NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

McCLENDON, J.

Defendant, Dedrin Cyprian, was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42. He entered a plea of not guilty. After a trial by jury, defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant now appeals, raising ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 8, 2009, at approximately 11:43 p.m., the Hammond Police Department was dispatched to North Oaks Hospital in reference to a reported rape. The victim, R.L., indicated that she had been attacked and raped at her home at knifepoint.1 The victim's home was secured and processed while a rape kit was administered. Sergeant Jamie Hauck noted that the home was in disarray, although there were no signs of a forced entry. After processing the scene, Sergeant Hauck returned to the hospital, took photographs of the victim, and collected the rape kit. Sergeant Hauck noted that the victim was distraught and had swollen black eyes, abrasions, bruises, and a knot on her head. The victim initially indicated that she was unable to identify or fully describe her attacker and that he had forced her into her home when she returned from an outing. The next day, the victim's mother took her to the police station and the victim disclosed that she was familiar with the attacker, defendant, as he had previously been hired by her mother to perform yard work.2

On February 7, 2009, the day before the instant offense, defendant visited the victim's mother and they, including the victim, smoked marijuana during the visit. The victim's mother did not leave the victim alone with defendant on that occasion, and defendant did not make any sexual advances toward the victim. The following evening, the date of the instant offense, defendant came to the victim's home at about 6:00 p.m., and the victim's mother told him to leave because she was about to go to work. Defendant complied.

Defendant came back about 8:45 p.m., after the victim's mother left to go to work, and told the victim that he had been locked out of his home and needed a place to wait for someone to unlock the door. The victim allowed defendant to enter the home to wait. According to the victim, as they were sitting on the living room sofa, defendant put his arm around her, and when she rejected his advances, he physically attacked her and vaginally, anally, and orally raped her at knifepoint. Before leaving, defendant threatened to kill the victim and her family if she reported the incident to the police.

Upon defendant's arrest on February 12, 2009, photographs were taken of his injuries including bruises on his head and arms. DNA evidence presented by the State during the trial confirmed that defendant had vaginal and anal intercourse with the victim. While defendant did not testify during the trial, the defense presented the hypothesis of innocence that the sexual acts were consensual.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In the sole assignment of error, defendant argues that his two appointed trial attorneys were ineffective in failing to object to the State's calling attention to defendant's post-arrest and Miranda silence or in failing to request a jury instruction to disregard the references. Defendant contends that references to his silence were calculated violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically intended to prejudice the jury against him. Defendant argues there was no valid, strategic reason for his counsel's failure to object. Defendant notes that he did not testify on his own behalf at the trial and the jury was never instructed to disregard the references to his post-arrest and Miranda silence. Defendant also notes that the victim had been impeached by her initial statements following the incident. He argues that the jury must have viewed his silence as a tacit admission of guilt. Finally, defendant concludes that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance the result of the trial would have been different.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has indicated that, under the authority of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 771, where the prosecutor or a witness makes a reference to a defendant's post-arrest silence, the trial court is required, upon the request of the defendant or the State, to promptly admonish the jury. In such cases where the court is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the defendant a fair trial, upon motion of the defendant, the court may grant a mistrial. State v. Kersey, 406 So.2d 555, 560 (La. 1981).

Herein, no objection, request for admonition, or motion for mistrial was lodged as the witness gave the testimony in question. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must state an objection contemporaneously with the occurrence of the alleged error, as well as the grounds for the objection. LSA-C.E. art. 103A(1); LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 841A. The purpose behind the contemporaneous objection rule is to put the trial court on notice of an alleged irregularity so that it may cure the problem and to prevent the defendant from gambling on a favorable verdict, then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by an objection. State v. Lanclos, 07-0082 (La. 4/8/08), 980 So.2d 643, 648. Since defendant did not lodge an objection, he is precluded from raising the issue on appeal. See State v. Tipton, 95-2483 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97), 705 So.2d 1142, 1147-48. However, as previously stated, defendant argues on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting or requesting an admonition. Thus, this court will address the issue in an ineffective assistance of counsel context.

A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13, of the Louisiana Constitution. When a defendant seeks reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish two separate elements to succeed. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

The Strickland inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. Thus, in evaluating the performance of counsel, the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. State v. Morgan, 472 So.2d 934, 937 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985). A failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. State v. Robinson, 471 So.2d 1035, 1038-39 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 476 So.2d 350 (La. 1985).

When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal, the issue is generally referred to post-conviction proceedings in which both sides can introduce evidence and the validity of the claim can be properly determined. State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1339 (La. 1990).3 However, where the record discloses evidence needed to decide the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel and that issue was raised by assignment of error on appeal, the issue may be addressed in the interest of judicial economy. See State v. Bourgeois, 451 So.2d 172, 174 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 457 So.2d 18 (La. 1984). In this matter, the record is sufficient to decide the issue raised in defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument. We will therefore address the defendant's claim.

The following pertinent colloquy took place during the State's direct examination of Sergeant Hauck:

At this point the State introduced photographs of the visible injuries on defendant's body that were taken after defendant received his Miranda warnings. When the State asked Sergeant Hauck if she recognized the photographs of defendant, Sergeant Hauck responded, in pertinent part:

As noted, defense counsel did not object to the references to defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent.

In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the use, for impeachment purposes, of the defendant's silence at the time of arrest and after receiving the Miranda warnings, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 74-75, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 1128, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000). However, not every mention of the defendant's post-arrest silence is prohibited by Doyle. As emphasized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. George, 95-0110 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 975, 980, Doyle condemns only "the use for impeachment purposes" of the defendant's post-arrest silence. A brief reference to post-arrest silence does not mandate a mistrial or reversal where the trial as a whole was fairly conducted, the proof of guilt is strong, and the State made no use of the silence for impeachment. See State v. Smith, 336 So.2d 867, 868-70 (La. 1976). See also State v. Stelly, 93-1090 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/94), 635 So.2d 725, 728-29, writ denied, 94-1211 (La. 9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1309. Further, the State is allowed reference to the defendant's post-arrest silence when the line of questioning is an attempt to summarize the extent of the police investigation and is not designed to exploit the defendant's failure to claim his innocence after his arrest in an effort to impeach his testimony or attack his defense. See George, 661 So.2d at 979-80.

We find that the references to post-arrest silence herein did not warrant a mistrial or prejudice the defendant.4 The State ultimately elicited from Sergeant Hauck the fact that photographs were taken of the defendant's visible injuries after he was given his Miranda warnings. The State did not pursue the above line of questioning for the purpose of calling the jury's attention to defendant's post-arrest silence or having the jury make an inappropriate inference. See Stelly, 635 So.2d at 728-29. Further, the second reference was clearly unsolicited and the State did not bring further attention to the issue. The references to defendant's post-Miranda silence were brief, and the trial as a whole was conducted fairly. Moreover, defendant did not testify at the trial and thus, the testimony in question certainly was not used for impeachment purposes. Although the victim, when questioned at the hospital, did not initially disclose the identity of the attacker, the next day she came to the police station with her mother and identified defendant as the attacker. Sergeant Hauck testified that rape victims typically delay disclosing details due to embarrassment. During the trial, the victim gave a detailed account of the brutal physical attack and rape. The victim consistently, from the initial report and during subsequent accounts, indicated that she was physically attacked, that the attacker pulled a knife on her, and that he anally, orally, and repeatedly vaginally raped her. As stated, defendant did not testify, nor did the defense present any evidence, and the jury apparently accepted the victim's testimony.

Accordingly, defendant's post-arrest silence was not used against him within the meaning of Doyle. We do not find error in defense counsel's decision to not object, request for admonition, or move for a mistrial. Further, defendant did not suffer such substantial prejudice that he was deprived of any reasonable expectation of a fair trial. Based on the foregoing, defendant has failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Thus, we find that defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, and his sole assignment of error is without merit.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.