NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

CRAIN, J.

The defendant, Logan Michael Craig, was charged by bill of information with one count of first degree vehicular negligent injuring, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:39.2 (count 1), and one count of hit and run driving with serious bodily injury, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:100 (count 2). He pled not guilty on both counts. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged on both counts. On count 1, he was sentenced to five years at hard labor, which was suspended, and five years of probation. On count 2, he was sentenced to seven and one-half years at hard labor, which was suspended, and five years of probation. Both sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other. The defendant appeals arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred in denying motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The victim, Kara Robinett, testified that she and the defendant had been dating for nearly a year at the time of this occurrence on June 13, 2010. On that date, she and the defendant cooked a meal, watched a movie, and drank mixed drinks at her house trailer on Wax Road in Denham Springs. Robinett testified that when the defendant was leaving at approximately 10:00 p.m., he "side stepped a little bit," causing her to be concerned whether he was alright to drive. When she asked if he could drive, he answered "yes." Nevertheless, Robinett offered to drive the defendant home but he said he needed his truck for work the next morning. Robinett then offered to drive the defendant home in his truck and have someone pick her up the next day. The defendant became aggravated and told Robinett he was a "big boy." Robinett then walked the defendant to the trailer door. The defendant opened the door but released it in mid-swing, causing the door to strike Robinett in the face. Robinett then became aggravated and told the defendant what had happened. He said he knew then stumbled down the steps.

Moments later, Robinett exited the trailer and watched as the defendant, who had already entered his truck, peeled out and backed out into the road. She ran to the side of the road and held her hand up for the defendant to stop. He stopped and Robinett walked to the driver's side window and motioned for him to roll down the window. The defendant refused and Robinett tried to open the door. She testified "[t]he next thing I know that happened, I was — my feet were up off the ground, and I was holding onto the side of the truck." She lost her grip and was swept under the truck and run over by the rear driver's side tire. Robinett could not move after being run over. She had bloodied arms and legs and sustained multiple fractures to her pelvis. Robinette required a three week hospitalization followed by an additional three weeks in rehabilitation where she had to relearn how to walk.

The defendant testified and presented a different version of the events. According to the defendant, the incident occurred after Robinett became belligerent when he refused to spend the night with her. He claimed they shared a bottle of wine over dinner and that she smoked marijuana that night. He testified that Robinett threatened to call the police to report him for drinking and driving if he tried to leave, and that she told him she was going to "get a knife" to prevent him from leaving. The defendant claimed he was terrified, that he "danced around" Robinett, then left her trailer as fast as he could.

The defendant testified that as he was leaving in his truck, Robinett began pounding on his hood and screaming at him to get out. He claimed he was under the impression that Robinett had a knife, but conceded he never saw her with one. He testified that when he "took off to go forward," Robinett moved to the side of his truck, but he locked the door so she "couldn't get" him. The defendant drove to the end of the road, "went to turn the block," then stopped in the parking lot of a fire station where he called 911 at 11:34 p.m. and again at 11:42 p.m.

The defendant testified, "I was calling for assistance, not only for myself[,] but I needed a story or statement given for this incident so that I couldn't be accused of anything after the fact." He claimed that he returned to the scene between the 911 calls because the 911 operator asked him if anyone was injured. This "planted a seed in [his] brain" that Robinett may have been struck by his sideview mirror. After returning to the scene, he saw Robinett "slumped on the side of the road face down" but did not know why she was lying down. According to the defendant, "I didn't know if she had fallen on said knife." A group of people were gathering so the defendant returned to the fire station and called 911 again, this time requesting medical assistance. He testified:

The defendant claimed to be unaware that Robinett was dragged by his truck until a deputy told him. He further testified that "there was no evidence that [Robinett] was run over. The medical report indicates fractures, but there is no indication that my tires ever ran over her, and I never felt anything."

At trial, the State played recordings of the 911 calls. They revealed that at 11:32 p.m. a female caller reported that "a woman just got run over." The caller stated she looked out her window because the victim was "laying in the middle of the ground, screaming." The caller stated the vehicle that ran over the victim "took off." At 11:34 p.m., the defendant placed his first 911 call and said, "I'm not really sure it's an emergency, but my girlfriend tried to jump in front of my truck as I was leaving." When asked if she was struck by his vehicle, the defendant said, "I don't know." He identified himself and Robinett by name and gave her location.

At 11:42 p.m., the defendant again called 911 and said "the altercation has occurred with some injury." When asked about the extent of the injuries, he replied, "I honestly do not know," then added, "[a]s I was attempting to escape, somebody threw themselves in front of a moving vehicle." He again denied knowing whether his truck struck Robinett. He stated Robinett had been "running down the side of the truck" and he was reporting the incident because he "didn't want to be responsible for someone's damage." The defendant claimed he was at Oak View Trailer Park and did not know if anyone was injured, but after being asked by the 911 operator to look around and report any injuries, indicated he was "around the block." Responding to the 911 operator, the defendant disclosed the license plate number of his vehicle.

The police apprehended the defendant at the fire station. He had an odor of alcohol on his breath. He performed poorly on field sobriety tests and at approximately 1:00 a.m., had a blood alcohol level of .103.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number 1, the defendant argues that because Robinett "put herself in harm's way by her own actions," his intoxication was not a proximate cause of her injuries, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree vehicular negligent injuring. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for hit and run driving with serious bodily injury because he stopped his vehicle within a short distance of the incident, called 911, and gave his name. In assignment of error number 2, he argues that the trial court erred in denying the motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved both the essential elements of the crime and that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. In conducting this review, we are mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, which is, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove," in order to convict, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 486, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157 and 00-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732 (quoting La. R.S. 15:438).

For a conviction based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The facts so established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Wright, 730 So. 2d at 487.

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:39.2, in pertinent part, provides:

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:100, in pertinent part, provides:

Reasonable aid within the meaning of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:100 is aid that is fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So.2d 7, 15. Evidence that a defendant caused an accident, left the scene, and failed to render reasonable aid is sufficient to establish the requisite general criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction for hit and run driving. See, Williams, 893 So. 2d at 16.

After a thorough review of the record and applying the applicable legal standards, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact could find that the defendant committed first degree vehicular negligent injuring and hit and run driving. The jury heard and rejected the defendant's theory that Robinett was responsible for putting herself in harm's way. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the fact finder reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls; the defendant is then guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984). No such hypothesis exists in this case.

The convictions reflect that the jury accepted Robinett's testimony and rejected the defendant's. Robinett's testimony established that the defendant caused an accident then left without rendering aid. This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. Rather, the trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. When there is conflicting testimony, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Lofton, 96-1429 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 1365, 1368, writ denied, 97-1124 (La. 10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1331.

We cannot say that the jury's determination of the evidence was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See, State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder. An appellate court cannot overturn a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the fact finder. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). We find the evidence was sufficient to convict. Accordingly, the motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence were properly denied. These assignments of error are without merit.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.