NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

GUIDRY, J.

A father appeals a child custody and support decree wherein the trial court approved the mother's relocation with the child and awarded her domiciliary custody. For the following reasons, we amend the judgment, and as amended, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 2006, Meghan Dours and Todd O'Neill began dating, and as a result of that relationship, Alana Claire O'Neill was born on May 19, 2007. At the time of Alana's birth, Meghan lived in Baton Rouge with her mother, and for the first ten months of the child's life, Todd frequently traveled to Baton Rouge from Hammond to spend time with his daughter. In March or April 2008, Meghan's mother moved to Texas, so Meghan and Alana moved to Hammond to live with Todd. The couple shared a home in Hammond until February 2009, when Todd moved out, and in June 2009, Meghan moved to an apartment in a neighboring town. From February 2009 to February 2010, the couple shared physical custody of their daughter, with Todd keeping her Monday through Wednesday, and occasionally on additional days as Meghan's schedule required, with the assistance of his family.

In late February 2010, Meghan moved with Alana to a suburb of Dallas, Texas to live with her mother and stepfather. Following the move, Alana did not return to Louisiana, and it was not until Easter 2010, that Todd traveled to Texas to see his daughter. At the time of the Easter visit, Todd requested and was allowed to take physical custody of Alana and bring her back to Louisiana for a week; however, on returning to Louisiana, Todd immediately filed a petition opposing Meghan's relocation with the child and seeking a court decree as to exercise of custody by the parties. Todd's custody action was later consolidated with a dormant custody action that had previously been filed by Meghan.

A hearing on the consolidated custody pleadings began on June 16, 2010, but was not completed, so the matter was recessed for three weeks. During the recess, Todd filed a motion to recuse the trial judge, which motion was eventually denied, but resulted in the recessed hearing being delayed for several months.1 Finally, on April 1, 2011, the custody hearing was resumed, following which the trial court rendered judgment granting the parties joint custody of Alana, with Meghan being designated the domiciliary parent. The trial court further allowed Meghan's relocation to Texas with Alana and ordered Todd to pay $1,144.00 a month in child support.

It is from this judgment that Todd appeals, assigning the following rulings of the trial court as error2:

DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, Todd alleges that the trial court improperly placed the burden of proof on him on the issue of relocation by adopting as its reasons for judgment the closing arguments of Meghan's counsel. While it is true that the trial court simply adopted the arguments of Meghan's counsel, with some modifications, a review of the counsel's closing arguments reveals that Todd mischaracterizes the findings of the trial court pursuant to that action. In his closing arguments, counsel for Meghan went through each of the twelve factors listed in La. R.S. 9:355.12 and discussed the evidence presented in relation to each factor. At the conclusion of counsel's evaluation of each of the factors, he stated "[t]hey haven't refuted any of the elements that I just told you in their direct examination of their client."

Louisiana Revised Statute 9:355.13 states that "[t]he relocating parent has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and is in the best interest of the child." Nothing in our review of the closing arguments of Meghan's counsel, which were adopted as the reasons for judgment of the trial court, persuades us that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Todd. Rather, a simple reading of the closing arguments indicates a determination that Meghan met her burden of proof, and Todd was unsuccessful in showing otherwise. Accordingly, we find no merit in Todd's first assignment of error and reject the allegations contained therein.

In his second assignment of error, Todd alleges that Meghan failed to sustain the requisite burden of proof under La. R.S. 9:355.13. We disagree. While Meghan clearly failed to comply with the requisites of La. R.S. 9:355.3(B)3 when she effectively relocated to Texas with Alana without first obtaining court authorization or the written consent of Todd, that action alone was not sufficient to deem the relocation to have been made in bad faith. Instead, La. R.S. 9:355.6 states:

A determination as to whether the proposed relocation was made in good faith is subject to manifest error review on appeal. See Nelson v. Land, 01-1073, p. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/01), 818 So.2d 91, 96-97.

At trial, Meghan stated that she discussed the possibility of moving to Texas with Todd in December 2009 because (a) she was having trouble paying her rent, and he could not assist; (b) Alana was not in school, and they could not agree on one, plus better schools were offered in Texas; and (c) she was not working full time in Louisiana, but thought she could find full-time employment in Texas. Todd acknowledged that Meghan had discussed with him the possibility of moving to Texas to live with her mom prior to her doing so. He stated that he asked Meghan not to go to Dallas and "plant any roots," but he could not recall if told her not to go to Dallas when she informed him that she was trying to get a job there.

Meghan admitted that she did not apply for any jobs in her field in Louisiana, but she stated that she knew from experience that there simply were no jobs available. She explained that as the president of the American Marketing Association, a position she held while enrolled at Southeastern, she set up a job board for members and looked for positions where members could work, volunteer, or intern, but said she did not have "a whole lot of success" in finding appropriate positions to post for members. However, she testified that she was able to obtain suitable employment in her field upon moving to Texas.

As for Alana's schooling, Meghan testified that since moving to Texas, she was able to successfully enroll Alana in a Montessori-based pre-school, which she had been unable to accomplish in Louisiana. Meghan testified that she had wanted to enroll Alana in the Montessori system in Hammond, but found the Montessori schools in Hammond were too expensive and "had waiting lists and didn't take child care assistance." She said she had discussed with Todd her desire to enroll Alana in a Montessori school in Hammond, but explained "[w]e both understood that we couldn't afford it."

Based on this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that the relocation was made in good faith. Thus, we must now consider whether the relocation was in the best interest of the child.

An illustrative list of factors for the court to consider in making this determination is found in La. R.S. 3:355.12.4 This list parallels the listing of multiple factors found in La. C.C. art. 134, with special emphasis on the logistical and economic circumstances associated with a relocation, particularly an out-of-state relocation. Bonnecarrere v. Bonnecarrere, 11-0061, p. 10 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/1/11), 69 So.3d 1225, 1233.

Meghan's purpose for relocating was to explore employment opportunities and to provide a more stable and reliable lifestyle for her daughter; Todd's reason for opposing the relocation is that the move means significantly less time he will be able to spend with his daughter.

In the reasons for judgment adopted by the trial court, each of the factors listed in La. R.S. 9:355.12 were discussed, with primary consideration being given to the fact that Meghan has acted as the primary caregiver for Alana since birth. The record further reveals that at the time of trial, Alana was of the fairly young age of three years old; nevertheless, upon relocating to Texas, Meghan successfully enrolled Alana in an academically structured, Montessori pre-school. There was no evidence presented that the move adversely affected Alana physically, emotionally, or educationally. The child's attitude did not change, and she was at the head of her pre-school class in Texas.

The record indicates that prior to the relocation, the parties shared free and easy access to the child; however, following the relocation, the opposite was true, mainly due to the lack of a formal custody decree. As a result, Meghan refused to grant Todd physical custody without a written stipulation as to when the child would be returned. Todd, in turn, attempted to keep the child in Louisiana and opposed returning the child to Texas absent a court decree. The court found that pending the subject custody hearing, Meghan encouraged Todd's visitation with the child, albeit, in Texas with supervision.

By residing with her mom in Texas, Meghan is able to provide decent housing for her and Alana at no expense. Meghan testified that in her mother's house, she and Alana have their own separate bedrooms, a separate living area shared by just the two of them, and a Hollywood bathroom that connects their two bedrooms. Todd, conversely, testified that he lives in a two-bedroom trailer home with his wife and newborn son and, consequently, Alana would share a room in the home with the newborn son, while residing with Todd.

Finally, Meghan testified that since the relocation, "[everything is more stable for [Alana]. We have routines for everything, for bedtime, for after school. She knows who's going to be there in the afternoon. She knows what house she's going to ... [sleep] at. I've noticed a lot less acting out from her. She craves routines. She loves them. She gets very upset if you go out of routine."

On reviewing the record before us, we find that evidence adequately supports the trial court's determination that granting the relocation was in the best interest of Alana. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Meghan to relocate to Texas with Alana. See Curole v. Curole, 02-1891, p. 4 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 1094, 1096.

Todd next contends that the trial court erred in setting the award of child support. Due to the nature of Todd's employment, he contends that the trial court erred in strictly relying on the gross receipts reported on his income tax returns and not taking into consideration necessary expense deductions attributable to his employment as a musician. We find merit in this assignment of error.

Neither party submitted a verified income statement as required by La. R.S. 9:315.2; nevertheless, some documentary evidence was introduced at trial and the parties also testified regarding their incomes. Meghan introduced a recent pay stub and testified that it was representative of her monthly gross salary of $2,000.00 per month.5 Todd introduced copies of his tax returns for 2007, 2008, and 2009. According to the gross receipts listed on his tax returns, Todd earned $53,514.00 in 2007, $29,901.00 in 2008, and $41,961.00 in 2009. At the time of trial, Todd had not completed his tax return for 2010, so he testified regarding his income for 2010, since he started working with a new band that year. According to his testimony, in 2010, he estimated that he earned roughly $300.00 per show and that he performed on average two shows a week, which equals a yearly gross income of $31,200.00; however, Todd estimated that his gross salary was closer to $25,000.00 for the year. In closing arguments, Todd's counsel asserted that Todd had a monthly salary of roughly $2,200.00 per month; whereas counsel for Meghan asserted that an average of Todd's income for the last four years is $41,600.00.

The child support worksheets used by the parties to calculate the amount of support that would be due were not included in the record before us, but considering the evidence in the record before us, we are unable to replicate the sums accepted by the trial court from Meghan's counsel.6 Further, La. R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c) expressly defines "gross income," in part, as:

Thus, we find that the trial court erred in failing to deduct from its calculation of Todd's gross income ordinary and necessary expenses in accordance with La. R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(c). Accordingly, we will recalculate the award of child support.

For 2007, Todd's income tax return indicates that he earned $2,954.00 in "wages, salaries, tips, etc.," and had gross receipts of $53,514.00. Deducting from his gross receipts ordinary and necessary expenses in the sum of $10,331.OO,7 results in a gross income of $46,137.00 for 2007. For 2008, Todd's income tax return indicates that he earned $5,875.00 in "wages, salaries, tips, etc.," and had gross receipts of $29,901.00. Deducting from his gross receipts ordinary and necessary expenses in the sum of $4,938.00,8 results in a gross income of $30,838.00. And for 2009, Todd's income tax return only shows gross receipts of $41,961.00, from which ordinary and necessary expenses in the sum of $6,384.0099 are deducted to equal a gross income of $35,577.00. Relying on Todd's testimony regarding his earnings for 2010 as being approximately $31,200.00, we find an average of Todd's income for the four years prior to trial to be $35,938.00, equaling an average monthly income of $2,995.00.

Thus, in accordance with the worksheet found in La. R.S. 9:315.20, we calculate the child support owed by Todd as follows. The combined monthly income of Todd and Meghan is $4,995.00. According to La. R.S. 9:315.19, the "Louisiana Child Support Guideline Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations," a combined income of $4,995.00, translates to a monthly child support obligation of $825.40 for one child. Returning to the worksheet, this amount is added to the net child care costs of $750.00 per month,10 and the child's health insurance premium cost, of $155.00 per month based on the testimony of Meghan, equaling a total child support obligation of $1,730.40. As Todd's percentage share of the parties' combined gross monthly income is 60 percent, we find that Todd owes monthly child support of $1,038.24. We will amend the judgment to reflect this amount. We will also amend the judgment to set forth the precise date each month that such payments are due. See Wells v. Wells, 07-1663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/07), 972 So.2d 493 (unpublished opinion).

In Todd's final assignment of error, Todd contests that portion of the trial court's judgment decreeing him liable for child support payments retroactive to November 16, 2009, the date Meghan filed her "Rule to Set Custody and Visitation and for Provisional Custody." Todd's contests this order because he was never served with this pleading, and therefore, he contends that the ruling based on the unserved pleading is an absolute nullity.

As a preliminary matter, we observe that pursuant to a motion filed by Todd on April 21, 2010, proceedings on Meghan's rule were consolidated with proceedings initiated by a "Petition to Set Custody, Ex-Parte Custody and to Set Aside Agreement," filed by Todd on April 7, 2010. Moreover, in answer to Todd's petition, Meghan filed a reconventional demand on April 13, 2010, in which she sought, among other claims, an award of child support. While it is true that a judgment rendered against a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law is an absolute nullity, see La. C.C.P. arts. 1201(A) and 2002(A)(2), the objectionable decree in this case can be properly premised on the April 13, 2010 reconventional demand with which Todd was served. Thus, in addition to amending the amount of child support Todd is ordered to pay in the judgment, we will amend the judgment to reflect that the award is retroactive to April 13, 2010, as the date Meghan judicially demanded the award. See La. R.S. 9:315.21(B)(2).

CONCLUSION

Finding no error in the trial court's judgment allowing the mother to relocate with the minor child and making her the domiciliary parent, we affirm that portion of the judgment. Having determined that the trial court erred in its award of child support, we amend that portion of the judgment to decree that the father, Todd O'Neill, owes child support in the amount $1,038.24 per month, payable to Meghan Dours on the 15th day of each month. Moreover, the award of child support is retroactive to the date of filing of Meghan's reconventional demand on April 13, 2010. All costs of this appeal are apportioned equally to the parties.

JUDGMENT AMENDED IN PART, AND AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.