Filed: Dec. 22, 2010
Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2010
Summary: Not Designated for Publication PETTIGREW, J. In this case, plaintiff, Bridgette Gravois Ortega, filed a petition to annul a December 13, 2004 judgment that was rendered terminating the community property regime that previously existed between her and defendant, Koury J. Ortega, and substituting in lieu thereof a regime of separation of property. Bridgette alleged that this judgment was "obtained due to the fraudulent actions of [Koury] and his agents." Bridgette further argued that she was nev
Summary: Not Designated for Publication PETTIGREW, J. In this case, plaintiff, Bridgette Gravois Ortega, filed a petition to annul a December 13, 2004 judgment that was rendered terminating the community property regime that previously existed between her and defendant, Koury J. Ortega, and substituting in lieu thereof a regime of separation of property. Bridgette alleged that this judgment was "obtained due to the fraudulent actions of [Koury] and his agents." Bridgette further argued that she was neve..
More
Not Designated for Publication
PETTIGREW, J.
In this case, plaintiff, Bridgette Gravois Ortega, filed a petition to annul a December 13, 2004 judgment that was rendered terminating the community property regime that previously existed between her and defendant, Koury J. Ortega, and substituting in lieu thereof a regime of separation of property. Bridgette alleged that this judgment was "obtained due to the fraudulent actions of [Koury] and his agents." Bridgette further argued that she was never informed that she needed to speak to an attorney before signing the agreement and that she never appeared before the trial court prior to the entry of the judgment. On February 2, 2010, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Koury, dismissing Bridgette's petition to annul and finding no evidence that Bridgette was under duress in signing the agreement. The trial court further found that based on this court's holding in Boyer v. Boyer, 616 So.2d 730, 733 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied. 620 So.2d 882 (La. 1993), a hearing was not required for the granting of the separation of property.2
From this judgment, Bridgette has appealed, assigning the following specifications of error:
1. The Trial Court erred in finding [that Bridgette] was not defrauded or mislead in agreeing to and signing the Termination of Community Property Regime when her husband and father-in-law decided it should be done before starting their new business partnership.
2. The Trial Court erred in finding that the requirements of La. Civil Code Art. 2329 were adequately met when the District Judge failed to make a determination as to whether the termination was in the best interests of the parties and whether the parties understood the governing principles and rules.
With respect to the initial error assigned by Bridgette, the trial court concluded in written reasons for judgment as follows:
The petition alleges that [Bridgette] never spoke with an attorney prior to the judgment separating property, nor was she ever informed of her need to do so; she did not appear in court prior to the entering of the judgment; she did not know that upon divorce she would have no community rights; and the judgment of separation was fraudulently obtained by [Koury] and his agents.
The evidence does not support the allegations. [Koury] and [his step-father] wanted to go into business and in the process they would borrow a significant amount of money. The business had a chance of succeeding, but also of failing. A failure would have involved community assets of the parties as well as their personal responsibility for the debt. Discussions were had between the parties and with Attorney Stubbs about isolating [Bridgette] from responsibility for the loan. He recommended the separation of property, met with the parties to explain the process, and prepared the documents. He also advised [Bridgette] of her right to seek independent counsel. [Bridgette] must have understood that she owned no part of the business, just as she must have understood that she owned no part of the debt of the business. The family home was relegated to [Bridgette] to protect it from the risk of the business venture while the rental property was relegated to [Koury].
The Court finds there is no evidence of fraud or duress in the preparation or execution of the separation of property.
Based on our thorough review of the record herein, we find no manifest error in this determination. This assignment of error is without merit.
The second error assigned by Bridgette concerns the trial court's determination that no hearing was required for the granting of the separation of property. It is the opinion of this court that Boyer is controlling precedent, and thus, this assignment is similarly without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment in accordance with Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1.B. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against plaintiff/appellant, Bridgette Gravois Ortega.
AFFIRMED.
