NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HUGHES, J.

This is an appeal of a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs/appellees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This suit arose from an automobile accident that occurred on April 25, 2009, on Greenwell Springs Road in East Baton Rouge Parish. A vehicle operated by the defendant/appellant, Shalyn Guillory, rear-ended a vehicle operated by plaintiff/appellee, Terri Hollins. Ms. Hollins filed suit against Ms. Guillory and her insurer, Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau),1 individually and on behalf of her two minor children, Centraia Curry and Jacy Hobson, whom she alleged were passengers in the vehicle at the time of the accident. Ms. Sharon Young also joined in the suit against Ms. Guillory and Farm Bureau on behalf of her minor child, Kelly Smith, whom she alleged was also a passenger in the Hollins vehicle at the time of the accident.2

The investigating officer, Corporal Daniel Ervin of the Baton Rouge City Police Department, witnessed the accident. He and Ms. Guillory dispute that there were any passengers in the Hollins vehicle at the time the accident occurred. A trial was held on August 11, 2011. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that Ms. Guillory was 100% at fault for causing the accident and that the plaintiffs had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that there were four occupants in the Hollins vehicle at the time the accident occurred. Ms. Guillory and Farm Bureau appeal that judgment and make the following assignment of error:3

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong." Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). The supreme court has announced a two-part test for the reversal of a factfinder's determinations: (1) the appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993); see also Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987). Thus, the issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier-of-fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Where factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the trier-of-fact's findings demand great deference. Boudreaux v. Jeff, 2003-1932, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 884 So.2d 665, 671; Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 2002-2498, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/03), 862 So.2d 1010, 1016, writ denied, 2004-0447 (La. 4/2/04), 869 So.2d 889. The trier-of-fact is empowered to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness deemed lacking in credibility. Verges v. Verges, 2001-0208, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/02), 815 So.2d 356, 363, writ denied, 2002-1528 (La. 9/20/02), 825 So.2d 1179. Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 883; Wright v. Bennett, 2004-1944, p. 25 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/05), 924 So.2d 178, 193.

Ms. Hollins, Centraia, Jacy, and Kelly testified at the trial. They all stated that they were traveling from a "Black Pearls" meeting to Ms. Hollins's home at the time the accident occurred.4 Ms. Hollins testified that the meetings are held from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. at the Eden Park library every fourth Saturday of the month. Jacy testified that she had never missed a meeting.

Each of the girls described the accident and testified that they were in the vehicle at the time the accident occurred. The testimony of Ms. Hollins and the girls was consistent. After the accident, the officer instructed Ms. Hollins to move the vehicle from the roadway into the Winn-Dixie parking lot. Once there, Cpl. Ervin approached the vehicle on the driver's side and spoke to Ms. Hollins through the driver's-side window, at which time he asked, according to all four plaintiffs, "if we were okay." They each spoke about the injuries they had sustained in the accident and the treatment they had received. All of the plaintiffs reported having fully recovered from their injuries at the time of the trial.

The defendant driver, Ms. Guillory, agreed with the testimony of the plaintiffs that after the collision occurred, Cpl. Ervin instructed that the vehicles be moved off of the roadway and into the parking lot. Further, Ms. Guillory also testified that Cpl. Ervin stood at the driver's-side windows of each vehicle to speak to the drivers regarding the accident. And, while Ms. Guillory testified that there were no passengers in Ms. Hollins's vehicle, she admitted that she did not "walk up to" the truck.

According to Cpl. Ervin, however, he contacted Ms. Hollins behind her vehicle and spoke to her there. He testified that he requested Ms. Hollins's information and that she walked to the passenger's-side door of her truck to retrieve the information from the glove box as he stood beside her. As such, he explained that he was certain that there was no one in the passenger's seat of the truck. Further, he testified that there were no passengers in the truck at all, but admitted that from his position he could not see the back seat of the truck and did not recall whether he specifically looked in the back seat. While he stated at the trial that he asked Ms. Hollins whether there were any other occupants in the vehicle and that she had responded "no," on cross-examination he admitted that he had made a prior inconsistent statement during his deposition. At the deposition, he said that due to the peculiar fact that he had witnessed this accident, he had not asked Ms. Hollins whether there were any additional occupants in her vehicle, "because I could see it." However, at the trial he insisted that he would have asked Ms. Hollins whether there were any other occupants in her vehicle, explaining that it was standard investigation procedure. When asked why his testimony had changed, he simply stated that he did not recall why he testified differently at his deposition.

The trial witnesses agreed that the truck driven by Ms. Hollins had tinted windows, that it was sunny outside on the day of the accident, and that only the driver's-side window was rolled down at any time.

The four plaintiffs consistently testified that they were in the truck and described where they were leaving from and going to, the accident itself, the details of how Cpl. Ervin handled the investigation, and the injuries they sustained and treatment they underwent.

Ms. Guillory testified that she did not approach the plaintiffs' vehicle and that Cpl. Ervin approached the Hollins vehicle on the driver's side. Cpl. Ervin testified that he approached the Hollins vehicle on the passenger side, did not see any other occupants, and that Ms. Hollins answered "no" when he asked her if there were any other occupants. But at his deposition, he testified that he had not asked Ms. Hollins about other occupants.

The trial court is in the best position to resolve these conflicting testimonies. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 883. After a thorough review of the record, we cannot determine that the trial court committed manifest error or was clearly wrong in finding that the plaintiffs/appellees proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Centraia, Jacy, and Kelly were passengers in the vehicle driven by Ms. Hollins at the time of the accident.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendants/appellants, Shalyn Guillory and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company.

AFFIRMED.