NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HUGHES, J.

This is an appeal of a November 8, 2011 trial court judgment, dismissing claims asserted by the defendant/plaintiff-in-reconvention in a foreclosure proceeding, via executory process, which sought to annul a sheriffs sale of immovable property; to assert a claim for failure of the mortgagee to maintain flood insurance at an existing coverage level; and to challenge the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 13:3852, 13:3853, 13:3886, and 13:3886.1, regarding notice. Having found this case appropriate for disposition by memorandum opinion, in accordance with the Uniform Rules for Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1(B), we detail only the central facts and law herein.

Marcus Thirstrup was the owner of a home located on Olympia Drive in Slidell, Louisiana, which he had insured for flood damage in the amounts of $125,000 for the building and $30,000 for the contents, when he entered into a loan agreement, on March 28, 2002, with Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. ("Countrywide"), securing the loan with a mortgage on the property. As part of the agreement between the parties, Countrywide agreed to pay the flood insurance premiums to the insurer, along with other expenses, out of an escrow account, and Mr. Thirstrup agreed to make sufficient payments into the escrow account for payment of the insurance premiums and to "furnish to [Countrywide] all notices of amounts to be paid." Further, the mortgage agreement obligated the borrower, Mr. Thirstrup, to keep the improvements on the property insured against all hazards, including flood. The mortgage agreement stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

In August of 2002 and August of 2003, the flood insurance policy issued by Bankers Insurance Group/First Community Insurance Company, in the coverage amounts of $125,000 for the building and $30,000 for the contents, with a $500 deductible applicable to each coverage amount and at a premium of $236, was renewed at the existing coverage level, with Countrywide paying the premium out of Mr. Thirstrup's escrow account. However, in November of 2003, Fidelity National Insurance Services ("Fidelity"), the successor to Bankers Insurance Group/First Community Insurance Company, sent a notice to Mr. Thirstrup stating that, pursuant to new eligibility requirements established by the National Flood Insurance Program for "Preferred Risk Policies," the Thirstrup property was no longer in a preferred risk policy zone. The November 2003 notice further notified Mr. Thirstrup that, unless he submitted an additional premium of $366, his policy would be rewritten as a "Standard Flood Policy," with lower limits of coverage.

Although Mr. Thirstrup contends that he contacted a Countrywide representative by telephone about the flood insurance change, it does not appear that Mr. Thirstrup took any steps to "maintain" his insurance coverage, which was his duty pursuant to the mortgage contract, by negotiating with Fidelity for different coverage than that described in Fidelity's November 2003 notice. Nor does the record reflect that Mr. Thirstrup paid the additional $366 premium amount requested in Fidelity's November 2003 notice, either by forwarding this sum directly to Fidelity or by paying this sum into his Countrywide escrow account for payment by Countrywide to Fidelity. Upon Mr. Thirstrup's failure to "maintain" his flood insurance coverage at the existing coverage level, Countrywide, pursuant to the express provisions of the mortgage contract, was "under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount of coverage."

A November 21, 2003 flood insurance declarations page, for the policy period ending August 8, 2004, was mailed to Mr. Thirstrup, stating that the coverage limits were $30,900 for the building and $4,700 for the contents, and the premium amount was $248. The subsequent flood insurance renewal notice for the policy period of August 8, 2004 through August 8, 2005, mailed to Mr. Thirstrup on June 13, 2004, also stated that the coverage limits were $30,900 for the building and $4,700 for the contents, and the premium was $248, which was paid by Countrywide out of Mr. Thirstrup's escrow account Thereafter, on August 3, 2004, a declarations page showing these coverage and premium amounts was mailed to Mr. Thirstrup. The next flood insurance renewal notice, for the policy period of August 8, 2005 through August 8, 2006, was mailed to Mr. Thirstrup on June 13, 2005, and again stated that the coverage limits were $30,900 for the building and $4,700 for the contents; the premium was again paid by Countrywide out of Mr. Thirstrup's escrow account. On August 9, 2005, a declarations page showing these coverage and premium amounts was again mailed to Mr. Thirstrup. On August 29, 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana and resulted in flooding damage to Mr. Thirstrup's Olympia Drive house. Mr. Thirstrup subsequently received flood insurance proceeds checks from Fidelity in the amounts of $30,900, $3,000, and $1,700.

On April 3, 2009 Countrywide filed this suit for executory process, based on a confession of judgment in the act of mortgage signed by Mr. Thirstrup. Countrywide alleged that the monthly installment payment due on January 1, 2006, and all subsequent installment payments, had not been paid. After complying with the procedures set forth in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure for executory process, including notice to Mr. Thirstrup, a sheriff's sale of the property was scheduled for July 22, 2009. The first scheduled sale was canceled, the sale was rescheduled for February 3, 2010, and the property was sold.

On August 3, 2010 Mr. Thirstrup filed a pleading entitled "Petition in Reconvention to Nullify Foreclosure Sale, for Immediate Injunctive Relief against Eviction, and for Damages," naming as defendants both Countrywide and the alleged administrator of the loan, Bank of America, N.A. ("BNA"),2 and alleging, in summary, that Countrywide: breached its obligation to maintain flood insurance at existing coverage levels; engaged in fraud and ill practices by agreeing to cancel the first scheduled foreclosure sale, but rescheduling the sale without further notice to him; and engaged in unfair trade practices. The statements made in the attached affidavit of Mr. Thirstrup included his admission that he had received the November 2003 correspondence from his flood insurer detailing the change of status of his insured property and indicating that, to maintain his existing coverage level, an additional premium of $366 was required. Mr. Thirstrup's affidavit also maintained that, during this litigation, he had received numerous verbal assurances from both BNA personnel and from the foreclosure attorney's office that the foreclosure would be cancelled and, after the property was sold, he claimed to have been told that steps were being taken to rescind the foreclosure. Further, Mr. Thirstrup attached a copy of a July 20, 2009 email, purportedly sent to him by one of the foreclosure attorneys, stating:

Mr. Thirstrup's affidavit and attachments further indicate that he had prior knowledge of the first scheduled (July 22, 2009) sheriff's sale.

In response to Mr. Thirstrup's petition, Countrywide and BNA filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, contending that when a creditor has properly complied with the legal requirements for executory process, there are only two ways to defend against the sale of the property (i.e., by filing an injunction to arrest the sale or by suspensively appealing from the writ of seizure and sale (citing LSA-C.C.P. art. 2642;3 LSA-R.S. 13:3852;4 Citizens Bank & Trust Company v. Little Ford, Inc., 522 So.2d 1124 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988); Ford Motor Credit Company v. Herron, 234 So.2d 517 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1970); and Dryades Savings and Loan Association v. Givens, 602 So.2d 325 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)), and the plaintiff did neither.

Following a November 3, 2010 hearing on Mr. Thirstrup's request for injunctive relief and on the exception of no cause of action raised by the defendants-in-reconvention, the trial court denied injunctive relief and granted judgment, in part, in favor of the defendants-in-reconvention, dismissing that portion of Mr. Thirstrup's reconventional demand seeking the nullity of the foreclosure sale. The trial court also denied the no cause of action exception as to Mr. Thirstrup's reconventional demand for damages for Countrywide's failure to maintain his existing flood insurance coverage level. In her reasons for judgment, the trial judge recognized that Mr. Thirstrup had alleged two separate causes of action: (1) to annul the foreclosure sale; and (2) for damages arising out of tort, contract, and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. With respect to the action to annul the foreclosure sale, the trial court stated that Mr. Thirstrup had alleged two bases: (1) lack of notice of the sale date; and (2) fraud and ill practices by Countrywide, in telling Mr. Thirstrup he would be advised of subsequent developments. Citing Reed v. Meaux, 292 So.2d 557 (La. 1973), the trial court reasoned that LSA-C.C.P. arts. 2001-2006, otherwise governing nullity actions, are not applicable to judicial sales by executory process, since the authentic documents required for executory process, under LSA-C.C.P. art. 2635, are the foundation of the proceeding, and the failure to comply with Article 2635 are "defects of form," which are not substantive in character and cannot serve as grounds for nullity of the sale. Further citing Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Lassiter, 2004-0484 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/30/04), 889 So.2d 1155, the trial court held that Louisiana law does not require the defendant in an executory proceeding to be provided with notice of a rescheduled judicial sale. The trial court concluded that because Mr. Thirstrup was aware of the first scheduled sheriffs sale date and the cancellation of that sale, he had failed to state a cause of action to annul the foreclosure sale. However, the court found Mr. Thirstrup had stated a cause of action for damages, based on the allegations made regarding a possible obligation of the mortgagee to maintain the existing flood insurance coverage level.

Thereafter, on January 18, 2011, Mr. Thirstrup requested permission to file a first supplemental and amending petition, which was granted. In his amended petition, Mr. Thirstrup added an additional defendant-in-reconvention, the Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"),5 and further challenged the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 13:3852, 13:3853, 13:3886, and 13:3886.1, insofar as these statutes did not require that notice of the rescheduled foreclosure sale be provided to him.

FNMA responded to Mr. Thirstrup's amended petition with a peremptory exception, pleading the objections of no cause of action and no right of action. Countrywide and BNA filed a peremptory exception, pleading the objections of no cause of action and no right of action, as to Mr. Thirstrup's constitutional challenges, and also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Mr. Thirstrup's flood insurance related claims. A hearing was held on the exceptions and on the motion for partial summary judgment on August 24, 2011. Thereafter, judgments were signed on September 6, 2011, granting Countrywide's and BNA's motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Thirstrup's claims "related to the level of flood insurance coverage" on his property, granting FNMA's peremptory exceptions, and dismissing all claims against FNMA. A judgment was signed on November 8, 2011, granting Countrywide's and BNA's peremptory exceptions, as to Mr. Thirstrup's constitutional challenges, and dismissing "all claims asserted in this litigation by Marcus J. Thirstrup" against defendants-in-reconvention, "by virtue of this Judgment and the prior Judgments . . . dated January 3, 2011 and September 6, 2011." Mr. Thirstrup has appealed the November 8, 2011 judgment.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record presented on appeal, we find no merit in Mr. Thirstrup's assignments of error. The basis of his lawsuit is his contention that, because of the unreimbursed expenses and costs he had to pay out-of-pocket to repair his Hurricane Katrina damaged house, he was unable to pay his monthly mortgage payments and/or he did not owe further mortgage payments, on account of Countrywide's alleged breach of its contractual obligation to maintain the existing flood insurance coverage level.6 However, the plain language of the mortgage contract, quoted hereinabove, clearly placed the burden on Mr. Thirstrup to acquire an appropriate level of flood insurance coverage. Mr. Thirstrup's flood insurance company notified him that it was lowering his limits of coverage in November of 2003. Yet, despite repeated renewal notices and declarations of coverage being sent to Mr. Thirstrup over the course of several years, unequivocally showing that he had lower limits of coverage than he preferred, he took no other action to maintain the flood insurance coverage level he wanted. Because of Mr. Thirstrup's erroneous interpretation of the obligations imposed under his mortgage contract (that Countrywide had a contractual duty to maintain flood insurance on his behalf, when the mortgage contract provided to the contrary), he concluded that he was justified in failing to make his mortgage payments, resulting in Countrywide's use of executory process to seize and sell the mortgaged home. Because Countrywide's suit for executory process was authorized under the contract between the parties and under the law, Mr. Thirstrup's action to annul the sheriff's sale of the property and/or for damages was meritless. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court rulings dismissing Mr. Thirstrup's claims, and we affirm the November 8, 2011 trial court judgment, in accordance with Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1(B). All costs of this appeal are to be borne by the appellant, Marcus J. Thirstrup.

AFFIRMED.