NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge.

This is an appeal taken from three trial court rulings: 1) the granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, 2) the granting of an involuntary motion for dismissal in favor of the defendants, and 3) the denial of plaintiffs' motion requesting that the trial court sign one final money judgment encompassing each of its prior rulings and judgments into one. We find a genuine issue of material fact exists, thus the granting of the motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was inappropriate.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs, Dr. Roland S. Waguespack, Carol Waguespack, and The Roland Waguespack, M.D., PMC, are attempting to recover an alleged $38,000 loan made to the defendants, Dr. I. Ricardo Martinez Jr., Dolley Dean Martinez, and The American-Georgian Academy of Medicine & Surgery, Inc. (Academy).

In May of 1996, a group of physicians, including Dr. and Mrs. Waguespack, traveled to Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia (Georgia), to participate in a conference with Georgian physicians to promote humanitarian aid and medical advancements within the country. This initiative was led by Dr. and Mrs. Martinez. After returning home, Mrs. Martinez formed the Academy in an effort to further the objectives of the delegation. Dr. and Mrs. Martinez were named as the directors in the initial report. Dr. Martinez also served as the Academy's American president, and Mrs. Martinez was named the executive director.

Both the Martinezes, through the Academy, and the Waguespacks, as volunteer members, began an endeavor to obtain an eye laser to train Georgian physicians to perform laser eye surgery on their patients. Mrs. Martinez researched and negotiated the purchase of the laser. However, it was The Roland Waguespack M.D., PMC, through its agent Mrs. Waguespack, that wired the manufacturer the payment of $37,924.22 for purchase of the eye laser.

Dr. and Mrs. Waguespack sought repayment for the funds used to buy the laser, and when those requests were ignored, they filed a lawsuit against the Martinezes and the Academy on June 18, 1998, alleging the $38,000 was a loan.1

The plaintiffs later filed a motion for summary judgment where they asserted that the debt was evidenced by a promissory note, signed by Dr. Martinez as president of the Academy.2 Defendants opposed the motion asserting that the note was invalid and denied ever executing a promissory note on behalf of the plaintiffs. After a hearing on January 9, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the promissory note was valid and enforceable against all of the defendants, jointly and in solido.3 The trial court entered a written judgment on January 20, 2004. On August 3, 2004, defendant's motion for new trial was denied as to the Academy and granted as to the Martinezes, individually.

On September 19-20, 2011, a bench trial was held to decide the issue of whether the corporate veil could be pierced and the Martinezes could be held individually liable for the promissory note executed by the Academy. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the Martinezes orally moved for an involuntary dismissal; and the trial court granted their motion, finding that a plaintiff cannot pierce the corporate veil to hold a non-shareholder liable for the corporation's debts. A written judgment was signed by the trial court on October 4, 2011. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for new trial on October 24, 2011. Subsequently, on November 23, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the trial court to sign one final judgment consistent with the court's previous ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion on November 28, 2011.

Plaintiffs filed an appeal, and defendants filed a cross-appeal.

DISCUSSION

In their only assignment of error in the cross-appeal, defendants urge that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding the promissory note to be valid and enforceable against the Academy. The defendants assert that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the note, claiming that Dr. Martinez never signed the promissory note and that they believed that the Waguespacks donated the laser to the Academy. Defendants acknowledge that the note contained a facsimile of Dr. Martinez's signature, but maintain that he never signed the promissory note.

Appellate courts review the granting of summary judgment de novo under the same criteria governing the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183 (citation omitted). "Favored in Louisiana, the summary judgment procedure `is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action' and shall be construed to accomplish these ends." King v. Parish Nat'l Bank, 04-0337, p. 7 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So.2d 540, 545 citing La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).4

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." La. C.C.P. art. 966(B); Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 03-1424, p. 4 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002, 1005. The initial burden of proof remains with the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the mover has made a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence demonstrating that a material factual issue remains. When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, the non-moving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided by law, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. La. C.C.P. art. 967. The failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 03-1533, p. 7 (La. 2/02/04), 866 So.2d 228, 233 (citation omitted).

In affidavits and depositions, the plaintiffs assert that they had a meeting with the Martinezes around the 19th of February 1997, which included the Martinezes' attorney. They claim that Dr. Martinez signed the promissory note at that meeting. While they do not dispute being in attendance at the meeting, Dr. Martinez and his former counsel, Daniel Capobianco, who attended the entirety of the meeting, deny the signing of a promissory note.5

Both the Waguespacks' and the Martinezes' handwriting experts submitted a report confirming that the signature on the promissory note was that of Dr. Martinez. However, the Martinezes' expert, James Dupuis, also stated in his report that technology exists that would make detection of a forgery extremely difficult.

Given the affidavits, depositions, and expert report provided with the opposition for motion for summary judgment, the defendants' met their burden of proof in showing there is genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the note. Therefore, the summary judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded for a trial on the merits.6

For the reasons discussed, the granting of the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on January 20, 2004, is hereby reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.