NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PETTIGREW, J.

In this contractual dispute arising out of a commercial loan agreement, the borrower contends that a series of e-mails he exchanged with the bank constituted a valid new contract and credit agreement. From a judgment granting the bank's motion for summary judgment, the borrower has appealed. We hereby affirm.

FACTS

The record reflects that in early 2008, plaintiff, Joseph N. Traigle, an indirect owner and acting manager of The Other LA Group, No. 1, LLC. ("TOLAG"), approached defendant Hancock Bank of Louisiana ("Hancock Bank") about the possibility of obtaining financing so TOLAG could develop a television sitcom series and then market that series to various companies for television and DVD distribution. It was anticipated that the development and sale of the series would occur quickly, and that a loan supporting same could be repaid in full within six months.

Following the approval of TOLAG's loan by Hancock Bank's internal credit committee, the loan conditions were agreed to, and Traigle, as acting manager of TOLAG, executed a promissory note dated January 29, 2008, made payable to the order of Hancock Bank, in the principal amount of $550,000.00 ("the Original Note"). The loan conditions specified that the Original Note was to be paid, in full, within six months, or by July 29, 2008. As security for the Original Note, TOLAG executed a "Commercial Pledge Agreement" wherein it granted Hancock Bank a continuing security interest in any and all of the proceeds/income generated from the sale or distribution of the "sitcom" production. In addition, Traigle, and Gregory Walker, another indirect owner of TOLAG, each executed Commercial Guaranty agreements wherein they personally and solidarily guaranteed the prompt payment of the Original Note and all indebtedness and obligations that TOLAG owed to Hancock Bank.

In late April 2008, Traigle, as acting manager of TOLAG, approached Hancock Bank seeking additional funds in order to continue the development and marketing of its sitcom series. Upon review by its internal credit committee, Hancock Bank agreed to grant TOLAG a renewal and extension of the Original Note and to fund an additional $125,000.00, thereby increasing TOLAG's total indebtedness to $674,029.40 with a maturity date of October 15, 2008. Said agreement was conditioned upon TOLAG making a $200,000.00 principal reduction payment on or before June 15, 2008, together with regular monthly interest payments on the loan commencing June 2, 2008. TOLAG accepted these conditions; and on May 2, 2008, the parties executed a second promissory note reflecting these terms ("the Replacement Note"). In accordance with the Replacement Note, TOLAG made the required principal reduction payment and, generally, made its monthly interest payments on a timely basis.

On October 7, 2008, eight days prior to the October 15, 2008 maturity date of the Replacement Note, Traigle e-mailed defendant Donald J. Zornman, Regional President of Commercial Banking for Hancock Bank, and requested an additional eight months to repay the Replacement Note. In exchange for the extension, Traigle offered to continue making monthly interest payments to Hancock Bank, and suggested that in the event TOLAG could not sell its sitcom after an additional eight months, TOLAG would subsequently repay the loan through fully amortized, regular monthly installments over five years, "with the principals in TOLAG continuing to guarantee the debt to [sic] it is paid in full." At the conclusion of the e-mail were the names of Traigle and Walker.

Zornman, acting on behalf of Hancock Bank, sent a reply to Traigle's e-mail the following day indicating his general agreement to the basic structure and renewal of TOLAG's loan. Specifically, Zornman's e-mail response to Traigle stated:

Following the foregoing e-mail exchange, Langlois began the process of obtaining internal approval for yet another renewal of TOLAG's loan. After review by its internal credit committee, Hancock Bank once again agreed to grant TOLAG an extension of its loan for an additional eight months. In the event the loan was not fully paid at that time, the credit committee outlined possible conditions Hancock Bank might impose to insure repayment of the loan. A possible course of action proposed by the credit committee was that, assuming TOLAG reduced the principal amount owed by 20 percent at the end of eight months (the date of maturity), then the remaining principal amount would be amortized over 36 months. On October 16, 2008, Traigle, as acting manager of TOLAG, executed a third promissory note in the principal amount of $474,029.00 ("the Third Note") with a maturity date of June 16, 2009.

Prior to the maturity of the Third Note, Traigle contacted Langlois at Hancock Bank regarding the possibility of dividing the liability under the Third Note in half. Specifically, Traigle proposed that he would assume responsibility for one-half of the indebtedness to Hancock Bank, with Traigle's co-guarantor, Walker, assuming responsibility for the remaining half. Hancock Bank did not agree to Traigle's proposal, and on June 16, 2009, the Third Note matured. TOLAG still had not sold its sitcom series.

In July 2009, defendant Verni Howard replaced Langlois as the primary loan officer on the TOLAG loan. At a meeting called with Traigle regarding the TOLAG loan, Howard was advised that Traigle's partner. Walker, was having financial difficulties and might not be able to assist in the repayment of the TOLAG loan. Traigle again requested that he be released from his guaranty in exchange for his payment of one-half of the total indebtedness. Later, Howard learned that Walker's company, Gulf States Staffing and Personnel, LLC, had filed for protection pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Traigle, on behalf of TOLAG, executed a check to Hancock Bank on September 15, 2009, in the amount of $6,024.12 for the payment of monthly interest outstanding since maturity. The following day, September 16, 2009, Howard met with Traigle and Walker to discuss repayment of the TOLAG loan. Howard stressed that any renewal of the loan would require more substantive collateral. In an e-mail sent to both Traigle and Walker the following day, Howard confirmed the parties' agreement that Hancock Bank needed to have "a final resolution" no later than Friday September 18, 2009.2

On September 22, 2009, Traigle sent an e-mail to Howard evidently inquiring as to whether a proposed cross-pledge by Traigle of a certificate of deposit would be acceptable to Hancock Bank as additional collateral. Howard replied that the proposed certificate of deposit already secured other debt, and that Hancock Bank could not "begin to even contemplate longer term solutions" for TOLAG without the posting of additional acceptable collateral. Howard stated that additional acceptable collateral needed to be either real estate or cash, and further added:

I am in the office for the remainder of the day.

Shortly after receiving Howard's e-mail, Traigle responded and advised Howard to "[l]et it go to Special Assets, I'm `out of gas'." Two minutes later, Traigle sent a separate e-mail to Howard, with a copy to Zornman, commenting, "One more observation, this situation is 90 days past due due to the `NEGLIGENCE OF HANCOCK BANK[.]"' Howard, in response to Traigle's first e-mail, replied, "I completely understand. Thanks for responding back! I just finished a credit meeting, but will call you in an hour or so." Howard apparently replied instead to Traigle's second e-mail, and stated:

TOLAG's Third Note was turned over to Hancock Bank's Special Asset Division on September 23, 2009, and in accordance with the terms of the Commercial Guaranty agreement signed by Traigle, Hancock Bank promptly exercised its right to offset Traigle's personal checking account by $484,497.58, and applied these funds to the TOLAG indebtedness. In accordance with Howard's e-mail, TOLAG's interest check was returned un-cashed.

ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT

On October 23, 2009, Traigle filed a Petition for Damages in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. Named as defendants therein were Hancock Bank, Zornman, and Howard (collectively, "defendants"). In connection with the filing of his petition, Traigle alleged defendants were liable for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) abuse of rights; (4) conversion; (5) fraud; (6) negligent or intentional misrepresentation; and (7) detrimental reliance.

Zornman and Howard responded to the petition by filing a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, while Hancock Bank responded by filing a dilatory exception raising the objection of vagueness with respect to Traigle's claims of fraud. At the conclusion of a hearing held on February 22, 2010, the trial court denied both exceptions.

Defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there existed no "written credit agreement" upon which Traigle could base his claims, and hence, Traigle's claims were barred by the Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute (La. R.S. 6:1121 etseq.) Following a hearing on January 31, 2011, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with defendants and granted summary judgment dismissing Traigle's claims with prejudice. From this judgment, Traigle now appeals. Defendants have answered the appeal, and seek an award of costs as well as attorney fees as damages for Traigle's filing of a frivolous appeal.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Gonzales v. Kissner, 2008-2154, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/11/09), 24 So.3d 214, 217. Summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B). Summary judgment is favored and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. La. Code Civ; P. art, 966(A)(2); Aucoin v. Rochel, 2008-1180, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/08), 5 So.3d 197, 200, writ denied. 2009-0122 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 143.

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the mover. If, however, the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require that all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, the mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual evidence sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the adverse party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to summary judgment. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(C)(2); Robles v. ExxonMobile, 2002-0854, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/03), 844 So.2d 339, 341.

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Boudreaux v. Vankerkhove, 2007-2555, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/11/08), 993 So.2d 725, 729-730. An appellate court thus asks the same questions as does the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ernest v. Petroleum Service Corp., 2002-2482, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/19/03), 868 So.2d 96, 97, writ denied, 2003-3439 (La. 2/20/04), 866 So.2d 830.

ANALYSIS

The Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute (La. R.S. 6:1121 et seq.), like similar legislation in other states, was enacted in 1989 in response to a surge in lender liability lawsuits that usually involved assertions of a breach of oral agreements to lend, to refinance, or to forbear. Whitney National Bank v. Rockwell, 94-3049, p. 7 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 1325, 1329. The primary purpose in enacting these credit agreement statutes was to establish certainty as to the contractual liability of financial institutions. Whitney, at 94-3049, p. 8; 661 So.2d at 1330. These statutes seek to preclude debtors from bringing claims based on oral agreements, and therefore require a "writing" as a prerequisite for a debtor to file suit against a lender. Whitney, at 94-3049, p. 7; 661 So.2d at 1329.

Specifically, La. RS. 6:1122 provides that "[a] debtor shall not maintain an action on a credit agreement3 unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the creditor4 and the debtor5." Additionally, La. RS. 6:1123 states:

The sole issue presented by Traigle in the instant appeal is whether the parties, through the October 7-8, 2008 e-mail exchange, entered into a valid credit agreement to amortize TOLAG's existing loan over five years.

In his brief to this court, Traigle contends that the e-mail exchange between himself and Zornman represented an offer by Traigle and an acceptance by Zornman on behalf of Hancock Bank. Traigle further contends that the e-mail exchange was in writing and electronically signed by both parties, who have a long history of conducting business with each other through electronic means. For these reasons, Traigle claims that the e-mail exchange constituted a complete, written, and binding credit agreement between TOLAG and Hancock Bank to amortize TOLAG's loan over five years following the expiration of an eight-month credit extension.

In response, defendants assert that in granting the original loan, and each subsequent modification thereafter, the parties never formalized any agreement via e-mail. Defendants point out that the original loan as well as the subsequent loan modifications all required a new set of loan documents that were executed at a formal loan-closing meeting attended by both parties. It is the position of defendants that the e-mail exchange was merely evidence of the parties'"agreement to agree," for the reason that the terms set forth in the October 7-8, 2008 e-mails did not constitute a "complete credit agreement in and of itself." Defendants also point out that Zornman's alleged e-mail "acceptance" stated that Traigle would be contacted with respect to the "renewal documents" and, further, that there existed no formal agreement regarding the type of collateral required, the date payments would be due, or perhaps most importantly, an agreed upon rate of interest. Finally, defendants direct this court's attention to the fact that the October 7, 2008 e-mail exchange pre-dated the parties' execution of the Third Note by over a week. Defendants argue that if Traigle (as a former president and CEO of a bank for eight years) had intended for Hancock Bank to be bound by the terms outlined in his October 7, 2008 e-mail, Traigle should have insisted that said terms be incorporated into the subsequently executed Third Note and accompanying loan documents.

Upon careful examination of the pleadings, memoranda, and exhibits presented in connection with the issue raised in this matter, it is evident that although the parties routinely communicated via e-mail, all loan documents were finalized through formal written agreements, executed in person. Therefore, we agree with the trial court's finding that:

We conclude, as did the trial court, that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Lastly, in their answer to Traigle's appeal, defendants assert claims for attorney fees and costs as damages for the filing of a frivolous appeal. As we do not find that the instant appeal was filed solely to cause defendants to expend additional costs and incur substantial attorney fees, we decline to make Traigle answerable in damages.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Hancock Bank of Louisiana, Donald J. Zornman, and Verni Howard, that dismissed the claims put forth against them by plaintiff, Joseph N. Traigle, is hereby affirmed. All costs associated with this appeal shall be assessed against plaintiff, Joseph N. Traigle.

AFFIRMED.