NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
GAIDRY, J.
The defendant, William David Lauga, was charged by bill of information with armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64. He pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty by a unanimous verdict. He made motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, which were both denied by the trial court. He was sentenced to sixty-five years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. He moved for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied. He then appealed his conviction and sentence to this Court. State v. Lauga, 2010-2209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/10/11). In an unpublished decision, this Court affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. The trial court then resentenced the defendant to sixty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. He now appeals, raising two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction and the sentence.
FACTS
The following facts are essentially repeated from our opinion in this matter in 2010-KA-2209.
On January 25, 2009, Joseph Brooks was working as a bartender at Tooloula's in St. Tammany Parish. At approximately 1:30 a.m., as Brooks was cleaning and preparing for closing, a male patron entered. The patron, who was clad in a navy blue jacket with a name tag and a U.S. Marshal patch on the sleeve, sat at the bar and engaged in conversation with Brooks. According to Brooks, the man stated he was a U.S. Marshal with the New Orleans Division and indicated he was investigating an armed robbery. He provided a description of the alleged suspect. Brooks advised that he had not seen anyone matching the description and proceeded to discuss a recent patron whom he considered suspicious.
After conversing with Brooks for a while, the man left the bar area and went to the restroom. Brooks continued cleaning. The man later exited the restroom and returned to the bar area. He and Brooks engaged in further conversation. At some point, the man told Brooks he needed to retrieve some paperwork from his vehicle. When he returned, he and Brooks continued to talk about the suspicious patron. Approximately ten minutes later, the man pulled out a gun and held it to Brooks's neck. Brooks pushed the perpetrator away from him and ran out the front door. Outside, the perpetrator threatened to "blow [Brooks's] f-ing head off," grabbed Brooks by his shirt, and threw him onto the ground. He then pointed the gun at Brooks and instructed him to get up and "don't [do] nothing [sic] stupid." Brooks stood up and ran away. The perpetrator chased Brooks, threatening to shoot him and demanding money.
Eventually, the perpetrator discontinued the pursuit and returned to the bar. Once Brooks realized that he was no longer being chased, he used his cell phone to contact the police. Brooks watched as the perpetrator exited the bar and ran north through the parking lot into an apartment complex. Meanwhile, Deputy Sean Beavers of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office arrived on the scene. Brooks returned to the bar, advised Deputy Beavers of what occurred, and provided a physical description of the perpetrator. Brooks also observed that the money that had been in his tip jar (three $1 bills and a few quarters) was gone.
On February 16, 2009, Brooks identified the defendant, from a six-person photographic lineup, as the individual who pretended to be a U.S. Marshal and eventually robbed him at gunpoint on the night in question. Brooks also identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery in open court during the trial. Brooks testified that he got a good look at the defendant, whom he believed to be a marshal, for approximately twenty-five minutes. Brooks emphasized that there was no doubt in his mind that the defendant was the person who had robbed him.
At the defendant's trial, Elissa Lee testified regarding an evening she and her friend, Amanda Smith, spent in the company of the defendant and an individual named "Jeremy" at Mudbugs in Slidell. Lee testified that, at some point during the encounter, which lasted approximately three hours, the defendant pulled out a badge and stated that he was a U.S. Marshal. The defendant told Lee and Smith that they were under arrest and requested that the women leave the bar with Jeremy and him. The women refused. However, they continued to "hang out" with the men inside of Mudbugs. According to Lee, the defendant was wearing a "law enforcement hat." Approximately two weeks later, Lee identified the defendant from a photographic lineup as the purported U.S. Marshal she conversed with at Mudbugs. Lee also identified the defendant in open court at the defendant's trial.
The defendant testified on his own behalf at the trial. He denied committing the armed robbery at issue and presented a defense of misidentification. He claimed he was asleep at a friend's house when the offense occurred. Regarding Lee's testimony, the defendant admitted that he met Lee and Smith at Mudbugs approximately five days after the date of the robbery in this case. However, he denied ever showing the women a badge or claiming to be a U.S. Marshal.
In addition to introducing evidence regarding the Tooloula's robbery, pursuant to La. Code Evid. art. 404(B), the State introduced evidence that the defendant was involved in another, unrelated, armed robbery that occurred in Orleans Parish. The defendant was never prosecuted for that crime. At the trial of the instant matter, Rebecca Gilbert testified that on June 2, 2008, she was working as a cashier at Paradise Casino in Orleans Parish. At some time between 1:30 to 2:30 a.m., the defendant entered the casino, held a gun to the head of the security guard, and threatened to kill him. The defendant then escorted the guard over to the cashier station at gunpoint and demanded that Gilbert give him money. She filled a bag the defendant handed her with approximately $15,000 in cash. The defendant instructed Gilbert and the security guard to lie down on the floor. Once they complied, he fled.
Gilbert testified the defendant was wearing a black cap, black clothing and black face paint. She identified him in a pretrial photographic lineup as the robber. However, she explained she later refused to cooperate with the investigation of the case because she feared for her life. The charge against the defendant for the Orleans Parish robbery was not pursued by the district attorney.1 Gilbert identified the defendant in open court at the instant trial as the individual who robbed her. She explained that although she still feared for her life, she was willing to testify at the instant trial because she felt that her failure to cooperate with the Orleans Parish robbery investigation resulted in someone else being "victimized."
Detective Gregory Powell, of the New Orleans Police Department, testified that he reviewed the video surveillance footage from Paradise Casino in connection with his investigation of the armed robbery in Orleans Parish. According to him, the defendant was observed wearing a hat with the letters "SWAT" on it, a large black coat, and some blue or purple gloves on his hands, and he left the casino in a white Ford Expedition. Detective Powell later determined that the defendant owned a white Ford Expedition. When Detective Powell compiled a photographic lineup and presented it to Gilbert, she positively identified the defendant as the person who committed the robbery.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 & 2
In two related assignments of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider his sentence, which he argues is constitutionally excessive.
As an initial matter, we note that the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence following the original sentencing hearing, but did not make a new motion after resentencing. The motion to reconsider alleged that the sentence was constitutionally excessive, that the interests of justice require a less severe sentence, and all reasons orally argued before the court at the time of sentencing. At the original sentencing hearing, the defendant argued that the sentence was excessive because he was a first offender. The defendant also filed a pro se motion to reconsider in which he argued that he was innocent, and that the trial court failed to give the defense the presentence investigation report (PSI) for consideration in setting a fair sentence. Under La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(E), a defendant must make or file a motion to reconsider sentence setting forth the "specific ground" upon which the motion is based in order to raise an objection to the sentence on appeal. If the defendant does not allege any specific ground for his claim of excessiveness or present any argument or evidence not previously considered by the court at original sentencing, he is relegated on appeal to a review of his bare claim of excessiveness. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La. 1993) (per curiam). In the instant matter, though the defendant did not make a new motion for reconsideration of sentence, because the trial court imposed an identical sentence, we will consider all of the arguments included in his motions to reconsider sentence filed after the original sentencing.
Article 1, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in the light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. A trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Hurst, 99-2868 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So.2d 75, 83, writ denied, 2000-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So.2d 962.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth items which must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. While the trial court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894.1, the record must reflect that it adequately considered the guidelines. State v. Williams, 521 So.2d 629, 633 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness must consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Watkins, 532 So.2d 1182, 1186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). However, the goal of Article 894.1 is the articulation of the factual basis for a sentence, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. See State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). Even when a trial court assigns no reasons, the sentence will be set aside on appeal and remanded for resentencing only if the record is either inadequate or clearly indicates that the sentence is excessive. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.4(D); State v. Harris, 601 So.2d 775, 779 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
For the crime of armed robbery, the defendant was exposed to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:64(B). Thus, the trial court's sentence of sixty-five years imprisonment at hard labor falls within the statutory guidelines.
At the sentencing hearing following remand, the trial court gave the same sentence given at the original sentencing hearing, and adopted all of the reasons articulated at that time. At the first sentencing hearing, the trial court said it was particularly disturbed by the fact that this case, as opposed to many other cases of armed robbery, did not involve drug activity, which made the defendant's case more sinister. The trial court also considered that the defendant represented himself to be in law enforcement and then used that representation to prey upon the victim. Considering Article 894.1, the trial court said that there was an undue risk of the defendant committing further violent crimes, that his conduct during the crime manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim when he said he was going to kill him, that he used a position of alleged status to try to get his victim to go along with him, and that he used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense. The defendant also used a firearm. Over the defendant's objection, the court also considered the Article 404(B) evidence that came in at trial as evidence that the defendant had been involved in similar offenses, which showed a criminal history and something that would have been considered as part of a multiple-offender adjudication. The court did not state whether or not it considered the PSI, but it did state that there were no Article 894.1 mitigating factors. Finally, the trial court said there was no doubt that the defendant was a serious and grave risk to the community and that he had proven himself unfit to be part of any community.
We find that the trial court's reasons for the sentence adequately demonstrate compliance with Article 894.1. The trial court articulated several reasons why it felt the defendant was a particular threat to the community, and why the circumstances of the crime dictated that the defendant be kept in a custodial environment. In addition, although the defendant is a first-felony offender, the trial court properly considered the prior armed robbery in Orleans Parish, for which the defendant was never prosecuted. Though the defendant argued pro se that the trial court did not give the defense the PSI in considering a fair sentence, a review of the record shows that the defendant never requested to view the PSI. Further, a trial court considers the case's aggravating and mitigating factors before imposing a sentence, but ultimately it can sentence a defendant on whichever grounds it believes most relevant. In other words, the trial court has much discretion in sentencing. See State v. Milstead, 95-1983 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 1274, 1277, writ denied, 96-2601 (La. 3/27/97), 692 So.2d 392.
Based on the facts adduced at trial, that the sentence is well within the statutory limits, and given the trial court's wide discretion in the imposition of sentences, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to sixty-five years at hard labor. Accordingly, these assignments of error are without merit.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
