Not Designated for Publication

WHIPPLE, J.

This matter is before us on appeal by plaintiffs, the legal guardian of a patient, the mother of a student, and an employee of New Orleans Adolescent Hospital ("NOAH"), who collectively filed suit for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment regarding the closure of NOAH, a public, inpatient mental health facility that was located in New Orleans. In this appeal, plaintiffs challenge the trial court's September 11, 2009 judgment, which maintained the defendants' declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief.

However, also before us are two writ applications filed by the defendants, challenging the trial court's December 4, 2009 judgment, which denied the defendants' exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action filed in response to plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment. For judicial efficiency and completeness, by orders dated March 26, 2010, this court referred the defendants' writ applications to the panel handling the instant appeal. Doe v. Jindal, 2010 CW 0003 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/26/10); Doe v. Jindal, 2010 CW 0030 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/26/10).

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's September 11, 2009 judgment, maintaining defendants' exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to the claims for injunctive relief, and we grant defendants' writ applications and reverse in part the trial court's December 4, 2009 ruling, which had denied their exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action as to plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 10, 2009, plaintiffs, identified as Mary Doe, John Doe, and Janice Doe, filed a petition for injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin the closure of NOAH.1 Named as defendants were: Bobby Jindal, in his capacity as Governor of Louisiana; Alan Levine, in his capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals ("DHH"); Jennifer Kopke, in her capacity as Assistant Secretary of the Office of Mental Health ("OMH"); Richard Kramer, in his capacity as Executive Officer of NOAH; and the State of Louisiana (in some instances referred to collectively herein as "the state defendants"). In their petition, plaintiffs contended that NOAH was the only public hospital in New Orleans that provided inpatient mental health services post Katrina and that the closing of NOAH: (1) placed thousands of family members and other innocent citizens at risk of grave physical harm and even death; (2) violated the "Enumerated Rights" of the mentally ill under LSA-R.S. 28:171, et seq. and the due process and equal protection safeguards of La. Const, art. I, §§ 1, 2, 3, 22, and 24; (3) denied students in need of mental health services presently enrolled in NOAH's state-supported school district a public education as guaranteed by La. Const, art. VIII; and (4) deprived permanent state employees employed at NOAH of a vested property right and denied them equal employment opportunities, substantive due process, and equal protection.

Plaintiffs further contended that despite the clearly expressed will of the Louisiana Legislature to fund NOAH for the 2009-2010 budget year, Governor Jindal vetoed the 2009-2010 funding of NOAH and "the executive branch chose to send the funds appropriated to [NOAH] to another state facility across Lake Pontchartrain to Mandeville, Louisiana." Thus, plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the closure of NOAH.

In response, the state defendants fded a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601, which provides that no court shall have subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief against any state department or agency involving the expenditure of public funds when the director of that department or agency certifies that the expenditure of such funds would have the effect of creating a deficit in the funds of that state department or agency.2 In support of the exception, the state defendants filed the affidavit of DHH Secretary Levine, who specifically attested: (1) that the executive budget for fiscal year 2009-2010 called for the consolidation of NOAH and Southeast Louisiana Hospital; (2) that Act 10 of the 2009 Regular Legislative Session as signed by Governor Jindal contained no appropriations or funding for the inpatient operation of NOAH; and (3) that any injunctive relief effectively forcing DHH to expend public funds to maintain bed capacity and services at NOAH would create a deficit in the appropriated funds of DHH.

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a First Amending and Supplemental Petition, seeking both a mandatory injunction and a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs averred that subsequent to the filing of their original petition for injunctive relief to prevent the closing of NOAH, the state defendants began laying off NOAH employees, refusing to admit new patients to NOAH, and transferring patients and employees to Southeast Louisiana Hospital in Mandeville. Thus, plaintiffs set forth that they were amending their request for a preliminary injunction (to enjoin the closure of NOAH) to now request the issuance of a mandatory injunction compelling the state defendants to reopen NOAH at the same patient and staffing level that existed as of July 10,2009, the date their original petition for injunctive relief was filed.

In the amended petition, plaintiffs further sought to challenge the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 13:4062 and LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601, which they contend improperly deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction "to issue an injunction to protect the state-mandated rights for mentally ill patients" based on "the unilateral assertion or `certification'" from the governor or the secretary of DHH that keeping NOAH open would create a deficit. Plaintiffs averred that unless specific sections of these laws were declared unconstitutional, plaintiffs would be denied their "day in court" to challenge state action that threatens lives, property, and public safety.

Plaintiffs further requested in their amended petition that the court "declare the legal rights of persons/citizens suffering from mental illness or substance abuse under [LSA-]R.S. 28:171 to have access to certain statemandated rights in the community near their family, home, place of employment or special school district for students suffering with a mental illness" and that the court declare that "closing [NOAH] and transferring patients forty (40) miles across Lake Pontchatrain [sic] away from their home, family, work, or school violate the ... state-mandated legal rights of citizens/patients suffering from mental illness under [LSA-]R.S. 28:171 et seq." (Emphasis added).

One week after the filing of the first amending and supplemental petition, a hearing was conducted on the state defendants' exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Following the hearing, the trial court signed a judgment dated September 11, 2009, maintaining the exception and dismissing, with prejudice, the claims for injunctive relief asserted by plaintiffs in both the original and first amending and supplemental petition.

Thereafter, on September 15, 2009, the State of Louisiana and Governor Jindal filed exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action and also renewed previously filed exceptions of vagueness and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with regard to plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment set forth in their first supplementing and amended petition. DHH Secretary Levine, Assistant OMH Secretary Kopke, and Kramer also filed exceptions of no cause of action, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and vagueness or ambiguity with regard to plaintiffs' first amending and supplemental petition.

Following a hearing on the state defendants' exceptions to plaintiffs' first amending and supplemental petition, the trial court signed a judgment dated December 4, 2009, denying the exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action filed by Governor Jindal and the State of Louisiana and by DHH Secretary Levine, Assistant OMH Secretary Kopke, and Kramer. However, the state defendants' exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction were maintained as to any employment claims by plaintiffs, which the court determined were governed by civil service laws. The trial court also maintained the defendants' exceptions of vagueness and allowed plaintiffs twenty-two days from the hearing date to amend the petition.3

From the September 11, 2009 judgment maintaining the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief in both the original and first amending and supplemental petitions, plaintiffs appeal,4 contending that the trial court erred in:

In writ application number 2010 CW 0003, DHH Secretary Levine, Assistant OMH Secretary Kopke, and Kramer challenge the December 4, 2009 judgment denying their exception of no cause of action. Governor Jindal and the State of Louisiana also challenge in writ application number 2010 CW 0030 the trial court's December 4, 2009 ruling denying their exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action.

PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL OF SEPTEMBER 11,2009 JUDGMENT

Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 2

In their first and second assignments of error, plaintiffs argue that because the request for injunctive relief was based on a state-mandated legal right, the trial court should have looked beyond the restrictive jurisdictional mandate of a legislative enactment, specifically LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601, and should have exercised subject matter jurisdiction based on the judicial power vested in district courts pursuant to article V, sections 1, 2, and 16 of the Louisiana Constitution in pursuit of "an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice" to which plaintiffs are entitled pursuant to article I, section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution.

Generally, an injunction shall be issued in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601(A). However, LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601(A) further provides that:5

As set forth above, in support of their exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction with regard to plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, the state defendants submitted the affidavit of DHH Secretary Levine, who attested that the executive budget for fiscal year 2009-2010 called for the consolidation of NOAH and Southeast Louisiana Hospital; that Act 10 of the 2009 Regular Legislative Session as signed by Governor Jindal contained no appropriations or funding for the inpatient operation of NOAH; and that any injunctive relief effectively forcing DHH to expend public funds to maintain bed capacity and services at NOAH would create a deficit in the appropriated funds of DHH. Thus, finding that the provisions of LSC.C.P. art. 3601 clearly applied herein, the trial court maintained the exception, recognizing its own lack of subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.

As this court has previously ruled, the expenditure of state funds is a matter reserved to the legislative branch, and an exception pleading the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is properly maintained by the trial court when the agency's director has certified that the expenditure of the funds would create a deficit in the funds of that agency. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries. Inc. v. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, 2000-0852 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/22/01), 808 So.2d 681, 684. Thus, once DHH Secretary Levine certified to the trial court that the expenditure of funds to keep NOAH open would create a deficit in the funds of that agency, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief to prevent the closing of NOAH.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court nonetheless should have exercised the judicial power vested in district courts pursuant to article V, sections 1, 2, and 16 of the Louisiana Constitution in order to protect plaintiffs' rights to "an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice" guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution. Thus, through these arguments, plaintiffs are essentially challenging the constitutionality of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601's limitation on the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.

Considering the plaintiffs' arguments in this light and for the reasons expressed below in our disposition of the defendants' writ applications, we find no merit to these claims.

Assignments of Error Nos. 3 and 4

In their third assignment of error, plaintiffs contend that the trial court further erred in giving full legal weight to the affidavit of DHH Secretary Levine, who attested that keeping NOAH open would create a deficit in the DHH budget, while assigning no legal weight to an allegedly countervailing affidavit of a state legislator, who attested that funds had been appropriated for fiscal year 2008-2009 to prevent a deficit at NOAH. In their fourth assignment of error, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Governor Jindal vetoed funding for NOAH when the record establishes that $14.2 million appropriated for NOAH remained in the budget to be used by Southeast Louisiana Hospital in Mandeville.6

Through these assignments of error, plaintiffs attempt to challenge the veracity of DHH Secretary Levine's affidavit. However, as this court has previously held with regard to the application of the provisions of LSC.C.P. art. 3601, a litigant does not have the authority to traverse the affidavit of the head of a state department or agency. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 808 So. 2d at 685.

Accordingly, these assignments of error lack merit.

Assignment of Error No. 5

Plaintiffs contend in their fifth assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying their request to cancel the hearing scheduled on the preliminary injunction and in refusing to convert the hearing into an ordinary proceeding for mandatory injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601. Essentially, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in maintaining the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction without delaying the matter to consider the constitutional issues subsequently asserted in plaintiffs' first amending and supplemental petition, jLe, whether LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 unconstitutionally limits the district court's subject matter jurisdiction to grant the type of injunctive relief sought herein.

As outlined above, in their original petition for injunctive relief, filed on July 10, 2009, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the state defendants from closing NOAH. In response to that petition, the state defendants filed various exceptions to the original petition on July 23, 2009, including an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601. Following transfer of this suit from Orleans Parish Civil District Court to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish, the trial court, by order dated August 14, 2009, scheduled a hearing for August 26, 2009, on the state defendants' exceptions, including the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.

Only after the trial court signed the August 14, 2009 order, setting the August 26, 2009 hearing date on the state defendants' exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction did plaintiffs file their first amending and supplemental petition requesting a mandatory injunction to compel the state defendants to reopen NOAH and for declaratory judgment, and seek an order cancelling the hearing previously scheduled for August 26, 2009. However, the trial court refused to grant plaintiffs' request to cancel the August 26, 2009 hearing.

Pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 929, when the declinatory exception is pleaded before an answer is filed, the exception shall be tried and decided in advance of the trial of the case. Moreover, trial courts are vested with great discretion in determining the order in which they will handle matters on their dockets. Appellate courts interfere in trial court matters, such as control of a docket, case management, and determination of whether a continuance should be granted, only with reluctance and in extreme cases. Thinkstream, Inc. v. Rubin, 2006-1595 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/07), 971 So.2d 1092, 1102, writ denied, 2007-2113 (La. 1/7/08), 973 So.2d 730. Considering the particular facts and procedural history of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its great discretion in going forward with the scheduled hearing.

This assignment of error also lacks merit.

WRIT APPLICATION NUMBER 2010 CW 0003

In this writ application, DHH Secretary Levine, Assistant OMH Secretary Kopke, and NOAH executive officer Kramer challenge the December 4, 2009 judgment, which denied their exception of no cause of action filed in response to plaintiffs' first amending and supplemental petition for declaratory judgment. They contend that the trial court erred in denying their exception of no cause of action based solely on its finding that plaintiffs' allegation of the unconstitutionality of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 was sufficient to state a cause of action, where their exception of no cause of action was based entirely on arguments unrelated to the constitutionality of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601. They assert that their exception of no cause of action should have been maintained because: plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action where the allegations of their amending petition consisted entirely of factual conclusions which were devoid of facts to support those conclusions; and plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action where their amending petition claimed that defendants violated a right for which no remedy in law exists.

WRIT APPLICATION NUMBER 2010 CW 0030

In writ application number 2010 CW 0030, Governor Jindal and the State of Louisiana also challenge the trial court's December 4, 2009 ruling denying their exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action as to plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment. They contend that: (1) the trial court disregarded binding precedent in denying the exceptions of no cause of action where no justiciable controversy exists and the law provides no remedy for the challenged actions; (2) the trial court disregarded binding precedent in denying the exception of no right of action where plaintiffs lack standing to assert a private right of action; and (3) the trial court erred in recognizing declaratory judgment actions as automatically available to anyone regardless of limitations on the court's exercise of judicial powers and in ruling that "any citizen in the state can challenge the constitutionality of a statute, the constitutionality of actions and so forth."

The exception of no cause of action questions whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition. The purpose of the exception is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. Richardson v. Home Depot USA. 2000-0393 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/28/01), 808 So.2d 544, 546. The exception is triable on the face of the petition, and all well-pleaded allegations of fact must be accepted as true. A court should maintain the exception only if the law affords no remedy under any evidence that is admissible under the pleadings. Knight v. Magee, 2001-2041 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/02), 835 So.2d 636, 638.

The exception raises a question of law, and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Any doubts are resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the petition. The question, therefore, is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Knight, 835 So. 2d at 638.

On review, we find the plaintiffs' petitions fail to state a cause of action for the declaratory relief sought.

In their petitions, the plaintiffs seek the following declaratory judgment relief: (1) a declaration of the legal rights of persons/citizens suffering from mental illness or substance abuse pursuant to LSA-R.S. 28:171 "to have access to certain state-mandated rights in the community where near their family, home, place of employment or special school district for students suffering with a mental illness"; (2) a declaration that the closing of NOAH and the transferring of patients forty miles away to another facility violate the state-mandated legal rights of citizens/patients suffering from mental illness, as set forth in LSA-R.S. 28:171, which rights the plaintiffs claim are guaranteed by law, the Louisiana Constitution, and the United States Constitution; (3) a declaration that LSA-R.S. 13:4062 and LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 violate the provisions of LSA-Const. art. I, section 22, guaranteeing that all courts shall be open and that every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law; and (4) a declaration that LSA-R.S. 13:4062 and LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 violate the provisions of LSA-Const. art. V, sections 1, 2, and 16, with regard to the jurisdiction and power of the courts. (R. 232-233, 227, 347-349).

Turning to the plaintiffs' first claim for declaratory judgment relief, LSA-R.S. 28:171 prohibits the deprivation of any rights guaranteed by law or by the United States and Louisiana constitutions of a patient in a mental health or substance abuse treatment facility "solely because of his status as a patient" in such a facility, but, notably, does not grant any new or independent rights to those patients as suggested by the plaintiffs. Specifically, LSA-R.S. 28:171 provides, in pertinent part:

Thus, as the state defendants correctly note, this statute clearly does not grant an individual the right to be treated or educated at any particular state facility or, more specifically, at NOAH. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for declaratory judgment declaring the existence of such a right.

The state defendants next contend that the plaintiffs cannot show that they are entitled to a judicial declaration that the closing of NOAH and the transferring of patients forty miles away to another facility violate the statemandated legal rights of citizens/patients suffering from mental illness, as set forth in LSA-R.S. 28:171, as claimed by the plaintiffs to be guaranteed by law, the Louisiana Constitution, and the United States Constitution. We agree. In doing so, we note that the declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs seek in this claim is likewise premised on their alleged right to receive treatment in a facility (and to receive education in combination therewith) in a particular community or facility, le., near their family, home, place of employment or special school district for students suffering with a mental illness. Because we agree with the state defendants that the plaintiffs cannot show that such a right exists, in this case where another facility is forty miles away, the plaintiffs likewise fail to state a cause of action for a declaration that any constitutionally protected right has been violated on this basis by the closing of NOAH.

Turning to the plaintiffs' claims that they are entitled to a declaration that LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 and LSA-R.S. 13:4062 deprive them of open access to the courts and due process in contravention of LSA-Const. art., I, section 22, and violate the provisions of LSA-Const. art. V, sections 1, 2, and 16, which vest and grant jurisdiction and power in the courts, we likewise find that the plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action. Instead, we conclude that even if the rights the plaintiffs seek to assert were determined to exist, LSA-R.S. 13:4062 and LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 do not conflict with LSA-Const. art. I, section 22, regarding access to the courts and do not unconstitutionally restrict or infringe upon the power and jurisdiction of the courts, as set forth in article V of the Louisiana Constitution. Rather, as the state defendants correctly assert, these provisions are a reflection of and exist to preserve the constitutional principle of separation of powers as mandated by LSA-Const. art. II, section 2.

As noted by this court in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 808 So. 2d at 684, the expenditure of state funds is a matter reserved to the legislative branch (subject to the veto power of the Governor). LSA-Const. art. Ill, §§ 16 & 18; LSA-Const. art. IV, § 5(G). Moreover, LSA-R.S. 13:4062 and LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 exist for a specific and valid purpose: to further the powers granted to the legislative branch regarding control over the expenditure of state funds by prohibiting courts from unduly interfering with the operations of this branch of government by granting injunctions that would force state agencies or departments to expend state funds in excess of those appropriated to the agency or department by the legislature and to thereby place the public fisc at risk. See Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 808 So. 2d at 684. To hold otherwise would result in LSA-Const. art. I, section 22 being interpreted to grant the plaintiffs herein access to the courts to bring what is, at best, an improper challenge to the authority of the legislature and the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. Accordingly, the plaintiffs likewise cannot state a cause of action on these bases. Because the plaintiffs' failure to state a cause of action for the relief requested cannot be cured by amendment of their petition, the plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

Accordingly, we find merit to the state defendants' writ applications, which we grant, and hereby reverse that portion of the trial court's December 4, 2009 ruling denying the state defendants' exception of no cause of action. In doing so, we pretermit consideration of the other alleged errors raised in the writ applications.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court's September 11, 2009 judgment, maintaining the defendants' exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to the claims for injunctive relief, is affirmed. We grant the defendants' writ application numbers 2010 CW 0003 and 2010 CW 0030 and reverse, in part, the trial court's December 4, 2009 ruling, inasmuch as it denied their exceptions of no cause of action. Accordingly, the defendants' exceptions of no cause of action as to the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment are maintained and the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment, their only remaining claims, are dismissed with prejudice. Because all of the plaintiffs' claims have been dismissed, the plaintiffs' suit is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, in its entirety. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; WRIT NUMBER 2010 CW 0003 AND WRIT NUMBER 2010 CW 0030 GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY; DECEMBER 4, 2009 JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' SUIT.