NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PARRO, J.

Gary and Mary Babin appeal a judgment that sustained a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissed their claims against Bethesda Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc. (Bethesda) and Lane Regional Medical Center (Lane). After thorough review, we find no legal error in the analysis or conclusion of the district court, and affirm the judgment under Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1(B).

On October 13, 2011, the Babins filed a petition in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (19th JDC), alleging that Gary had been injured by Lane employees while a patient in that facility, and on or about May 3, 2010, while undergoing physical therapy at Bethesda for that injury, was again injured when employees at Bethesda dropped him to the floor while attempting to use a lift to put him into a standing position. Lane filed dilatory exceptions raising the objection of prematurity and vagueness, and a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription. Bethesda filed a declinatory exception raising the objection of lis pendens2 and a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription.

The exceptions were tried on March 19, 2012. Lane introduced evidence showing that Gary's claimed injury at its facility must have occurred during his only period of hospitalization there between October 15 and October 27, 2009, about two years before suit was filed. As stated in the petition, Gary's injury at Bethesda occurred about May 3, 2010, seventeen months before suit was filed. Since the petition showed on its face that the suit was prescribed,3 the Babins had the burden of producing evidence to show that the running of prescription had been interrupted. The Babins urged that their late filing should be excused under the doctrine of "contra non valentem," which is a jurisprudential exception that prevents the running of liberative prescription under certain factual situations. One of these, commonly known as the "discovery rule," is where the cause of action is neither known nor reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff's ignorance is not induced by the defendant. See Clavier v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp. Inc., 12-0560 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/12), ___ So.3d ___, writ denied, 13-0264 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 384; see also LSA-R.S. 9:5628(A). Another is where the defendant has done some act that effectively prevents the plaintiff from availing himself of his cause of action. See Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La. 4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206, 211. The Babins claimed that Gary's medical records showed he was physically and mentally incapacitated by the injuries he received at Lane and Bethesda, such that he was mentally unable to understand that he might have a cause of action against them and was physically unable to take the steps necessary to file suit.

However, our review of the medical records confirms the district court's conclusion that those records only establish a mental problem for which Gary received treatment between April 9 and 19, 2010, predating the Bethesda incident; the records do not show a consistent, disabling mental defect. Moreover, Bethesda introduced a letter that it had received from a local legal firm, advising that the firm was representing Gary concerning legal claims arising out of his treatment there and requesting copies of all his medical records. That letter was dated August 26, 2010, and contained medical release forms signed by Gary, indicating that he certainly knew by that time that he may have a legal claim against one or both defendants.

On appeal, the Babins urge that the August letter should be considered the commencement of the running of prescription, since it is the only evidence that Gary was aware of a potential cause of action. They contend that the fax filing on July 19, 2011, was within a year of that letter and interrupted the running of liberative prescription on the Babins' claims against both solidary obligors. However, as the district court pointed out, LSA-R.S. 13:850(B) requires certain steps to be taken within five days of the fax filing,4 absent which, the filing "shall have no force or effect." LSA-R.S. 13:850(C). Therefore, that filing had no force or effect; it did not interrupt the running of prescription and, even though petitions were filed under that docket number and in this case on October 13, 2011, those filings were too late and the Babins' actions were prescribed.

The district court signed a judgment on March 29, 2012, pretermitting the defendants' other exceptions, maintaining their prescription exception, and dismissing the Babins' claims. We have reviewed the entire record, including the district court's oral reasons for judgment expressed at the conclusion of the trial of the exceptions, and find no error in the district court's factual and legal conclusions.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from and assess all costs of this appeal to Gary and Mary Babin.

AFFIRMED.