NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HIGGINBOTHAM, J.

The defendant, Calvin Wayne Miller, was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape, a violation of La. R.S. 14:42. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:81. The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, both of which the district court denied. The defendant also filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the district court stated was moot. The state subsequently filed a multiple offender bill of information, and the defendant was adjudicated as a fourth-felony habitual offender. He was then sentenced to twenty years with the Department of Corrections. The defendant now appeals, alleging three assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

On November 19, 2010, L.W.,1 the victim, watched a video at school instructing her class on how to prevent sexual abuse and who to report to if they became a victim of such abuse. Later that day, L.W. disclosed to her school guidance counselor that she had been touched in an inappropriate way by the defendant who was married to L.W.'s grandmother.2 The counselor reported the information to Jessica Gilbert with the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), and DCFS contacted Detective Carli Messina at the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office. Gilbert and Detective Messina went to a motel where the victim and her family were residing and spoke to the victim privately. The victim told Gilbert that the defendant began to fondle her on top of her clothing when she was in the fourth grade. She also told Gilbert that the incidents progressed to the defendant touching her private areas while the two were undressed, and, eventually, holding her down and having vaginal intercourse with her. The last incident occurred approximately one week before the victim made her initial disclosure. After speaking with Gilbert and Detective Messina, the victim was taken to Children's Hospital for an examination and to the Child Advocacy Center for an interview. L.W.'s mother retrieved the pajama bottoms and underwear that L.W. was wearing on the night of the last incident and turned them over to the police. She testified that the pajama bottoms belonged to L.W. Additionally, L.W. testified that the pajama bottoms belonged to her and that she was wearing them on the night of the last incident. The DNA profile obtained from the pajama bottoms was a perfect match to the defendant.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to grant a continuance of his trial. The defendant contends that the district court's failure to grant his motion severely prejudiced his trial preparation and denied him effective representation at trial.

A motion for continuance, if timely filed, may be granted, in the discretion of the court, in any case if there is good ground therefor. La. Code Crim. P. art. 712. A motion for continuance shall be in writing and filed at least seven days prior to the commencement of trial. Upon written motion at any time, the district court may grant a motion for continuance after a contradictory hearing, but only upon a showing that such motion is in the interest of justice. La. Code Crim. P. art. 707. The decision whether to grant or refuse a motion for continuance based on these provisions rests within the sound discretion of the district court, and a reviewing court will not disturb such a determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. Additionally, even when an abuse of discretion is shown, the denial of a motion for continuance generally is not reversible absent a showing of specific prejudice. State v. Reeves, 2006-2419 (La. 5/5/09), 11 So.3d 1031, 1078-79, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 637, 175 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009).

The motion was filed by the defendant's public defender, Peter Ierardi, on the first day of trial, November 14, 2011. The defendant alleged that the he did not believe Ierardi was his counsel and would not cooperate with him until November 10, 2011. The defendant also alleged that additional time was needed to subpoena alibi witnesses and to get a transcript of a pretrial hearing that was held before Ierardi was appointed. At the time of that hearing, the defendant was represented by private counsel, Charles Gary Wainwright.

The district court denied the motion, noting that Ierardi was appointed in September and could have requested a transcript of the pretrial hearing at that time. The court also pointed out that it explained the necessity of cooperating with Ierardi to the defendant in October and that there had been ample time to prepare.

Our review of the record reveals that the defendant was informed multiple times that Wainwright was no longer representing him and that he needed to cooperate with Ierardi. He was present in court on September 16, 2011, when Wainwright withdrew as defense counsel and Ierardi was appointed. A continuance was granted that day pursuant to a motion made by Ierardi. Prior to that date, the defendant had been granted two continuances. On October 25, 2011, the court advised the defendant that he needed to cooperate with Ierardi because Wainwright had withdrawn as his counsel. The court brought the defendant in for a second time on November 9, 2011, and read a letter to him from Wainwright that stated he was no longer representing him. Throughout this time, Ierardi went to the jail to meet with the defendant. On one occasion, guards brought the defendant down to meet with Ierardi against his wishes, but he refused to speak to him.

Under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its sound discretion in denying the motion to continue. Further, even if an abuse of discretion did occur, the defendant failed to establish any specific prejudice he suffered as a result. Absent a showing of specific prejudice, the erroneous denial of a motion to continue is not reversible. See Reeves, 11 So.3d at 1079. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

The defendant argues in his second assignment of error that the district court erred by not allowing him to call two witnesses to testify in front of the jury. Defendant argues that the jury may not have returned a guilty verdict if they had heard the testimony of these two witnesses.

According to La. Code Crim. P. art. 764, the exclusion of witnesses is governed by La. Code Evid. art. 615, providing that on request of a party, the court shall order that witnesses be excluded from the courtroom or from a place where they can see or hear the proceedings. La. Code Evid. Art. 615(A). The court may impose appropriate sanctions for violations of its exclusion order including contempt, appropriate instructions to the jury, or when such sanctions are insufficient, disqualification of the witness. La. Code Evid. art. 615(C).

The purpose of sequestration is to assure that a witness will testify as to his own knowledge of the events, to prevent the testimony of one witness from influencing the testimony of others, and to strengthen the role of cross-examination in developing facts. State v. Nevers, 621 So.2d 1108, 1112 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 617 So.2d 906 (La. 1993). The district court judge, in his discretion, may determine the disqualification of a witness when a rule of sequestration has been violated. This ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 621, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). When the exclusion is of a defense witness, the defendant's right to compel the attendance of witnesses and to present his defense, as guaranteed by Article I, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution, may be impaired. Thus, there are constitutional limits on the district court's discretion. State v. Warren, 437 So.2d 836, 839-40 (La. 1983). Unless the sequestration violation was "with the consent[,] connivance, procurement or knowledge of the defendant or his counsel," the exclusion of that witness's testimony is constitutionally impermissible. Nevertheless, unless the exclusion of the testimony would prejudice substantial rights of the defendant, or substantially violate a constitutional or statutory right, the error is not cause for reversal. Id. at 840.

At the outset of trial, the state moved for sequestration of all witnesses and the defense joined in the motion. The witnesses were identified and asked to step outside of the courtroom. After the state's witnesses testified, the defense sought to call two witnesses who were not subject to sequestration and were present throughout the entire trial. The district court pointed out that both witnesses sat through the entire trial and heard the testimony of all of the state's witnesses and that it would not be fundamentally fair to the state to allow the defendant's witnesses to tesfify. The defendant was not allowed to present this testimony in front of the jury, but was allowed to proffer it outside of the jury's presence. The defendant contends that the jury may have returned a not guilty verdict if they heard the testimony of these two witnesses because both witnesses testified that the pajama bottoms containing the defendant's DNA belonged to the defendant's wife, L.W.'s grandmother, rather than to L.W.

The record does not support the defendant's contention that the sequestration violation was without his consent, procurement or knowledge. At least one of the two witnesses was a relative of the defendant and, as noted above, although both parties requested sequestration, neither of the two witnesses were sequestered.

The record also does not support the defendant's argument that the testimony of the two witnesses may have resulted in a not guilty verdict. The testimony proffered by the defendant indicates that both witnesses saw the defendant's wife wearing the pajama bottoms at issue. However, L.W. testified that she got the pajama bottoms from her grandmother and that they now belonged to her. L.W.'s mother also testified that the pajama bottoms belonged to L.W. Neither of the two witnesses had ever seen L.W. in any sleepwear, and neither were they around the motel where L.W. and her grandmother were living in November 2010. One of the witnesses stated that she did not know what type of sleepwear L.W. had and that L.W.'s grandmother could have passed the pajama bottoms at issue down to her. The defendant has failed to show that any of his substantial rights were prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony proffered. Moreover, the defendant testified in the presence of the jury that the pajama bottoms belonged to his wife. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. We find no merit in this assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

In his last assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on his motion to reconsider sentence. Prior to the defendant's multiple offender hearing, the district court, having not yet sentenced the defendant, ruled that his motion to reconsider sentence was moot. Once the defendant's sentence was imposed, his motion to reconsider was no longer moot. However, the district court never made a ruling on the defendant's motion.

After the multiple offender hearing, the defendant was adjudicated a fourth-felony habitual offender and sentenced to twenty years with the Department of Corrections. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:81(H)(2) provides that at least two years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation. or suspension of sentence. The district court failed to specify how many years of the defendant's twenty-year sentence were to be served without the benefit of parole. Thus, we remand to the district court for resentencing in accordance with La. R.S. 14:81(H)(2) and for a ruling to be made on the defendant's outstanding motion to reconsider sentence.

CONVICTION AND HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.