NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WHIPPLE, Judge.

The defendant, Ricardo Tenorio-Palma, was charged by bill of information with one count of attempted first degree murder (count I), a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and LSA-R.S. 14:30; and one count of armed robbery (count II), a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:64. He pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, and was sentenced on each count to fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with the sentences to run concurrently with each other. He now appeals, contending that his guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder and to armed robbery placed him in double jeopardy and that the trial court sentenced him in violation of the plea agreement. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

Due to the guilty pleas in this matter, there was no trial and, thus, no trial testimony concerning the offenses. The State and the defense, however, stipulated that the victim, Ms. Ula Reynolds, would testify that she was familiar with the defendant because he had hung Christmas tree lights for her before the incident and that on the day of the incident, he had come into her home, forcibly taken property1 from her, and caused a life-threatening injury to her neck with a sharp object.2 The bill of information charged the defendant committed the offenses on December 16, 2009.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In assignment of error number 1, the defendant argues his guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder and armed robbery placed him in double jeopardy because the only basis for a finding of first degree murder in this case was the fact that an armed robbery occurred while the defendant was attempting to kill the victim.

In considering defendant's arguments, we initially note that the defendant's guilty pleas did not waive the issue of double jeopardy. See State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 588 (La. 1976). Further, the federal and state constitutions both provide that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; La. Const. art. I, § 15. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects the accused against multiple punishment for the same offense as well as a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. State v. Willis, 591 So.2d 365, 372 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 594 So.2d 1316 (La. 1992).

In determining whether or not the double jeopardy prohibition has been violated, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized two different tests, i.e., the test established in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 309 (1932),3 and the "same evidence" test. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Louisiana Supreme Court has principally relied on the "same evidence" test when evaluating double jeopardy claims. Wallis, 591 So. 2d at 372.

Under the "same evidence" test, if the proof required to support a finding of guilt of one crime would also support conviction of another crime, the prohibition against double jeopardy bars a conviction for more than one crime. See State v. LeBlanc, 618 So.2d 949, 957 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 95-2216 (La. 10/4/96), 679 So.2d 1372.

The "same evidence" test focuses upon the actual physical and testimonial evidence necessary to secure a conviction. This test depends upon the proof required to convict, not the evidence actually introduced at trial. Thus, under the "same evidence" test, the court's concern is with the "evidential focus" of the facts adduced at trial in light of the verdict rendered, i.e., how the evidence presented goes to satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof. Therefore, "if the evidence required to support a finding of guilt of one crime would also support a conviction for another offense, the defendant can be placed in jeopardy for only one of the two." State v. Sandifer, 95-2226 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 1324, 1329 (emphasis in original).

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. LSA-R.S. 14:27(A).

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30, in pertinent part, provides:

Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon. LSA-R.S. 14:64(A).

The defendant correctly notes that the bill of information did not specify how he committed count I. However, the State granted the defense open-file discovery in this case. Further, at the beginning of the guilty-plea hearing, the State introduced into evidence an October 18, 2010 letter from the victim, stating that prior to the incident, her health was good for "an 84-year-old lady." The State indicated the victim was "in her eighties" and in ill health.

Thereafter, the trial court asked the defendant if he understood he was present in court entering pleas to the charges against him of attempted first degree murder and armed robbery. The defendant answered affirmatively. Subsequently, the court read the portion of the statute the defendant was charged with violating, including, "First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of some enumerated crimes, one of which is armed robbery, or when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is over the age of sixty-five (65) years." The defendant indicated he had no questions. The court then read the definition of armed robbery to the defendant. Thereafter, the State offered a stipulation "based on open file discovery and copies of materials provided to the defense and pre-trial conferences that there is a factual basis for these pleas, Your Honor." Additionally, the State offered that the victim "would come to court and testify that [the defendant] had hung some Christmas tree lights for her previous to this incident and was known to her, came into her home and forcibly took property from her person and caused a life threatening injury to her neck with a sharp object." The defense agreed with the stipulation.

In the instant case, the evidence required to support an armed robbery conviction would not support a conviction for attempted first degree murder based on the age of the victim. The State would also have to establish that the defendant, acting with a specific intent to commit first degree murder, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward killing the victim, and that the victim was sixty-five years of age or older. Similarly, the evidence required to support an attempted first degree murder conviction based on the age of the victim would not support a conviction for armed robbery. Additional evidence would be needed to establish the defendant's taking of anything of value belonging to the victim from her person or that was in her immediate control. Moreover, in this case, separate and apart from the evidence that the defendant took money from the victim and cut her throat, the State presented evidence reflecting that the victim was sixty-five years of age or older. Thus, the State presented independent evidence to establish the defendant committed attempted first degree murder and armed robbery, and the defendant was not placed in double jeopardy.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

VIOLATION OF PLEA AGREEMENT

In assignment of error number 2, the defendant argues that the trial court imposed a sentence greater than the sentence agreed to in the plea agreement.

At the guilty-plea hearing, the defense stated "it is also my understanding the Court has agreed to impose a sentence of not more than total of fifty (50) years in this matter." The trial court stated, "That's correct."

At the sentencing hearing, the State indicated the defendant had pled guilty "as part of a plea bargain agreement which was fifty (50) years." The court then sentenced the defendant, on each count, to fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with the sentences to run concurrently with each other. There was no violation of the plea agreement. See State v. Gray, 434 So.2d 447, 447-48 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1983) (three concurrent sentences of twenty years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence did not violate plea agreement for sentences that "would not total more than 25 years.").

This assignment of error is also without merit.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES ON COUNTS I AND II AFFIRMED.