WELCH, J.
The defendant, Marlon J. Wells, was charged by bill of information filed under Twenty-second Judicial District Court Docket #409433 with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (count I), a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1); and one count of possession with intent to distribute alprazolam (count II), a violation of La. R.S. 40:969(A)(1); and he pled not guilty.
No factual basis appears in the record because the State and the defense stipulated a factual basis existed for the defendant's guilty pleas. The bill of information filed under Twenty-second Judicial District Court Docket #409433 charged counts I and II were committed on December 7, 2005. The bill of information filed under Twenty-second Judicial District Court Docket #413943 charged the offense was committed between March 3, 2006 and March 4, 2006. The bill of information filed under Twenty-second Judicial District Court Docket #500145 charged counts I and II were committed on October 6, 2007.
The counseled defense brief contains no assignments of error and sets forth that it is filed to conform with the procedures outlined in
Defense counsel reviews the procedural history of the case. She sets forth that after a review of the record, she has found no non-frivolous issues to present on appeal. Accordingly, she moves to withdraw. Her motion to withdraw sets forth she made a conscientious effort to determine whether there existed any nonfrivolous issues on appeal, but found none.
A copy of defense counsel's brief and motion to withdraw were sent to the defendant. Defense counsel also informed the defendant that he had the right to file a brief on his own behalf. The defendant filed a pro se brief with this court. In that brief he claims he was not fully informed of the legal consequences of changing his plea because he was told the plea was for 60-90 days under La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1. The transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates, after fully informing the defendant of the consequences of changing his plea and sentencing him pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court stated, "the Court will retain jurisdiction under Article 881.1 for a period of 90 days from today." The trial court was extending the time for the filing of a motion to reconsider sentence.
This court has conducted an independent review of the entire record in this matter. Other than the illegal parole restriction on the sentence for bill of information #409433, count I, which we discuss below, we have found no reversible errors under La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). Furthermore, we conclude there are no non-frivolous issues or trial court rulings that arguably support this appeal. Accordingly, the defendant's convictions on all counts are affirmed; his habitual offender adjudication is also affirmed; and his sentences on bills of information #409433, count IT; #413943 and #500145, counts I and II, are affirmed; but his sentence on bill of information #409433, count I hereby is vacated; and we remand for resentencing on that count. Defense counsel's motion to withdraw, which has been held in abeyance pending the disposition of this matter, is hereby granted.
The defendant requests that this court examine the record for error under La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). This court routinely reviews the record for such errors, whether or not such a request is made by a defendant. Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), we are limited in our review to errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence.
In regard to bill of information #409433, count I, any person who violates La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) as to cocaine, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).
As applicable here, any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows: if the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) (prior to amendment by 2010 La. Acts No. 911, § 1 & 2010 La. Acts No. 973, § 2).
On bill of information #409433, count I, the trial court sentenced the defendant, as a third-felony habitual offender, to twenty-eight years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) authorized imposition of only the first two years of the sentence without benefit of parole, and La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) does not restrict parole eligibility. When the amendment of a defendant's sentence entails more than a ministerial correction of a sentencing error, the decision in
After a careful review of the record in these proceedings, other than the illegal parole restriction on the sentence for bill of information #409433, count I, we have found no reversible errors.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's convictions and habitual offender adjudication are affirmed; the sentences on bills of information #409433, count II and #413943 and #500145, counts I and II, are affirmed; the sentence on bill of information #409433, count I is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing on that count; and defense counsel's motion to withdraw is granted.