JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by pro se Petitioner Mamadou Jobe ("Jobe") (A#088057445), and a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Government. (Docs. 1, 16). At the time of filing, Jobe was an immigration detainee in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("DHS/ICE"), detained at the LaSalle Detention Center in Jena, Louisiana. Jobe was subsequently transferred to the Etowah County Jail in Gadsden, Alabama. Jobe challenges his continued detention pending removal under
Because Jobe has been released from detention, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) should be GRANTED.
Jobe is a native and citizen of Senegal who entered the United States on an unknown date and time. (Doc. 9, p. 1). Jobe was ordered removed on November 10, 2011. (Doc. 9-2, p. 1). According to the Government, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Jobe's appeal on March 20, 2014. (Doc. 9, p. 1). He was placed on supervision and released. (Doc. 1-2, p. 2). Jobe was arrested by ICE on December 14, 2017, and has remained in custody since that date. (Doc. 1-2, p. 2). A request for a travel document was submitted to the Consulate General of the Republic of Senegal on January 19, 2018. (Doc. 9, p. 1; Doc. 9-1, p. 1).
On March 5, 2018, ICE issued a "Decision to Continue Detention," claiming that Jobe's removal was "expected in the reasonably foreseeable future." (Doc. 9-3, p. 1). On June 28, 2018, ICE issued another "Decision to Continue Detention," indicating that it was "currently working with the Government of Senegal to secure a travel document." (Doc. 9-4, p. 1). Because a travel document was "expected," Jobe was ordered to remain in custody. (Doc. 9-4, p. 1). ICE provided the same reasons to continue detention in decisions dated October 9, 2018 and January 11, 2019. (Docs. 9-5, 9-6). Only the March 5, 2018 decision indicates that Jobe's removal was expected in the "reasonably foreseeable future." (Doc. 9-3, p. 1). Over 16 months have passed since that decision was issued.
According to the Government's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16), Jobe has been released pending his removal under an order of supervision.
The Government argues that the § 2241 Petition is moot because Jobe has been released on supervision, which is all of the relief that he requested. (Doc. 16).
"Article III of the Constitution limits federal `Judicial Power,' that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to `Cases' and `Controversies.'"
Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has not specifically considered whether a
Jobe requested a release from custody, and the Government has presented evidence showing that Jobe has been released under an order of supervision. (Doc. 16-2). Thus, the § 2241 Petition is moot. If a controversy is moot, the forum court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Because Jobe has obtained the relief sought in his Petition, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) be GRANTED and Jobe's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, WITH PREJUDICE as to the jurisdictional issue and WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the merits of Jobe's claim.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this Report and Recommendation have 14 calendar days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within 14 days after being served with a copy thereof. No other briefs (such as supplemental objections, reply briefs, etc.) may be filed. Providing a courtesy copy of the objection to the undersigned is neither required nor encouraged. Timely objections will be considered by the District Judge before a final ruling.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this Report and Recommendation within 14 days from the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge, except upon grounds of plain error.