Not Designated for Publication

HUGHES, J.

This is an appeal from a November 25, 2009 judgment allowing defendant/appellee, Ms. Adrienne Suttle,1 to relocate the minor children with whom she shares custody with plaintiff/appellant, Mr. Dane Scott Haaga, and holding Mr. Haaga in contempt of court for his failure to timely pay child support. Ms. Suttle answered the appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Haaga and Ms. Suttle were married and had two children. In May of 2003, the parties divorced and entered into a consent judgment regarding child support and custody. The consent judgment was approved and made the order of the court on August 18, 2003. Under that judgment, the parties were awarded joint custody of the children with Ms. Suttle designated as the primary domiciliary parent. Regarding child support, the judgment provides:

It is undisputed that the parties never entered into a written agreement to reduce the amount of child support owed by Mr. Haaga, but the parties both admit that they did reach a verbal agreement in early 2005 to reduce the monthly amount from $2,000.00 to $1,800.00. Thereafter, Mr. Haaga unilaterally reduced the monthly payments to $1,400.00 in March of 2006, then to $1,200.00 in August of 2008, and finally to $900.00 in September of 2008.

On May 22, 2009 Ms. Suttle sent Mr. Haaga a notice of intent to relocate the children to Texas. Mr. Haaga filed an opposition to the relocation and Ms. Suttle filed a motion seeking a court order to allow the relocation and a rule for contempt, alleging that Mr. Haaga should be held in contempt for his failure to pay the full amount of child support due and for his failure to pay timely. Thereafter, Mr. Haaga filed a motion requesting that the court specify custodial access and modify the custody arrangement.

After a hearing, the trial court rendered the November 25, 2009 judgment at issue in this appeal, wherein the court approved the mother's relocation with the children, provided that joint custody remain in effect, held Mr. Haaga in contempt of court for his failure to timely pay child support, and ordered that the arrearage issue be continued to a later date. The court also ordered that the parties meet with a hearing officer to recalculate the child support obligations of the parents.

Mr. Haaga appeals that judgment and asserts the following assignments of error:

Ms. Suttle answered this appeal and assigned error to the trial court's order that the child support obligation be re-calculated, and to the subsequent re-calculated figure ordered in a February 26, 2010 judgment.2

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. EVIDENTIARY ERRORS

In assignments of error 2, 3, and 4, Mr. Haaga challenges the trial court's rulings in excluding certain evidence and testimony. If, upon review, we find that the trial court committed an evidentiary error that interdicts the fact-finding process, we are required to then conduct a de novo review. As such, alleged evidentiary errors should be addressed first on appeal. Wright v. Bennett, 2004-1944, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/05), 924 So.2d 178, 182. This circuit has previously noted that LSA-C.E. art. 103(A) provides, in part, that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected." Wright, So.2d 924 at 183. "The proper inquiry for determining whether a party was prejudiced by a trial court's alleged erroneous ruling on the admission or denial of evidence is whether the alleged error, when compared to the entire record, had a substantial effect on the outcome of the case. If the effect on the outcome of the case is not substantial, reversal is not warranted." Wright, 924 So.2d at 183. The trial court is granted broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings and its determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Wright, 924 So.2d at 183 (citing Turner v. Ostrowe, 2001-1935 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/02), 828 So.2d 1212, 1216, writ denied, 2002-2940 (La. 2/7/03), 836 So.2d 107.)

Mr. Haaga first challenges the trial court's limitation on the testimony of Ms. Judith Lide, a vocational counselor retained by Mr. Haaga's attorney. A review of the record indicates that Mr. Haaga's attorney initially retained Ms. Nancy Favaloro, a vocational rehabilitation professional, but approximately one or two weeks prior to trial, substituted Ms. Lide for Ms. Favaloro without notifying opposing counsel and without responding to opposing counsel's discovery requests concerning the opinion held by the expert or the basis for such opinion. Nevertheless, the court did accept Ms. Lide as an expert and allowed Ms. Lide to testify, but limited her testimony to her knowledge of the general job availability in the area, noting that any testimony regarding Ms. Suttle's actual employability would have been based upon her review of Ms. Suttle's deposition alone. After review, we do not find that the limitation of the testimony of Ms. Lide was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

Mr. Haaga next challenges the trial court's exclusion of a certain portion of Mr. Michael Suttle's testimony. At the trial, Mr. Haaga's attorney wished to elicit testimony from Mr. Suttle, Ms. Suttle's fiance at that time, regarding Mr. Suttle's relationship with his children, the possibility of his relocating to New Orleans, and whether he had friends that could have offered Ms. Suttle a job in New Orleans. The trial court noted that it was not proper, under LSA-R.S. 9:355.12, to consider such material and that same was irrelevant. The court declined to admit further testimony by Mr. Suttle regarding those issues, but admitted the testimony by proffer. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Haaga's attorney was instructed to file into the record a summary of any other testimony he had expected to elicit at trial, but no summary was filed. We have reviewed the proffered material and find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

Finally, Mr. Haaga challenges the trial court's exclusion of a recorded phone conversation between Mr. Haaga and Ms. Suttle wherein Mr. Haaga asked Ms. Suttle what amount she wanted him to pay in child support that month, and Ms. Suttle responded "just do whatever you choose to do." A review of the testimony at trial reveals that both parties admitted and agreed to what was stated in the conversation. The record reflects that the conversation was recorded after Ms. Suttle sent the notice of relocation to Mr. Haaga. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Suttle filed the motion for relocation and the rule for contempt, which raised the issue that Mr. Haaga was in arrears on his child support obligation. Therefore, it appears that she did not intend her statement to be a waiver of any amount due. The court noted that at this hearing, only the issue of the relocation was to be decided and that the phone conversation regarding child support was irrelevant to the relocation issue. Regardless, because the conversation was acknowledged by the parties, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its exclusion of the actual recording.

II. RELOCATION

Under the statutes governing relocation of minor children, it is the burden of the relocating parent to prove that the proposed relocation is "made in good faith and is in the best interest of the child. In determining the child's best interest, the court shall consider the benefits which the child will derive either directly or indirectly from an enhancement in the relocating parent's general quality of life." LSA-R.S. 9:355.13.

The primary reason given by Ms. Suttle for wanting to move to Texas was that she had found a job in Texas. Ms. Suttle testified that she had made every attempt to find a job in the St. Tammany Parish and New Orleans area. She introduced evidence at the trial to show some of the efforts she had made. Mr. Haaga, after hearing her testimony, testified that it appeared that she had indeed made an effort to find employment in this area.

Additionally, Ms. Suttle testified that she wanted to move to Texas to marry her fiance, Mr. Suttle, with whom she had been in a relationship for the previous two years. Mr. Suttle lives in Texas, works in Texas, and has two children from his previous marriage that live in Texas. Ms. Suttle testified that her children and Mr. Suttle's children were close in age and had a good relationship.

The testimony of the witnesses, including Mr. Haaga, reveals that Ms. Suttle has, over the years, encouraged a good relationship with her children and her ex-husband. She has never thwarted their relationship. Based on the testimony and evidence introduced, we do not find that the court erred in determining that the request to relocate was made in good faith. Next, we consider whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the relocation was in the children's best interest.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.123 lists twelve factors a court should use to determine whether a relocation should be allowed in a contested case. The court took in more than ten hours of testimony from witnesses including both parents and step-parents. After listening to all of the testimony and reviewing all of the evidence and the law, the court gave thorough oral reasons for judgment and carefully considered each of the twelve enumerated factors listed in the statute, after which the court determined that it was in the children's best interest to remain with their mother, and to allow the mother to move to Texas where she could work and marry her fiance. In so concluding, the trial court noted that the children, while bonded to both parents, have primarily been cared for by their mother "from day one." The court noted that the children were thriving, that it did not anticipate any particular danger of negative impacts on their physical, educational, or emotional development, and that the educational opportunities of St. Tammany Parish and Katy, Texas were comparable. The court considered the travel time of five hours, the devotion of the parents, and the opportunity for the mother and the children to have an enhanced life in Texas. The court viewed Ms. Suttle's testimony regarding her failed endeavor to find a job in Louisiana as credible. Ms. Suttle also testified that whether or not the relocation was approved, she was in such financial hardship that she would be forced to sell her home. Ultimately, while the court sympathized with Mr. Haaga's position, it found that it was in the children's best interest to be allowed to move with their mother to Texas. After a thorough review of the testimony and evidence in this case, we cannot say that the court erred in that determination.

III. CONTEMPT

It has been settled in our jurisprudence that "[tlhe authority to punish for contempt of court falls within the inherent power of a court to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction and to enforce its lawful orders." In re Clyde D. Merritt, 391 So.2d 440, 442 (La. 1980); Rogers v. Dickens, 2006-0898, p.8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/9/07), 959 So.2d 940, 945. Contempt of court is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure as "any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority." LSA-C.C.P. art. 221. Acts constituting contempt of court are either classified as direct or constructive. LSA-C.C.P. art. 221. A direct contempt of court is defined by LSA-C.C.P. art. 222 as an act that is "committed in the immediate view and presence of the court and of which it has personal knowledge, or a contumacious failure to comply with a subpoena or summons, proof of service of which appears of record." Moreover, a constructive contempt of court is defined in the code as "any contempt other than a direct one." LSA-C.C.P. art. 224. The failure of a party to comply with an order of the court is a constructive contempt of court.

In matters concerning child support, neither equity nor practical inability to pay allows a parent to avoid paying his or her share of the child support obligation when the inability arises solely from that parent's own neglect and failure. State, Dept. of Social Services, Support Enforcement Services es. rel. A.M. v. Taylor, 2000-2048, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/15/02), 807 So.2d 1156, 1161; Brown v. Taylor, 31,352, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/99), 728 So.2d 1058, 1061. To find a person guilty of constructive contempt, it is necessary to find that he or she violated the order of court intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. Leger v. Leger, 2000-0505, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 808 So.2d 632, 635.

At the hearing, Mr. Haaga admitted that although he knew that the support payments were due on the first of each month, he did not pay them timely even once in the three years prior to the rule. Mr. Haaga goes so far as to testify that while he was not unable to pay the support, he did not because he did not believe that Ms. Suttle really needed the money timely, even though she phoned him numerous times to ask him for the late payments. We find no error by the trial court. The evidence sufficiently establishes a constructive contempt of court. This assignment of error lacks merit.

IV. ANSWER

Ms. Suttle answered Mr. Haaga's appeal and assigned error to the trial court's order that the child support obligation be re-calculated. Essentially, Ms. Suttle argues that in this case Mr. Haaga never formally judicially requested a reduction of child support and that it is impermissible for the court, on its own motion, to re-calculate and reduce a child support obligation. However, LSA-R.S. 9:356 states that:

While it is the usual circumstance that a specific pleading is filed requesting an increase and/or reduction in child support, and no such filing was made in this case, we note that in response to Ms. Suttle's request to relocate, Mr. Haaga did file a motion requesting a change in custody. Further, a review of the transcript of these proceedings reveals that Mr. Haaga made an oral request for a clarification of the child support obligation: "And whether 900 is right, I don't know. I want somebody to tell me. I do not want to hold any money from her. I want to, whatever my obligation to my children is, I want to pay it." The trial court then also noted that the relocation of the children warranted a change in circumstances, and ordered the parties to seek the aid of a hearing officer and then return to the court for a judicial determination of the child support obligation if an agreement could not be reached. No objection was made by Ms. Suttle to this procedure. In fact, no objection was made by Ms. Suttle until after the hearing officer had conducted her review, made her recommendation, and the trial court rendered the February 26, 2010 judgment, granting Mr. Haaga a reduction in his monthly child support obligation. We find no merit to this assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons assigned herein, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are to be borne by plaintiff/appellant, Mr. Dane Scott Haaga and the costs of the filing of the answer are to borne by defendant/appellee, Ms. Adrienne Suttle.

AFFIRMED.