NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WHIPPLE, C.J.

The defendant, Deborah Tina Littell, was charged by bill of information with distribution of Schedule II and III controlled dangerous substances, to wit: oxycodone (count one), hydrocodone (count two), and cocaine (count three), in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(A) and LSA-R.S. 40:968(A).1 See also LSA-R.S. 40:964 Schedule II(A)(1)(p) & (4) and Schedule III(D)(1)(d). The defendant pled not guilty on all three counts. The State severed count one. However, counts two and three proceeded to trial by jury.2 After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on counts two and three. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor on both counts two and three, to be served concurrently. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied by the trial court. On count one, after the defendant withdrew her former not-guilty plea and pled guilty, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment at hard labor, with two years to be served without benefit of parole. The sentence imposed on count one was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts two and three.

The defendant now appeals, assigning as error that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and the sentences imposed on counts one and three. On count two, we affirm the conviction, but vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 30, 2011, Detective Katherine Domain, as an undercover agent of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office Narcotics Task Force, called the defendant to make arrangements to purchase hydrocodone and cocaine. They initially agreed to meet the following day, May 31, in the parking lot of a Goodwill Store in Covington to complete the hydrocodone transaction for ten tablets at eight dollars per tablet for a total of eighty dollars.

At the time of the scheduled transaction, approximately 3:30 p.m. on May 31, Detective Domain was equipped with a Kel audio recording device to allow detectives in the surrounding area to monitor the transaction, and two hundred dollars, which were photocopied and documented narcotics funds. The defendant exited her vehicle, entered Detective Domain's vehicle, gave the detective a paper towel enclosing tablets suspected to contain hydrocodone, and began finalizing plans to complete a cocaine transaction later that evening. Detective Domain paid the defendant eighty dollars in narcotics funds and inquired about missing tablets. The defendant stated that she would only provide seven tablets for the funds, indicating that the cost included her gas and travel expenses. After the transaction was complete, Detective Domain gave the evidence to the case officer, Detective Anthony Holloway of the Sheriff's Office Narcotics Task Force.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., as agreed, the parties met at a food mart in Folsom. Detective Domain was again equipped with a monitoring device and narcotics funds. The defendant again entered the detective's vehicle and gave the detective the suspected cocaine, for which the detective paid one hundred forty dollars of narcotics funds. As soon as the hand-to-hand exchange was complete, Detective Domain communicated a predetermined password to the monitoring detectives, who then approached and formally arrested the defendant. The detectives also pretended to arrest the detective to protect her identity. Detective Domain again gave the evidence to Detective Holloway. The evidence was submitted to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office Crime Laboratory and determined to contain hydrocodone and cocaine.3,4

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In her sole assignment of error, the defendant contends that the court should have deviated from the mandatory sentence imposed. She argues that Louisiana's fiscal crisis is, in part, caused by high incarceration rates and harsh sentences that cause needless pain and suffering. Further, the defendant argues that the ten and fifteen-year concurrent sentences imposed in this case are unnecessarily harsh and oppressive. The defendant notes that she has no prior convictions and that the instant offenses consist of one episode of criminal activity that may have been committed to support a drug habit. Contending that the trial court inadequately considered her personal history, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to provide sufficient reasons to support the sentences as required by LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. Specifically, she notes that mitigating factors such as the non-violent nature of the crimes, her lack of a criminal record, her two-year college education, and her probability of rehabilitation and becoming a contributing member of society were not considered. Finally, the defendant argues that Louisiana needs to reform sentencing practices and increase alternative treatment programs and concludes that the incarceration in the instant case is excessive and is a waste of the state's limited resources.

Sentencing Error

On counts two and three, the defendant was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor, to be served concurrently. On count two, the defendant was convicted of distribution of hydrocodone, a Schedule III controlled dangerous substance, in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(A). Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:968(B), "[a]ny person who violates Subsection A with respect to any controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule III shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not more than ten years; and, in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars." Thus, the fifteen-year sentence imposed on count two is beyond the statutory maximum term of imprisonment. Therefore, as conceded by the State on appeal and evidenced by the above provisions, the defendant's sentence with regard to the distribution of hydrocodone conviction is illegal. Although the defendant has not raised this issue on appeal, this court has a statutory duty to inspect for sentencing errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and to correct them regardless of whether such errors are raised by the State or the defendant. LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 882 and 920(2).

Further, Article 882 permits an appellate court to correct an illegal sentence on review. However, in this case the trial court also had the discretion to impose a fine. To the extent that the amendment of the defendant's sentence entails more than a ministerial correction of a sentencing error, a sua sponte correction by a court of appeal is not sanctioned by the jurisprudence. See State v. Haynes, 2004-1893 (La. 12/10/04), 889 So.2d 224 (per curiam). Because of the sentencing discretion involved, we vacate the sentence for the distribution of hydrocodone conviction and remand for resentencing on that conviction. Since the sentence is hereby vacated, we pretermit consideration of defendant's excessive- sentence arguments as to count two. See State v. Morgan, 2006-0506 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 500, 501-02. Thus, the defendant's arguments are addressed herein only as to counts one and three.

Excessive Sentence

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive or cruel punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. The sentence imposed will not be set aside absent a showing of manifest abuse of the trial court's wide discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. State v. Andrews, 94-0842 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 448, 454.

At the outset, we note that the defendant did not object at the sentencing hearing that the trial court failed to comply with LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, nor did she include this ground in her motion to reconsider sentence. Thus, Article 881.1(E) precludes the defendant from raising this issue on appeal. Moreover, we note that even when a trial court has not complied with Article 894.1, this court is not required to remand the case for resentencing, unless the sentence imposed is apparently severe in relation to the particular offender or offense committed. State v. Pender, 521 So.2d 556, 557 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).

Further, we note that the jury's verdict was rendered October 26, 2011, and the defendant was sentenced on February 16, 2012. She filed her motion to reconsider sentence on February 24, 2012. Subsequently, on February 27, 2012, the defendant pled guilty to distribution of oxycodone (count one) and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor, with two years to be served without benefit of parole, to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts two and three. After the ten-year sentence was imposed, the trial court immediately asked the defendant if the sentence complied with the plea agreement and she responded affirmatively. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1(A)(1) provides: "In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to reconsider sentence." (Emphasis added.) One purpose of the motion to reconsider sentence is to allow the defendant to raise any errors that may have occurred during sentencing while the trial judge still has the jurisdiction to change or correct the sentence. The defendant may point out such errors or deficiencies, or may present argument or evidence not considered in the original sentencing, thereby preventing the necessity of a remand for resentencing. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La. 1993) (per curiam). An objection to a sentence or a motion to reconsider sentence filed before the sentence is imposed is premature. Thus, to the extent that the defendant is now raising the constitutionality of the sentence imposed on the count one distribution-of-oxycodone conviction, which resulted from her guilty plea on February 27, 2012, the record shows the defendant did not make or file a timely oral or written motion to reconsider sentence pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.1.

Under the clear language of Article 881.1(E), the defendant's failure to timely make or file a motion to reconsider sentence and include these specific grounds for the motion precludes her from urging same for the first time on appeal. Thus, the defendant is procedurally barred from appealing the sentence imposed on the distribution-of-oxycodone guilty-plea conviction on count one. See State v. Felder, 2000-2887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, 369, writ denied, 2001-3027 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173. Moreover, because the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced as agreed, she is precluded from seeking review of this sentence pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2). Nonetheless, in accordance with our review of the record as follows, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in imposing the sentence.

Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), the defendant was subject to a sentencing range of two to thirty years on counts one and three. Thus, the ten-year sentence imposed on count one is at the lower end of the sentencing range, and the fifteen-year sentence imposed on count three is in the middle of the sentencing range. Prior to imposing the sentences, the trial court inquired as to the defendant's age, which was thirty-eight years at the time, and discussed at trial. The court noted that the audio recordings of the transactions revealed the defendant's participation in a "significant drug enterprise." The trial court specifically noted that the defendant referred to putting in an order for certain drugs and indicated that the cocaine she sold "came straight off the block." The trial court noted the defendant's indication that the transaction involved the second batch of drugs that she received, since the first batch that she evaluated was unacceptable. Further, the defendant advised the purchaser to "let her know" if she did not like the cocaine, adding that she would replace it in that case.

We note that the defendant was convicted in this case as a distributor, not a user. We further note that drug offenses are not victimless crimes. Indeed, as noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, drug offenses affect not only the user, but society in general through higher medical costs, higher unemployment rates, loss of tax revenue from those unemployed, and associated crimes. See State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 678. Moreover, this court will not set aside a sentence on the ground of excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D). Considering the great discretion afforded to the trial court in fashioning the defendant's punishment and bearing in mind the nature of the crimes, we find that the record provides ample justification for the sentences. The sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses or shocking to the sense of justice and, therefore, are not unconstitutionally excessive. Thus, we find no merit in the assignment of error.

DECREE

For the reasons set forth above, we hereby affirm the defendant's convictions and the sentences imposed on counts one and three. The sentence imposed on count two is hereby vacated and the matter is remanded for resentencing.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES IMPOSED ON COUNTS ONE AND THREE AFFIRMED. CONVICTION ON COUNT TWO AFFIRMED; SENTENCE IMPOSED ON COUNT TWO VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.