NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PETTIGREW, J.

The plaintiffs, Janice and Gus Gustafson, appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Priority Electric, Inc., Rufus Tingle, Inc., and Montpelier US Insurance Company, which dismissed with prejudice their tort claims arising out of injuries sustained by Mrs. Gustafson on the construction site of the plaintiffs' new home. Although we do not agree with the trial court's legal analysis of whether a duty was owed, we believe that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that dismissal of the claims was warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court for reasons assigned herein.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 23, 2011, Janice and Gus Gustafson entered into a Buy-Sell Agreement with Rufus Tingle, Inc. (Rufus Tingle) for the construction of their new home in Covington, Louisiana. On October 6, 2011, while the home was under construction, a painting subcontractor contacted Mrs. Gustafson to inform her that the dining room wall had been repainted and was available for her viewing and inspection. On that date, Mrs. Gustafson entered the home unescorted through the open garage door and proceeded to the dining room. Once there, she stood facing the newly repainted wall and took several steps backward, to broaden her perspective and compare the shade of the new paint to the two adjacent walls. As she walked backwards, Mrs. Gustafson tripped on one of two unfinished PVC conduit stub-outs containing electrical wire that would ultimately service floor-mounted outlets in the adjoining den. As a result of the accident, Mrs. Gustafson sustained injuries to her right arm and wrist, which necessitated surgery.

On March 9, 2012, the Gustafsons filed suit against Rufus Tingle and its insurer Montpelier US Insurance Company (Montpelier), together with electrical subcontractor Priority Electric, Inc. (Priority) and its insurer, as a result of Mrs. Gustafson's injuries.1 On January 10, 2013, Priority filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the Gustafsons' claims on the grounds that the stub-out presented an open and obvious condition that was readily discoverable had Mrs. Gustafson exercised reasonable care. Priority argued that the defendants had no duty to warn Mrs. Gustafson under the circumstances. On January 17, 2013, Rufus Tingle and Montpelier moved for summary judgment on the same grounds.

On March 19, 2013, a hearing was held on the dual motions, at which time the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Priority, Rufus Tingle, and Montpelier. In oral reasons, the trial court agreed with the defendants that the stub-out presented an open and obvious hazard, commenting as follows:

In accord with its oral reasons, the trial court signed a written judgment on April 5, 2013, granting the motions for summary judgment and dismissing the claims against Rufus Tingle, Montpelier, and Priority with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs.2 From that judgment, the Gustafsons have appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether a summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342, 345 (La. 1991). The mover is entitled to judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, admitted for the purpose of the motion for summary judgment, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B)(2). The burden of proof rests with the movant. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(C)(2). However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Id. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

Competent evidence means evidence that tends to establish the fact in issue and does not rest on mere surmise or guess. Clifton v. Arnold, 87 So.2d 386, 389 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1956). An issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 2003-1424, p. 6 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002, 1006. If on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial. Id.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Gustafsons vehemently deny that the stub-out was an open and obvious defect. Rather, the Gustafsons argue that the stub-out created an unreasonable risk of harm and that the failure of Rufus Tingle and Priority to warn of that risk was a cause-in-fact of Mrs. Gustafson's injuries. The crux of the issue on appeal, therefore, is whether the stub-out constituted an unreasonable risk of harm, thereby creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the liability of Rufus Tingle, Priority, and Montpelier.

At the outset, we note that Rufus Tingle owned and/or had custody and control over the home site on October 6, 2011, the date of the accident at issue. Accordingly, the Gustafsons' claims against Rufus Tingle, the general contractor, and Priority, the electrical subcontractor, are primarily based on a theory of tort liability under La. Civ. Code Arts. 2317, 2317.1, and 2322. The pertinent articles provide liability for the owner or custodian of property, as follows:

A plaintiff must prove the following elements to hold the owner of a building liable for the damages caused by the building's ruin or a defective component: (1) ownership of the building; (2) the owner know or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin or defect; (3) the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care; (4) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care; and (5) causation.3 La. C.C. arts. 2317.1 and 2322. Additionally, the jurisprudence requires that the ruinous building or its defective component part create an unreasonable risk of harm and that the damage occurred through that risk. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So.2d 1146, 1148 (La. 1983).

The owner of a building is not responsible for all injuries resulting from any risk posed by his building. Entrevia, 427 So.2d at 1149. Rather, he is responsible only for those injuries caused by an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Id. It is the fact-finder's role to determine whether a defect is unreasonably dangerous in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 97-1174, p. 4 (La. 3/4/98), 708 So.2d 362, 364. To aid the trier-of-fact in making this unscientific, factual determination, the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a risk-utility balancing test, wherein the fact-finder must balance the gravity and risk of harm against individual societal rights and obligations, the social utility of the thing, and the cost and feasibility of repair. Reed, 97-1174 at 5, 708 So.2d at 365. The risk-utility test considers and weighs four pertinent factors: (1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of its social utility or whether it is dangerous by nature. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging, Inc., 2008-0528, p. 5 (La. 12/2/08), 995 So.2d 1184, 1186-87 (per curiam).

The second prong of the risk-utility test focuses on whether the allegedly dangerous or defective condition is obvious and apparent. The defendants herein have argued, and the trial court agreed, that if a defect is obvious and apparent, then there is no correlative duty to warn of its existence. We do not believe that to be a proper statement of the law.

The recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Broussard v. State ex rel Office of State Bldgs., 2012-1238 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 175, clarifies prior inconsistencies in the jurisprudence and distinguishes the duty and breach elements of the negligence analysis.4 In Broussard, a delivery driver, who sustained a back injury while pulling a loaded dolly into a misaligned elevator in a state building, brought a premises-liability action against the state. Following a jury trial, the lower court awarded the driver damages based on the percentages of fault assigned by the jury. The court of appeal reversed, holding the jury's determination that the offset created an unreasonable risk of harm was manifestly erroneous.

On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the primary issue was whether the defect in the building's elevators created an unreasonable risk of harm, thereby subjecting the state to liability under La. Civ. Code art. 2322. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 8, 113 So.3d at 183. In considering this issue, the court noted that by tethering the existence of a duty to a determination of whether the risk is unreasonable, prior decisions have admittedly conflated the duty and breach elements. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 11, 113 So.3d at 184-185. The conflation, in turn, has somewhat confused the jury's role as fact-finder and the judge's role as lawgiver. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 11, 113 So.3d at 185. In order to avoid further overlap of the roles of judge and jury, the court clarified that the analytic framework for evaluating an unreasonable risk of harm is properly classified as a determination of whether a defendant breached a duty owed, rather than a determination of whether a duty is owed ab initio. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 11-12, 113 So.3d at 185. The court explained that it is axiomatic that the issue of whether a duty is owed is a question of law, and the issue of whether a defendant has breached a duty owed is a question of fact. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 12, 113 So.3d at 185. Because the determination of whether a defect is unreasonably dangerous necessarily involves a myriad of factual considerations, varying from case to case, the court held that the cost-benefit analysis employed by the fact-finder in making this determination is more properly associated with the breach, rather than the duty, element of our duty-risk analysis. Id.

Applying those precepts, the court in Broussard concluded that the record contained a reasonable factual basis to support the jury's determination that the offset presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the delivery driver. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 13, 113 So.3d at 186. Moreover, the court found that the record supported a finding that the elevator's condition was not an open and obvious hazard, as the defect was not readily apparent to all who encountered it. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 13-14, 113 So.3d at 186. Although the driver testified that he was aware of the offset, there was ample testimony highlighting other instances of employees either tripping or falling on the elevators in the building after failing to notice they were misaligned. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 19, 113 So.3d at 189. Thus, the court concluded that the risk of harm created by the defect was significant when weighed against the elevators social utility and the cost of preventing the harm. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 14, 113 So.3d at 186.

Turning then to the case at hand, the trial court based its ruling on a factual finding that the defect presented by the electrical stub-outs created an open and obvious defect. Because the defect was open and obvious, the court concluded that there was no duty owed without any further inquiry. In light of the dictates set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Broussard, we believe that the trial court's reasoning underlying the grant of summary judgment was flawed. We believe that the risk-utility analysis is helpful in determining whether there are factual issues that preclude the grant of summary judgment. We will, therefore, proceed to apply the risk-utility analysis to consider whether the stub-outs presented an unreasonable risk of harm and whether the defendants breached any duty to the Gustafsons.5

Utility of the Stub-Outs

The first element of the analysis involves the utility of the complained of condition. In this case, the stub-outs held wiring which would eventually supply electrical power to floor outlets in the home's den. The stub-outs were necessary to hold the wiring until such time as the flooring was installed and the outlets were permanently placed. The necessity and utility of the stub-outs is not disputed by any of the parties, and it is not alleged that it is an uncommon practice in new construction.

Likelihood and Magnitude of Harm

The utility of the stub-outs, however, must necessarily be weighed against the likelihood and magnitude of the harm presented by their defective condition, including whether the defect was open and obvious. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 14, 113 So.3d at 186.

As to this factor, the Gustafsons argue that the stub-outs were not adequately visible. They submit that because the PVC pipes were blue and the unfinished cement floor was gray, the stub-outs were not visible to the naked eye of a reasonable, unsuspecting person. Despite this argument, the Gustafsons failed to make a showing that any of the numerous contractors, subcontractors, or other visitors to the home site ever tripped as a result of the stub-outs. Moreover, they failed to offer any expert opinion testimony to otherwise show that the stub-outs posed an unreasonable risk of harm. Instead, they relied solely on the testimony of Mrs. Gustafson, who admitted that she was walking backwards and not paying attention to what was behind her at the time of the accident.

We find that the plaintiffs' arguments as to limited visibility are offset by Mrs. Gustafson's own deposition testimony, wherein she acknowledged that she was aware of the presence of the stub-outs well before her trip and fall accident on October 6, 2011. In fact, Mrs. Gustafson admitted that she and her husband personally requested the installation of the floor-mounted electrical outlets and specifically made a change order to add the second stub-out. She additionally testified that she visited the construction site weekly and that she had previously seen the stub-outs, which had been there since the slab was poured. There is no allegation that the location and condition of the stub-outs were any different on the date of the accident than on the numerous other instances when she visited the home.

Given the undisputed facts and testimony, we find no error in the trial court's factual determination that the stub-outs posed an open and obvious defect. Unlike the facts in Broussard, there is no evidence that the stub-outs were not open and obvious to all who encountered them or otherwise posed an unreasonable risk of harm.

We further find that the defendants did not breach any duty by failing to warn of the stub-outs, especially since Mrs. Gustafson was already well aware of their presence prior to her trip and fall. Also, although Mrs. Gustafson has alleged in the petition that she was a business invitee on the premises on October 6, 2011, the record is devoid of any allegations, let alone factual evidence, that Rufus Tingle or Priority had knowledge of the Gustafsons unescorted entrances onto the construction site, thereby giving rise to a duty of reasonable care. Mrs. Gustafson admittedly let herself into the home through an unlocked garage door without the knowledge or assistance of Rufus Tingle and/or Priority's employees.

Cost of Preventing the Harm

The third prong of the risk-utility analysis requires the fact-finder to balance the risk of harm against the cost and feasibility of repair. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 23, 113 So.3d at 192; see also Reed, 97-1174 at 5, 708 So.2d at 365. Herein, the Gustafsons have failed to produce any expert testimony that the use of PVC stub-outs are unconventional in new home construction or that there are alternatives to the use of stub-outs during the installation of floor electrical outlets. Likewise, the Gustafsons have failed to show how the stub-outs utilized in this instance could have been better placed or made more visible. Although they argue that orange buckets or cones could easily have been placed over the PVC stub-outs, there is no testimony that the contrast of the blue pipes on the gray cement was insufficient to alert an unsuspecting person. Admittedly, Mrs. Gustafson had her back to the stub-outs just prior to her accident and was moving backwards with her eyes focused on the wall in front of her. Based on her own testimony, it is clear that she wouldn't have seen the stub-outs even if they had been otherwise marked.

Nature of the Plaintiff's Activity

The last prong of the risk-utility balancing test requires the fact-finder to analyze the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of its social utility or whether it is dangerous by nature. Broussard, 2012-1238 at 24, 113 So.3d at 192; Pitre v. Louisiana Tech. Univ., 95-1466, p. 16 (La. 5/10/96), 673 So.2d 585, 593. Herein, Mrs. Gustafson testified that she was walking backwards and looking at the dining room wall at the time of her trip and fall. Her testimony shows that her initial point of contact with the stub-outs was on her heel, and not the side of her foot. She also testified that she was focused on the paint color on the dining room wall in front of her, and she did not glance backwards or over her shoulder before proceeding backwards to get a better vantage point of the new paint color in contrast to the adjacent walls.

Mrs. Gustafson acted unreasonably in walking backwards without so much as a glance behind her to see what was in her path. The home was still under construction, and there were potentially any number of hazards that she could have encountered. She has failed to offer any evidence that she acted reasonably given the circumstances or that her actions were not dangerous by nature. To the contrary, all of the evidence shows that she acted negligently and that her own inattention was the cause-in-fact of her injury.

CONCLUSION

Based upon our careful de novo review of the record and in consideration of the risk-utility factors, there is no evidence that the stub-outs posed an unreasonable risk of harm or that the defendants otherwise breached a duty to the Gustafsons. All of the evidence indicates that the accident would not have occurred but for Mrs. Gustafson's own inattention and negligence. In the absence of any evidence as to the fault of the defendants, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the liability of the defendants. Although we do not agree with the rationale underlying the trial court's judgment, we believe that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate based on the undisputed facts. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the claims against Priority Electric, Inc., Rufus Tingle, Inc., and Montpelier US Insurance Company, with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs-appellants, Janice and Gus Gustafson.

AFFIRMED.