NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

McDONALD, Judge.

Defendant, Carl Anthony Duperon, was charged by bill of information with one count of aggravated arson, a violation of La. R.S. 14:51. He pled not guilty and, after a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The trial court denied defendant's motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal, and he was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for eighteen years, with the first two years of his sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. He now appeals, alleging one counseled assignment of error and three pro se assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

Around 9:30 p.m. on June 5, 2011, Lieutenant Kevin Dupuy of the Slidell Police Department received a complaint from a motorist that a thin black male in a light-colored shirt appeared to be attempting to set fire to a small, blue building on U.S. Highway 190 West.1 According to the motorist, the blue building was near Camellia Cafe.

Upon initially responding to the complaint, Lieutenant Dupuy and other officers were unable to locate a small, blue building in the immediate vicinity of Camellia Cafe. As he was canvassing the general area, Lieutenant Dupuy saw a silver BMW pull out of the driveway of what he believed to be a vacant residence at 826 Gause Boulevard West, approximately two blocks from Camellia Cafe. After following the BMW for approximately two blocks, Lieutenant Dupuy executed a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was being driven by defendant.

When defendant exited the vehicle, Lieutenant Dupuy observed that he matched the description of the black male from the motorist's complaint. Notably, defendant was thin and wearing a pink shirt. In response to Lieutenant Dupuy's questioning, defendant admitted that he had come from the residence at 826 Gause Boulevard West, stating that he was looking for a friend who owed him money. At that time, Lieutenant Dupuy looked into the interior of defendant's vehicle, and he saw an open Budweiser beer can on the driver's side floorboard and a mop bucket containing a two-liter Sprite bottle, which itself held a clear liquid on the passenger's side floorboard. Lieutenant Dupuy radioed the other responding officers and asked them to check the residence at 826 Gause Boulevard West for any potential signs of arson. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Jacob Morris informed Lieutenant Dupuy that smoke was emanating from the back side of the house. Lieutenant Dupuy immediately placed defendant under arrest.

Deputy Morris and another responding officer put out the fire, described as "a small to medium size flame," with a fire extinguisher. As Deputy Morris was attempting to extinguish the fire, the owner of the residence opened her window and asked the officers why they were on her property, as she was unaware that her home was on fire.

After his arrest, defendant was transported to the police station for questioning. Defendant was read his Miranda2 rights and then interviewed by Detective Brian Brown. Defendant repeated to Detective Brown the story he had told Lieutenant Dupuy about searching for a friend who owed him money. Detective Brown then informed defendant that Lieutenant Dupuy had opened the two-liter bottle from his car and found that the liquid inside smelled like gasoline. In response, defendant told Detective Brown that he used it when he would weed eat for people. However, defendant did not respond when Detective Brown told him that weed eaters often use a gas and oil mixture. Upon further observation, Detective Brown noticed that defendant's clothing smelled faintly of smoke and that defendant appeared to have lighter burns on the tips of his fingers. A lighter was among the items seized from defendant's vehicle.

At trial, St. Tammany Parish fireman Donald Keith Estes testified as an expert in arson investigation. In his opinion, the fire at 826 Gause Boulevard West had been set intentionally, but no combustible liquids or accelerants were used to start the fire. Further, he stated that if the fire had not been spotted when it was, the entire structure would have erupted into flames quickly. For that reason, he concluded that the fire had only been burning for a short period of time. Mr. Estes also testified that the fire could have been started with a lighter alone.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his only counseled assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle without a warrant because Lieutenant Dupuy did not have reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime when he conducted the traffic stop. In his second pro se assignment of error, defendant makes a similar argument in alleging that there was no corroboration of the anonymous tip before the traffic stop.

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution, a search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Griffin, 2007-0974 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/8/08), 984 So.2d 97, 109. Moreover, when challenged by a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Warren, 2005-2248 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1226. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is entitled to great weight, because the court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Jones, 2001-0908 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/02), 835 So.2d 703, 706, writ denied, 2002-2989 (La. 4/21/03), 841 So.2d 791. Consequently, when a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 281. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751. Further, the entire record, not merely the evidence adduced at the motion to suppress hearing, is reviewable by the appellate court in considering the correctness of a ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress. See State v. Francise, 597 So.2d 28, 30 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 604 So.2d 970 (La. 1992).

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the grounds that "the searches and/or seizures involved herein: 1. Were effected pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant; 2. Were not made incident to a lawful arrest; 3. Were conducted absent exigent circumstances; 4. Were not pursuant to the `plain view' doctrine; 5. Were conducted without the defendant's consent; or 6. Were not made in a `close pursuit' situation." Thus, defendant's sole relevant contention in his motion to suppress addressed only the assertion that the actual search of his vehicle "was conducted without the authority of a valid search warrant." After the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that the evidence found in defendant's vehicle "was seized adjacent to arrest" and not subject to suppression.

Though defendant now argues on appeal that Lieutenant Dupuy did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had committed a crime when he conducted the traffic stop, and further that Lieutenant Dupuy had not corroborated the anonymous tip before conducting the traffic stop, the defendant did not raise these arguments to the trial court. It is well settled that a new basis or ground for the motion to suppress cannot be articulated for the first time on appeal. State v. Brown, 434 So.2d 399, 402 (La. 1983). Doing so is prohibited under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 703(F) and 841, since the trial court would not be afforded an opportunity to consider the merits of the particular claims. See also State v. Peters, 546 So.2d 829, 831 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 552 So.2d 378 (La. 1989). Therefore, we do not address the arguments raised in these assignments of error.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first and third pro se assignments of error, defendant appears to argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated arson. Specifically, in his first pro se assignment of error defendant appears to argue that his "uncorroborated confession" was not enough to demonstrate that the fire was a result of "someone's criminal activity." Further, in his third pro se assignment of error, defendant appears to argue that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the fire was deliberately set by him, as opposed to an accidental or spontaneous occurrence.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.

Aggravated arson is the "intentional damaging by any explosive substance or the setting fire to any structure, watercraft, or movable whereby it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered." La. R.S. 14:51. Defendant does not appear to dispute that a fire occurred at 826 Gause Boulevard West, or that human life was endangered as a result of that fire. Instead, he seems to argue that his statements to Detective Brown alone cannot establish his culpability and that there is no other evidence linking him to the fire or to show that the fire was intentionally set.

We agree with defendant's contention that he could not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession without proof that a crime has been committed by someone. See State v. Celestine, 452 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984). However, under the circumstances of this case, we doubt that defendant's statements to Detective Brown should in any sense be considered a "confession." Defendant's statements amounted to his story that he went to the residence looking for a friend who owed him money, his stating that he possessed gas because he performed weed eating services for people, and his claims that the burn marks on his hands were old scars and not recent injuries. On their face, these statements do not rise to the level of an "uncorroborated confession" because defendant never admits any responsibility for the offense. If these statements had been the only evidence of defendant's guilt offered at trial, any rational jury should have found the defendant not guilty.

Discussion of defendant's first pro se assignment of error necessarily dovetails with consideration of his third pro se assignment of error, which claims that the State failed to prove that any criminal act whatsoever occurred. Under the Louisiana corpus delicti rule, an accused cannot be convicted on the basis of his own uncorroborated confession without proof that a crime has been committed by someone. This independent proof need not go to every element of the offense, and it may be either direct or circumstantial in nature. The prosecution must show that the injury specified in the crime occurred and that the injury was caused by someone's criminal activity. See State v. Thibodeaux, 98-1673 (La. 9/8/99), 750 So.2d 916, 926-27, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1112, 120 S.Ct. 1969, 146 L.Ed.2d 800 (2000).

In the instant case, Mr. Estes testified that the fire at 826 Gause Boulevard West was intentionally set, as opposed to an accidental or spontaneous fire. Mr. Estes also indicated that the fire had only been burning for a short period of time and that it could have been ignited with only a lighter. This uncontroverted testimony was itself sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the fire occurred as a result of someone's criminal act. Lieutenant Dupuy's observation of defendant pulling out of the residence's driveway, as well as defendant's own statements to Detective Brown, were sufficient to allow the jury to conclude based on circumstantial evidence that defendant was present at the residence when the fire started. Finally, considering that defendant's clothing smelled like smoke and that his fingertips appeared to be burned, the jury did not act irrationally in concluding that defendant actually set fire to the residence at 826 Gause Boulevard West.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was guilty of aggravated arson. Lieutenant Dupuy observed defendant leaving the occupied residence where the fire occurred shortly before other officers discovered the flames, and Mr. Estes established the fact that the fire had been set intentionally. These assignments of error are without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.