NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

KUHN, J.

Defendant, Dennis F. Dickerson, was charged by bill of information with one count of second degree kidnapping, a violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1. He pled not guilty and, after a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial and sentenced him to thirty-five years at hard labor, with the first two years of that sentence to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Subsequently, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information, which alleged that defendant had eight prior felony convictions. After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated defendant a fourth-or-subsequent-felony habitual offender, vacated his previous sentence, and imposed a new sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the entire term of the sentence. The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence. Defendant now appeals, alleging five assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and habitual offender adjudication, and we amend defendant's habitual offender sentence and affirm that sentence as amended.

FACTS

The victim, Stephanie Lemme, met defendant while she was employed as a nurse between October 2007 and May 2008 at the St. Tammany Parish Jail. Defendant was incarcerated in the medical dormitory, and he and Lemme became close as they engaged in conversations unrelated to defendant's medical treatment. Eventually, defendant asked Lemme to call his mother on his behalf Lemme complied. Near the beginning of June 2008, the topic of bonding defendant out of jail came up in conversations between Lemme and defendant. Lemme took cash out of her savings account and sold a Mercedes that she owned in order to give defendant money to pay his bonds in both Louisiana and Mississippi. When defendant was released from jail, he moved in with Lemme at her house in Covington on June 13. After a few weeks of living together harmoniously, defendant and Lemme began to argue. Lemme became upset about defendant's drinking habits and his use of her vehicle to go to destinations of which she was unaware.

On July 14, 2008, defendant picked up Lemme from Heritage Manor nursing home, her new place of employment, in her Ford Explorer. When Lemme went to put her purse in the back seat, she noticed beer cans and an ice chest, and she began a short argument with defendant about his drinking. While still in the vehicle, Lemme called her mother as defendant drove home. Once home, Lemme began to walk her dog as she informed her mother that defendant was drinking and that she was afraid. During this time, Lemme also received a call from her brother, and she expressed to him that she was afraid of defendant because he had been drinking and smoking. Lemme then told her brother that defendant was approaching her, and she disconnected the call.

As defendant approached Lemme, he told her to take him to his mother's house, which was located in Mississippi. Lemme did not want to drive defendant to Mississippi because of the price of gas, but she agreed to take him because she was afraid of him. As Lemme drove her vehicle near La. Hwy. 59, she and defendant continued to argue, and he began to hit her with his baseball cap and the back of his hand. When Lemme stopped at a gas station, she received a call from a police officer who had been dispatched to her home as a result of a call her brother had made after speaking with her. Lemme told the officer that she was all right. After she received another phone call, defendant took Lemme's phone and snapped it in half. At that time, defendant grabbed Lemme by the neck and told her just to go back to her home, but Lemme proceeded to drive toward Mississippi.

As Lemme drove on La. Hwy. 36, defendant hit her several more times. She pulled her vehicle over to the right shoulder, put it in park, and told defendant that she could not drive if he continued to hit her. Lemme attempted to exit the vehicle, but defendant grabbed her by her hair and her shoulders or arms, and he tried to pull her back to the vehicle. Lemme eventually succeeded in completely exiting the vehicle, and defendant followed after her. They began to struggle, and defendant hit Lemme several more times. Defendant ultimately persuaded Lemme to get back into the vehicle, except on the passenger's side, and he drove himself and Lemme to his mother's house in Mississippi. Lemme and defendant returned to her home the following day, after defendant's court appearance in Mississippi.

A couple of weeks following this incident, Lemme called defendant's bail bondsman, and he assisted her in getting defendant's bond revoked. She also made a report about the incident to Detective John Morse, of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office. Lemme provided Detective Morse with several photographs of her injuries that she indicated she had taken a few days following the incident. These photographs showed bruising injuries to Lemme's left eye, her nose, her mouth, and her back right shoulder. Based on this report, defendant was charged with second degree kidnapping.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #1

In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree kidnapping. Specifically, defendant argues that he had no intent to commit this offense, that he cannot be guilty of second degree kidnapping if he battered Lemme after their departure from her home, and that Lemme's actions were voluntary.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.

Second degree kidnapping is defined, in pertinent part, as the forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to another, or the enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to another, wherein the victim is physically injured. La. R.S. 14:44.1(A)(3) & (B)(1)-(2). Second degree kidnapping is a general intent crime, so proof of intent requires only a showing that the circumstances of the crime indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. See La. R.S. 14:10(2).

In the instant case, Lemme testified that she did not want to drive defendant to Mississippi, but that she acquiesced to defendant's demands out of fear. As she initially drove defendant, he began to hit her. When Lemme pulled over onto the shoulder of the road and attempted to flee her vehicle, defendant caught her and inflicted further physical abuse on her. In doing so, defendant either forced Lemme back into the vehicle, or he persuaded her to reenter the vehicle. Under either circumstance, defendant's actions were sufficient to demonstrate general criminal intent to commit second degree kidnapping.

Defendant argues that he could not be found guilty of second degree kidnapping where Lemme's physical injuries occurred after she and defendant left her home. We disagree. A simple reading of the pertinent second degree kidnapping provisions requires only that any forcible seizing and carrying, or enticing or persuading, occur "wherein" the victim is physically injured. Lemme was clearly injured in this case after she was forced against her will to drive defendant to Mississippi. If we were to read the second degree kidnapping statute as defendant argues, we would also have to read the statute to require that any sexual abuse that could occur during a second degree kidnapping happen during the seizing and carrying or enticing or persuading in order to satisfy the offense. Such an interpretation is absurd. Further, even if we were to read the statute as defendant argues, the jury still could have concluded that the second degree kidnapping occurred when Lemme attempted to flee her vehicle and defendant physically injured her before forcing or persuading her to reenter the vehicle. Therefore, even under defendant's interpretation of the statute, this argument is not persuasive.

Finally, defendant argues that Lemme voluntarily went with him to Mississippi. This hypothesis of innocence was supported at trial by defense counsel's argument that Lemme went to Mississippi voluntarily, but later lied to the police about the incident because she was upset with defendant for carrying on an affair with his ex-girlfriend. At trial, Lemme clearly communicated to the jury that she went with defendant initially due to her fear and that she was then forced to continue traveling with defendant as a result of his physical violence towards her. Lemme further testified that she did not falsely report defendant's actions out of any jealousy. Therefore, Lemme's testimony directly contradicts defendant's contention of voluntariness.

The only testimony given at trial that might support defendant's argument that Lemme voluntarily traveled with him to Mississippi came from his mother, who stated that nothing alarmed her on July 14, 2008, when defendant and Lemme stayed with her. The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Richardson, 459 So.2d 31, 38 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932. Further, a reviewing court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the fact finder. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Clearly, in this case, the jury chose to believe Lemme's testimony that she did not voluntarily travel with defendant and that she did not overtly seek help on the day of the incident because she was afraid. On the record before us, we cannot say that this conclusion is unreasonable.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was guilty of the second degree kidnapping of Lemme. Lemme testified that she left with defendant because she was afraid of him and that defendant physically injured her while she drove him to his mother's house. When Lemme tried to flee her vehicle to avoid further abuse, defendant used violence to force or entice her to reenter it, and he began driving.

This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #2

In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of other abusive acts committed against two other women prior to the incident at issue in the instant case thereby entitling him to a new trial.

At trial, the jury heard testimony from April Ryback and Tanya Comeaux, two women who had previously experienced physical abuse from defendant while they were in relationships with him. Ryback testified that she dated defendant briefly in 1999, and that on February 23, 1999, he appeared at her house while she was cooking. She stated that defendant knocked on her door and told her that he wanted her to bring him somewhere. Ryback told defendant that she would not bring him anywhere, and she did not let him in her house. Shortly thereafter, defendant broke into her bedroom window. As Ryback tried to grab her daughter and flee, defendant grabbed her and dragged her back to her bedroom. He threw her down in the closet and began to choke her. Ryback finally agreed to take defendant wherever he wanted to go, but when she made it outside with her daughter and defendant, she began to scream. Defendant threw her onto the ground, grabbed her keys, and took her car. As a result of the incident, Ryback suffered injuries to her face and neck. Defendant later pled guilty to theft and unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling as a result of this incident.

Tanya Comeaux testified that she knew defendant when he was going by the name Dennis Smith. On November 2, 2007, she and defendant's father were in a truck. Defendant and his father got into an argument, and defendant's father exited the truck. When Comeaux attempted to exit the truck as well, defendant punched her in the mouth and put her in the back of the truck. Defendant drove her to a friend's house. Shortly thereafter, defendant and another friend forced Comeaux into the back of the truck again, and defendant drove her to the Bogue Chitto River. At the river, he struck her in the face and on her back with a belt, his fists, and his feet. Defendant again forced Comeaux back into his truck, and he began driving at a high rate of speed. He then opened the door and pushed her out. Comeaux attempted to hold on to the door, but defendant accelerated as he dragged her, and she eventually fell completely out of the vehicle. When Comeaux regained consciousness, she flagged down a passing motorist, who brought her to a hospital, where she was treated for extensive injuries to her face, back, legs, and feet.

Prior to trial, the court held a Prieur1 hearing to determine the admissibility at trial of these other bad acts pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1). Having heard testimony from investigators familiar with those incidents, the trial court noted "several very distinctive features" between the incidents involving Ryback and Comeaux and with the facts of this case. With respect to Ryback, the trial court pointed out that "[t]he facts relative to wishing to receive transportation and physical coercion being utilized thereafter" bore a "marked resemblance to some of the allegations in this case." The trial court also noted similarities in the entire incident involving Comeaux and the injuries sustained by the victim during that incident. Overall, the trial court found that "there has been clear and convincing evidence presented ... on these two [prior acts]."

Generally, evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant is inadmissible due to the "substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant." To admit "other crimes" evidence, the State must establish that there is an independent and relevant reason for doing so, i.e., to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act. The Louisiana Supreme Court has also held other crimes evidence admissible as proof of other crimes exhibiting almost identical modus operandi or system, committed in close proximity in time and place. Evidence of other crimes, however, is not admissible simply to prove the bad character of the accused. Furthermore, the other crimes evidence must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue and the probative value of the extraneous crimes evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. State v. Tilley, 99-0569 (La. 7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 22, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 959, 121 S.Ct. 1488, 149 L.Ed.2d 375 (2001).

The procedure to be used when the State intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses was formerly controlled by Prieur. Prior to its repeal by 1995 La. Acts No. 1300, § 2, La. C.E. art. 1103 provided that the notice requirements and clear and convincing evidence standard of Prieur and its progeny were not overruled by the Code of Evidence. Prieur dealt with La. R.S. 15:445 and La. R.S. 15:446, now-repealed statutes, which addressed the admissibility of other crimes evidence. Under Prieur, the State was required to give a defendant notice, both that evidence of other crimes would be offered against him, and of which exception to the general exclusionary rule the State intended to rely upon. Prieur, 277 So.2d at 130. Additionally, the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other crimes. Prieur, 277 So.2d at 129; see also State v. Code, 627 So.2d 1373, 1381 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1870, 128 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994).

However, 1994 La. Acts 3d Ex. Sess., No. 51, §§ 1 & 2 amended La. C.E. art. 404(B) and added La. C.E. art. 1104, respectively. The amendment to Article 404(B) inserted into the article the language "provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes."

Article 1104 of the Code of Evidence provides that the burden of proof in pretrial Prieur hearings, "shall be identical to the burden of proof required by Federal Rules of Evidence Article IV, Rule 404." The burden of proof required by Federal Rules of Evidence Article IV, Rule 404, is satisfied upon a showing of sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the other crime, wrong, or act. See Huddleston v. U.S., 485 U.S. 681, 685, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). The Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of the burden of proof required for the admission of other crimes evidence in light of the repeal of Article 1103 and the addition of Article 1104. However, numerous Louisiana appellate courts, including this court, have held that burden of proof to now be less than "clear and convincing." See State v. Williams, 99-2576 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/22/00), 769 So.2d 730, 735 n.4.

We find that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of the other crimes evidence presented by the State. In this case, the testimony of the investigators at the Prieur hearing and of Ryback and Comeaux at trial clearly identified defendant as the perpetrator of the other offenses. Further, the evidence of the other incidents highlighted defendant's intent, plan, or absence of mistake in committing the instant offense because the methods of commission of the instant offense and the other crimes involved similar behavior and similar inflicted injuries. Finally, while the introduction of this other crimes evidence was certainly prejudicial on some level, the probative value of this evidence — to show that defendant had engaged in similar patterns of behavior in the past, thereby bolstering the victim's credibility — outweighed any prejudice.

Further, we find that even if the trial court did err or abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of defendant's other crimes evidence, any such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Article 921 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that "[a] judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused." The test for determining whether an error is harmless is whether the verdict actually rendered in the case "was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). In the instant case, the evidence of defendant's guilt presented through the testimony of the victim herself was substantial and greatly detailed. In contrast, the evidence of defendant's other crimes was presented relatively quickly and occupied only a minimal portion of the overall trial. In light of the substantial amount of direct evidence presented at trial describing defendant's instant offense, we find that even if the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's other crimes, defendant's guilty verdict was surely unattributable to any potential error. As such, defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #3

In his third assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress a statement that he made to Detective Morse. Specifically, defendant alleges that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda2 rights and that his statement was made freely and voluntarily, and not under the influence of fear, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises.

During a pretrial hearing and at trial,3 Detective Morse testified that he went to the parish jail to interview defendant after the victim had made her report about the incident. When Detective Morse initially approached defendant, he began to briefly inform defendant about the allegations that Lemme made against him. As Detective Morse was in the middle of informing defendant of these allegations, defendant interrupted him and stated that Lemme had been involved in a fight with a female cousin of his at a party, which was the source of the injuries Lemme documented in her photographs. Once defendant made that statement, Detective Morse immediately asked defendant whether he would be willing to speak about the incident. Defendant replied that he would but that he was not going to sign the Miranda form provided by Detective Morse. Corporal Lance Toups, assisting Detective Morse, advised defendant of his rights, and defendant indicated that he understood them, but he reiterated that he would not sign any form. Corporal Toups indicated on the Miranda form that defendant refused to sign it. In the subsequent conversation between defendant and Detective Morse, defendant gave only a first name for his cousin, and he indicated that it would be difficult to find her. No other statement from defendant was introduced at trial.

Before a confession can be introduced in evidence, the State has the burden of affirmatively proving that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. La. R.S. 15:451. It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his Miranda rights. Spontaneous and voluntary statements, not given as a result of police interrogation or compelling influence, are admissible in evidence without Miranda warnings even where a defendant is in custody. State v. Jones, 386 So.2d 1363, 1365-66 (La. 1980); State v. Guidry, 496 So.2d 650, 653 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ denied, 500 So.2d 420 (La. 1987).

In this case, it is clear that defendant's initial statement to Detective Morse, referencing a fight between Lemme and a cousin of defendant's, was the result of a spontaneous utterance. Having come to interview a witness with a rights form, Detective Morse obviously intended to advise defendant of his rights after he detailed to defendant the allegations against him. However, before Detective Morse could complete his recitation of the allegations, defendant interrupted him and provided an exculpatory statement of his own. Under these circumstances, the statement was completely unsolicited and voluntary. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled it admissible.

The only other statement of defendant's introduced at trial further elaborated upon the statement he initially made, and it purported to name his cousin and to declare her difficult to find. Detective Morse's testimony indicates that defendant made this statement after being fully advised of his Miranda rights and refusing to sign the Miranda form. Detective Morse's testimony was the sole proof, one way or another, of the voluntariness of defendant's statement. On the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in concluding that the State carried its burden of proving the voluntariness of defendant's statement. Moreover, even if we were to find that the trial court erred in admitting the statements defendant made to Detective Morse, any such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The admitted statements were purely exculpatory in nature, and defendant has not argued, either in the trial court or on appeal, that the effect of these statements at trial had any prejudicial effect, such as to malign his credibility.

This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #4

In his fourth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Detective Morse to "give an expert opinion on domestic violence escalation."

At trial, Detective Morse testified on direct examination about the concept of escalation. Detective Morse stated that in a domestic violence context, escalation occurs when abuses start out small and then evolve into more serious acts of violence. He testified that it is typical in such a context to see an evolution from verbal and mental abuse, to isolation of assets (such as vehicles or access to bank accounts), to physical violence, then to strangulation, and then to homicide. The State elicited this testimony from Detective Morse in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of the fear that Lemme felt towards defendant. Lemme later testified at trial that defendant verbally abused her, used her car without permission, and occasionally hit her.

Prior to Detective Morse's testimony on the concept of escalation, defense counsel objected to that line of questioning as requiring an expert opinion. The trial court initially sustained the objection, but it allowed the State to present evidence of Detective Morse's qualifications if it wanted to pursue questioning on this topic. Detective Morse testified that in ten years as a detective, he had handled many cases involving domestic violence, including cases that resulted in homicide or near homicide from domestic violence. Detective Morse stated that he had studied the concept of escalation as a result of his employment and that he had advised other members of his department on this specific concept but not as an expert witness. He also stated that he had previously testified in court regarding the same concept. Detective Morse stated that his studies of the issue of escalation had come from his "[o]bservations, experience, [and] working context dealing with professionals" from domestic violence assistance organizations. He also indicated that he had read numerous articles, books, and brochures on the subject and domestic violence in general. After hearing these qualifications, the trial court then overruled defense counsel's objection and allowed Detective Morse to testify pursuant to La. C.E. art. 701.

A law enforcement officer is permitted to express an opinion regarding matters of personal knowledge gained through experience, even if the witness is not first qualified as an expert. See La. C.E. art. 701; State v. Friday, 2010-2309 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/17/11), 73 So.3d 913, 922, writ denied, 2011-1456 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So.3d 1258. The trial court is vested with much discretion in determining which opinion testimony shall be received into evidence as lay or expert testimony. Friday, 73 So.3d at 922.

Detective Morse was not tendered as an expert under La. C.E. art 702. We disagree with defendant's contention that expert testimony was required to explain to the jury the concept of domestic violence escalation. Detective Morse readily encountered this concept in his daily experiences as an investigator, and that experience was sufficient to allow him to explain this concept to the jury at trial. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that Detective Morse's personal knowledge, training, and experience in the field enabled him to give an opinion about what is typical behavior in a domestic violence setting.

This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #5

In his final assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in imposing a constitutionally excessive sentence. Specifically, defendant contends that his habitual offender sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is grossly disproportionate and shocks the sense of justice.

Before we address whether defendant's sentence is excessive, we note a sentencing error that renders defendant's habitual offender sentence illegal. An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A).

After defendant's conviction, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information alleging that defendant had eight prior felony convictions. At defendant's habitual offender hearing, the State presented evidence that defendant had the following predicate convictions: (1) a May 3, 1999 conviction for simple escape under docket number 300785 in St. Tammany Parish; (2) a May 5, 2000 conviction for theft of goods over $500.00 under docket number 302263 in St. Tammany Parish; (3) a May 5, 2000 conviction for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling under docket number 302264 in St. Tammany Parish; (4) a May 5, 2000 conviction for attempted possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (cocaine) under docket number 318243 in St. Tammany Parish; (5) a July 13, 2001 conviction for assault on a public servant under docket number CR-1742-01-D in Hidalgo County, Texas; (6) a September 15, 2008 conviction for theft of goods valued between $100.00 and $500.00 under docket number 384536 in St. Tammany Parish; (7) a May 22, 2009 conviction for accessory after the fact to first degree robbery under docket number 07-CR1-97139 in Washington Parish; and (8) a July 20, 2009 conviction for simple escape under docket number 439888 in St. Tammany Parish. (Habitual offender exhibits 4-13).

After reviewing the evidence presented in relation to defendant's alleged predicate convictions, the trial court found that the State had carried its burden of proving that defendant had six predicate felony convictions in the above cases from St. Tammany Parish. The court found that defendant's alleged predicate conviction from Hidalgo County, Texas was not satisfactorily linked. The trial court further found that defendant's Washington Parish conviction for accessory after the fact to first degree robbery was inadequately linked because it did not include his fingerprints. On this basis, the trial court noted that defendant had at least six prior felony convictions that would classify him as a fourth-felony habitual offender and qualify him for a term of imprisonment of not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and no more than natural life.4 See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) (prior to 2010 amendments).

Even though the trial court recognized that defendant should have been sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) (prior to 2010 amendments), he then sentenced defendant to a term of life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Under the Habitual Offender Law, a term of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is authorized only when a defendant's predicate convictions and his instant conviction fall within special categories. If a defendant's third or fourth felonies and two of his prior felonies are crimes of violence, sex offenses with a victim under the age of eighteen, drug offenses punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, he is subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) & (c)(ii) (prior to 2010 amendments).

In the instant case, only defendant's instant conviction for second degree kidnapping qualifies under one of the categories enumerated in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) (prior to 2010 amendments). None of the predicate convictions found by the trial court to apply in defendant's case are crimes of violence, sex offenses with minor victims, drug offenses punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or other offenses punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more. Accordingly, the trial court's imposition of defendant's entire life sentence without parole was illegal.

When the correction of an illegal sentence involves sentencing discretion, an appellate court ordinarily should remand the case to the trial court for resentencing. However, in the instant case, we may correct defendant's illegal sentence on appeal rather than by remand for resentencing, because the trial court attempted to impose the maximum legal sentence in this matter, and thus, no exercise of sentencing discretion is involved. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A); State v. Miller, 96-2040 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/97), 703 So.2d 698, 701, writ denied, 98-0039 (La. 5/15/98), 719 So.2d 459. Here, under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) (prior to 2010 amendments), the range for defendant's habitual offender sentence was not less than the longest sentence prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life. Under La. R.S. 14:44.1(C), defendant was subject to a maximum sentence of forty years at hard labor, at least two of which shall be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Therefore, defendant's sentencing range under the applicable habitual offender provision is not less than forty years or more than his natural life.

Because the trial court attempted to sentence defendant to the maximum legal sentence, we affirm the trial court's sentencing of defendant to life imprisonment under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) (prior to 2010 amendments). Under State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La. 1981), the conditions imposed on this sentence are those called for in the reference statute. Had defendant been sentenced under the second degree kidnapping statute alone, the trial court could have restricted defendant's parole eligibility on a maximum sentence of forty years for the entirety of that term. See La. R.S. 14:44.1(C). Because the trial court in this case attempted to restrict defendant's parole eligibility for the maximum term, we do the same in defendant's amended sentence. Therefore, we amend defendant's habitual offender sentence to life imprisonment, with forty years of said sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Based on defendant's fifth assignment of error, we now must address whether defendant's amended sentence is constitutionally excessive.

Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may fall within statutory limits, it may nevertheless violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266, 267 (La. 1982). A trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). See also State v. Savario, 97-2614 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/98), 721 So.2d 1084, 1089, writ denied, 98-3032 (La. 4/1/99), 741 So.2d 1280.

Maximum sentences may only be imposed for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality. Miller, 703 So.2d at 701. A trial court is entitled to consider the defendant's entire criminal history in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed. State v. Ballett, 98-2568 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/15/00), 756 So.2d 587, 602, writ denied, 2000-1490 (La. 2/9/01), 785 So.2d 31.

Article 894.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth items that must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894.1, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the guidelines. State v. Herrin, 562 So.2d 1, 11 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 565 So.2d 942 (La. 1990). In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Watkins, 532 So.2d 1182, 1186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). Remand for full compliance with Article 894.1 is unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the sentence is shown. Lanclos, 419 So.2d at 478.

In sentencing defendant as a habitual offender, the trial judge stated that he considered the sentencing mandates of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and that he was convinced defendant had an extensive criminal history. He noted that even though he found defendant's Hidalgo County and Washington Parish convictions insufficient for habitual offender adjudication purposes, he found these convictions significant enough to consider in actually sentencing defendant. The trial judge also noted that defendant had committed all of his offenses by the approximate age of thirty. He further found that any sentence less than the maximum would deprecate the seriousness of the instant offense and would deprecate the seriousness of defendant's lengthy criminal history. The trial judge stated that defendant exhibited violent tendencies through his actions in the instant case and that his release could endanger the victim or others. Finally, he noted that defendant had shown no remorse. In light of all of these considerations, the trial judge attempted to impose the maximum possible habitual offender sentence upon defendant.

Considering the trial court's stated reasons and defendant's past conduct of repeated criminality, we find that no abuse of the trial court's sentencing discretion occurred where the trial court attempted to impose the maximum legal sentence in this case. As a result, we find that defendant's amended sentence of life imprisonment, with forty years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is not excessive.

As to defendant's amended sentence, this assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For these reasons, the conviction and habitual offender adjudication of defendant, Dennis F. Dickerson, are affirmed, and his habitual offender sentence is amended and, as amended, affirmed.

CONVICTION AND HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED; HABITUAL OFFENDER SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.