NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

KUHN, J.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Rodney and Kathleen Falgoust, appeal the trial court's judgment sustaining in part an exception of prescription as to plaintiffs' claims for damages arising from the HVAC system installed in their home purchased from A. Couvillion Construction, LLC (Couvillion) and dismissing those claims. Because we conclude that the judgment is not immediately appealable, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 2007, the Falgousts purchased a house located in the Beau Chene Subdivision in Mandeville, Louisiana, from Couvillion. The Falgousts alleged that after the purchase they learned of "major structural" defects in the house. They averred that there were defects in the HVAC system, the plumbing and tub structure, the fireplace and chimney, and in the roof and joist structure and sealing. Based on these defects, and alleging that Couvillion was in bad faith in its sale of the house, they filed suit in June 2011 to recover damages, legal interest, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Alternatively, the Falgousts seek recovery under the New Home Builders Warranty Act (NHWA). See La. R.S. 9:3141-3150.1

Couvillion filed an answer, asserting that the house has no defects, and alternatively, that all deficiencies for which it was responsible have been repaired or resolved. In May 2012, Couvillion filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking the dismissal of the lawsuit suggesting that the NHWA applies exclusively to the Falgousts' claims "regarding major structural defects within their home" and asserting that plaintiffs did not comply with its notice provisions. Couvillion also filed a peremptory exception raising the objections of prescription and peremption, urging that the Falgousts filed a suit to recover for "non major" structural defects in their home well after the applicable prescriptive period had accrued and sought dismissal with prejudice of the Falgousts' claims on this basis as well.

A hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment and the exception, and the trial court signed a judgment on August 21, 2012, expressly denying Couvillion's motion for summary judgment. The trial court's judgment also ordered:

The Falgousts have appealed the dismissal of their claims regarding defects in the HVAC system.

After the appeal was lodged, this court issued a rule to show cause that informed the parties the appealed judgment appeared to be a partial summary judgment that lacked the requisite designation of finality.

In response to this court's order, the appellate record was supplemented with a judgment signed on April 25, 2013.2 The amended judgment states in pertinent part:

The Falgousts also filed in this court a motion to supplement the appellate record with a document identified as the "CASH SALE OF PROPERTY" from Couvillion to the Falgousts "which document" they suggest "is undisputed" and forms Exhibit "H" to answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for production of documents that they filed.

PROPRIETY OF THE APPEAL

Even when a trial court has designated a partial judgment as final under Article 1915(B),3 that designation is not determinative of appellate jurisdiction. Van ex rel. White v. Davis, 2000-0206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So.2d 478, 480. This court must still ascertain whether it has jurisdiction to review the partial judgment from which the appeal was taken. See R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122. We cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless our appellate jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid final judgment. Texas Gas Exploration Corp. v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., 2011-0520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/11), 79 So.3d 1054, 1061, writ denied, 2012-0360 (La. 4/9/12), 85 So.3d 698.4

The appellate court is required to conduct a de novo determination of whether the designation was proper utilizing the following factors: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; and (4) miscellaneous facts such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So.2d at 1122-23.

In light of these considerations and based on the record before us, we find the trial court abused its discretion in designating the partial summary judgment as final and immediately appealable. The trial court concluded there was no just reason for delaying the appeal of this judgment "for reasons of judicial economy." However, dismissal of the HVAC claims does not substantially shorten the trial time in that it only dispenses with one category of the many defects the Falgousts have alleged. Because Couvillion claims that it has repaired all deficiencies in the home of which it was properly notified by plaintiff (apparently raising a defense that the Falgousts did not provide the required notice within one year after knowledge of the defects in accordance with La. R.S. 9:31455), it is possible that the need for review of the issue raised on appeal might be mooted by future developments in the trial court, since the trial court has not addressed this defense. Under these circumstances, we conclude that allowing an immediate appeal of the partial summary judgment rendered on August 21, 2012 only serves to encourage multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation that causes delay and judicial inefficiency.

Because we have determined that the partial summary judgment dismissing as prescribed one category of the Falgousts' numerous claims is not immediately appealable, the motion to supplement the record is moot and, therefore, denied.

DECREE

For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiffs-appellants, Rodney and Kathleen Falgoust.

APPEAL DISMISSED. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT DENIED.