NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HIGGINBOTHAM, J.

The defendant, Timothy Junek, was charged by bill of information with sexual battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, both of which the district court denied. He was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a constitutionally excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

The defendant1 was in a relationship with K.B.'s2 aunt and was living in K.B.'s grandparents' trailer with K.B.'s aunt on July 29, 2009. K.B. and one of her sisters were also at the trailer that night, watching television in the living room. K.B.'s aunt went to lie down in a bedroom, leaving the defendant alone with the two girls in the living room. While K.B.'s aunt was out of the room, the defendant took K.B.'s hand and made her touch his penis. The defendant asked K.B. if she knew what she was touching and laughed when she responded negatively. After hearing some noise in the living room, K.B.'s aunt returned to find the defendant seated next to K.B. with a blanket over himself.

The next day, K.B. reported the incident to her sister, who told their mother. K.B.'s mother contacted K.B.'s father, and the two decided to go the trailer and confront the defendant. Upon arrival at the trailer, K.B.'s father put the defendant in a headlock and asked the defendant "Do you like to touch little girls" or "you like to let little girls touch you." The defendant responded, "I don't remember that." Punches were thrown, and the police were called. When the police arrived, the defendant was lying on the floor, bleeding. The defendant asked the police officer if he could walk to the sink to spit out the blood, but ran out the back door when the officer was not looking. Later that night, the defendant turned himself in.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In defendant's sole assignment of error, he contends that the district court's sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is excessive.

Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266, 267 (La. 1982). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. Id. A trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982).

Whoever commits the crime of sexual battery on a victim under thirteen years of age when the offender is seventeen years of age or older shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-nine years.3 At least twenty-five years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:43.1C(2). The district court sentenced the defendant to the minimum statutory sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Even though a sentence is the mandatory minimum sentence, it may still be excessive if it makes no "measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" or amounts to nothing more than the "purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (La. 1993). In order for a defendant to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, he must "clearly and convincingly" show that:

State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676 (quoting State v. Young, 94-1636 (La. App. 4th Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 525, 528). Departures downward from the minimum sentence should only occur in rare situations. See Johnson, 709 So.2d at 677.4

At the sentencing hearing, the defendant addressed the court, apologized for "wasting everybody's time[,]" and asked the court to "have some mercy on" him. The district court considered the defendant's statement as well as a pre-sentence investigation report that recommended a sentence within the statutory guidelines. Before sentencing the defendant, the court noted that the defendant had a fair trial and that there was ample evidence for the jury to have convicted him.

Defendant argues that the district court failed to comply with La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1, which sets forth items that must be considered by the district court before imposing a sentence. However, the goal of Article 894.1 is the articulation of the factual basis for a sentence, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. See Lanclos, 419 So.2d at 478. Even when a trial court assigns no reasons, the sentence will be set aside on appeal and remanded for resentencing only if the record is either inadequate or clearly indicates that the sentence is excessive. See La. Code Crim. P. art 881.4(D); State v. Harris, 601 So.2d 775, 779 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).

We have reviewed the record and find that it supports the sentence imposed. Based on our review, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the statutory minimum sentence. The only mitigating factors cited by the defendant in his brief are his "relative youth" at the time of the offense and his status as a first felony offender. We do not find these factors to be sufficient circumstances to warrant a downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment at hard labor for twenty-five years. Moreover, we do not find that the defendant has "clearly and convincingly" shown that he is "exceptional." See Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676. He has failed to cite any unusual or exceptional circumstances to show that he is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign a sentence meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Therefore, there was no reason for the district court to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.

The assignment of error lacks merit.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.