NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PARRO, Judge.

The appellant challenges a trial court judgment, which sustained a peremptory exception pleading the objection of prescription and granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office and Rodney J. Strain, Jr., in his official capacity as the sheriff of St. Tammany Parish. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 11, 2004, Mark William Bourne filed a petition for damages against his ex-wife, Linda Ann Bombardier, contending that she had made certain false allegations about him to her attorney of record, with the intent to have him jailed. According to the petition, on February 11 and 12, 2003, Ms. Bombardier falsely claimed that Mr. Bourne made harassing phone calls to her home, her cell phone, and her office. On February 12, 2003, Ms. Bombardier's attorney allegedly contacted the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, as well as the St. Tammany Parish Jail and court clerks employed with the 22nd Judicial District Court, and reported Ms. Bombardier's allegations with the intent to have Mr. Bourne jailed.1 Mr. Bourne further contended that, as he was walking to his car on the afternoon of February 12, 2003, he was taken into custody by a St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Deputy and brought directly to jail, without a trial, where he remained until February 15, 2003. According to his petition, Mr. Bourne alleged that Ms. Bombardier initiated and maintained her allegations without probable cause and with the intent to cause him emotional distress.

In response, on March 23, 2004, Ms. Bombardier filed a declinatory exception pleading the objection of lis pendens and/or a dilatory exception pleading the objection of prematurity. According to the exceptions, Mr. Bourne and Ms. Bombardier were parties to an ongoing action, in which the trial court had issued a mutual injunction on April 9, 2002, directing each party to refrain from any form of harassment of the other party.2 In her exceptions, Ms. Bombardier alleged that Mr. Bourne had been found in contempt of court for violation of the injunction at a hearing on February 10, 2003, and that the trial court in that matter had sentenced him to jail. Mr. Bourne then appealed that judgment to this court. According to Ms. Bombardier, because the appeal was still pending before this court at the time Mr. Bourne filed the underlying petition for damages against her in this matter, that petition should be dismissed pursuant to the exceptions of lis pendens and/or prematurity.

After a hearing, the trial court overruled the exceptions. The trial court found that Mr. Bourne previously had been found in contempt of court for actions that occurred on December 6, 2002, and January 23, 2003, and had been sentenced to five days in the parish jail. The trial court further found that Mr. Bourne was incarcerated on February 10, 2003, and released from jail on February 11, 2003, and that the allegations contained in Mr. Bourne's underlying suit against Ms. Bombardier involved actions that allegedly occurred on February 11 and 12, 2003, after he was released from jail. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the allegations of the underlying suit did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the previous suit, which was pending on appeal.

On March 31, 2011, Mr. Bourne filed a supplemental petition for damages against the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office and Rodney J. Strain, Jr., in his official capacity as the sheriff of St. Tammany Parish (collectively, STPSO).3 In this petition, Mr. Bourne again alleged that he was walking to his vehicle on the afternoon of February 12, 2003, when he was taken into custody by a St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Deputy and brought directly to jail, where he remained until February 15, 2003. Mr. Bourne contended that STPSO illegally took him into custody and imprisoned him without probable cause, a warrant, a court order, or any other documentation or cause whatsoever. Accordingly, Mr. Bourne sought damages for these actions by STPSO.

STPSO filed an answer to the petition and supplemental petition and further filed a peremptory exception pleading the objection of prescription and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Mr. Bourne's claim against them. After a hearing on those matters, the trial court rendered judgment, which sustained the peremptory exception pleading the objection of prescription and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of STPSO. It is from this October 22, 2012 judgment that Mr. Bourne has appealed.

PRESCRIPTION

Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of inaction for a period of time. LSA-C.C. art. 3447. The fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is to afford a defendant economic and psychological security if no claim is made timely and to protect the defendant from stale claims and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof. Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 475 So.2d 1040 (La. 1985); Stroud v. Morrison Nursery, 04-1610 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 4/6/05), 899 So.2d 840, 843; Craig v. Bantek West, Inc., 03-2757 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/17/04), 885 So.2d 1234, 1240, writ denied, 04-2995 (La. 3/18/05), 896 So.2d 1004.

A claim for personal injuries is a delictual action subject to a liberative prescriptive period of one year, which commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained. See LSA-C.C. art. 3492. The objection of prescription may be raised by a peremptory exception. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 927(A)(1). Prescription is interrupted by the filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. See LSA-C.C. art. 3462. The interruption of prescription against one solidary or joint obligor is effective against all solidary or joint obligors. LSA-C.C. arts. 1799, 2324(C), and 3503. An interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a competent court and in the proper venue within the prescriptive period continues as long as the suit is pending. LSA-C.C. art. 3463. The effect of the interruption of prescription is that the time that has run prior to the interruption is not counted; prescription commences to run anew from the last day of the interruption. See LSA-C.C. art. 3466.

On the trial of a peremptory exception, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931. Generally, in the absence of evidence, the exception of prescription must be decided based upon the facts alleged in the petition, which must be accepted as true. Kirby v. Field, 04-1898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 131, 135, writ denied, 05-2467 (La. 3/24/06), 925 So.2d 1230. Ordinarily, the party pleading the objection of prescription bears the burden of proving the claim has prescribed. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 998. However, if a petition has prescribed on its face, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the action has not prescribed. Wheat v. Nievar, 07-0680 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/8/08), 984 So.2d 773, 775.

In this case, STPSO were named as defendants in the plaintiffs lawsuit in a supplemental petition, which was filed on March 31, 2011, more than eight years after he was allegedly arrested and put in jail by a St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Deputy. According to the supplemental petition, Mr. Bourne was taken into custody by STPSO and imprisoned on February 12, 2003, without probable cause, a warrant, or a court order, and without any other documentation or cause whatsoever. Thus, Mr. Bourne's claim against STPSO was prescribed on the face of the petition, and he bore the burden of proving that his claim had not prescribed.

DISCUSSION OF PRESCRIPTION

In an effort to carry his burden of proof, Mr. Bourne filed a memorandum in opposition to STPSO's exception of prescription,4 along with various documents attached to the memorandum. These attached documents were an apparent attempt to demonstrate that STPSO and Ms. Bombardier, Mr. Bourne's ex-wife, had been joint or solidary obligors, such that the filing of the petition against Ms. Bombardier had interrupted the running of prescription against STPSO.

We note that the documents attached to Mr. Bourne's memorandum were never introduced into evidence at the hearing on the exception of prescription. In such a hearing, documents attached to memoranda do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered on appeal. Caro v. Bradford White Corp., 96-120 (La. App. 5th Cir. 7/30/96), 678 So.2d 615, 618. Therefore, in this case, the exception of prescription must be decided only on the allegations in the petition, and all allegations must be accepted as true. See Kirby, 923 So.2d at 135.

In the original petition, Mr. Bourne alleged that Ms. Bombardier made false allegations to her attorney of record that Mr. Bourne was making harassing phone calls to her home, cell phone, and office and that she made these allegations with the intent to have Mr. Bourne jailed. He further alleged that Ms. Bombardier's attorney of record5 reported these allegations to STPSO, among others, with the intent that Mr. Bourne would be jailed. Finally, Mr. Bourne alleged in the original petition that he was taken into custody by a St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Deputy on February 12, 2003, and placed in jail, where he remained until February 15, 2003.

In the supplemental petition, which added STPSO, Mr. Bourne alleged that he was illegally taken into custody and jailed by a St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Deputy on the dates noted above, without probable cause, a warrant, a court order, or any other documentation or cause whatsoever. Although the incident complained of in both petitions is the same, Mr. Bourne does not allege in his supplemental petition that STPSO jailed him in response to any of the actions of Ms. Bombardier or her attorney of record. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Ms. Bombardier and STPSO were joint or solidary obligors, such that the filing of a suit against Ms. Bombardier would serve to interrupt prescription against STPSO. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment, which sustained the peremptory exception pleading the objection of prescription filed by STPSO.6

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, sustaining the peremptory exception pleading the objection of prescription filed by the defendants, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office and Rodney J. Strain, Jr., in his official capacity as the sheriff of St. Tammany Parish. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Mark William Bourne.

AFFIRMED.