd photographs of Mr. Rusu pointing to Mr. Porumb's photo (also subject to suspicion considering Mr. Porumb's asylum affirmations regarding the Brasov police). It could have provided transcripts of the witnesses who testified at trial or who were noted to assist, but instead the Government provided only the summaries of its own legal proceedings, two statements, an insignificant identification report, and a relatively irrelevant declaration regarding the presumed separate nature of the apartment.8 This is insufficient to allow the Court to make an independent determination of probable cause. See In re Ribaudo, 2004 WL 213021, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004) (Court unable to make an independent determination of probable cause where the Italian Government presented only a summary of its legal proceedings, the arrest warrant, and relevant laws, without providing the actual evidence referred to in the court summaries.) Contrast Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 1962) (Probable cause was founded upon "voluminous" documents, detailed in the opinion, indicating financial crimes.); Matter of Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1986) (Actual letters showing financial transgressions in the record supported a finding of probable cause.).

Because of the lack of key evidence needed for the probable cause analysis, and in light of the timing of Romania's charges, the Court concludes that the Romanian Government has not established probable cause and declines to certify the extradition on these additional grounds.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed herein, the Government's Motion to Certify (Rec. Doc. 11) is denied. The Court finds that the proposed extradition would violate 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1). The Court further finds that the Romanian Government has failed to provide sufficient information under the Treaty to provide a reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Porumb committed the offenses charged.

THUS DONE in Chambers, Lafayette, Louisiana on this 25th day of September, 2019.