NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

GUIDRY, J.

Plaintiffs, Sherie Landry and Raymond Burkart, Jr. (Burkarts), appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing their claims against defendants, Rhonda Hemelt wife of/and Christopher Aubert (Auberts), pursuant to the Auberts' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 28, 2002, the Burkarts purchased a home located at 806 Heather Hollow in Highlands Subdivision in Covington, Louisiana, from Elaine and James Williamson (Williamsons). On or about September 26, 2002, water started leaking into the home during periods of rainfall. Consequently, on August 1, 2003, the Burkarts filed a petition in redhibition and for damages, naming as defendants the Williamsons; all prior homeowners in the chain of title, including the Auberts and William Dunford; unidentified insurance companies; and realtors.

In their petition, the Burkarts asserted that the Auberts, the original homeowners, purchased the home from LCV Partnership on May 19, 1995, and thereafter sold the home to William Dunford on August 3, 1998. Dunford sold the home to the Williamsons on September 28, 2001. The Burkarts alleged that these defendants knew or should have known that the improvements at 806 Heather Hollow contained material defects and poor workmanship, and that they conspired to carry out a plan to make cosmetic improvements to the premises and not inform the Burkarts and future purchasers of the material defects and poor workmanship. The Burkarts further alleged that these defendants acted in bad faith, breached expressed warranties contained in their disclosure statements and acts of sale, and breached implied warranties, including the warranty of fitness for the purpose for which it was intended to be used.

Thereafter, on November 2, 2012, the Auberts filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Burkarts will be unable to establish that the Auberts are bad faith sellers who breached express or implied warranties of sale by failing to disclose, or conspiring to conceal, known defects in the home. Furthermore, the Auberts asserted that as good faith sellers, the Burkarts' suit against them is prescribed, because it was brought more than one year after the date the Auberts sold the home.

Following a hearing on the Auberts' motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Auberts and signed a judgment dismissing the Burkarts' claims against the Auberts with prejudice. The Burkarts now appeal from this judgment.

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Evan Hall Sugar Cooperative, Inc., 01-2956, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/02), 836 So.2d 484, 486. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits, if any, admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). Only evidence admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment shall be considered by the court in its ruling on the motion. La. C.C.P art. 966(F)(2).1

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the mover. If, however, the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require that all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, the mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual evidence sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the adverse party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to summary judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Lieux v. Mitchell, 06-0382, p. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 307, 314, writ denied, 07-0905 (La. 6/15/07), 958 So.2d 1199. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Smith v. Kopynec, 12-1472, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/7/13), 119 So.3d 835, 837.

A seller warrants to the buyer the absence of hidden defects in the thing sold and also warrants that the thing sold is fit for its intended use. La. C.C. art. 2475. Redhibition is the right of a buyer to obtain rescission of the sale when the thing sold has defects that render it useless, or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have bought the thing had he known of the defect. La. C.C. art. 2520. Alternatively, the buyer may be limited to a reduction of the purchase price when the defect does not render the thing totally useless, but diminishes its usefulness or value so that it must be presumed a buyer would still have bought it, but for a lesser price. La. C.C. art. 2520.

In general, a redhibition action for a defect of residential immovable property against a seller who did not know of the defect prescribes one year from the date of delivery of the property to the buyer. La. C.C. art. 2534(A). Where the seller knew, or is presumed to have known, of the defect, prescription of the action for redhibition is one year from the day the defect was discovered by the buyer. La. C.C. art. 2534(B).2

In the instant case, the Auberts filed their motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Burkarts will be unable to establish that the Auberts are bad faith sellers and therefore, their claims against the Auberts are prescribed. In support of their motion, the Auberts submitted: a copy of the motion to dismiss their previous lawsuit against LCV Partnership; affidavits from Christopher and Rhonda Aubert; the deposition of William Dunford; depositions of James and Elaine Williamson; property disclosure forms from previous sales of the subject house; inspection reports; the deposition of Larry Jones, P.E.; and all original and supplemental petitions filed by the Burkarts into the record.

The evidence submitted by the Auberts indicates that they filed suit against LCV in 1997 to encourage LCV to finally finish and resolve various punch list items that were left outstanding. However, the Auberts dismissed their suit when, "to the best of [their] knowledge," LCV completed all of the items. Additionally, the evidence indicates that the Auberts were not aware of any defects in the property at the time they sold it to Dunford, and none of the subsequent owners experienced the defects as alleged by the Burkarts. Finally, defects in the property were not discovered by several home inspectors, and it was not until the property was examined in 2004 that a defect in the construction of the home was discovered, namely, the absence of a secondary water barrier. In fact, Larry Jones, the Burkarts' expert, stated that a homeowner could not have discovered that there was no secondary water barrier on the house just by visual inspection; the homeowner would need an expert or a contractor to open a wall.

Accordingly, because the Auberts pointed out that the Burkarts are unable to establish that the Auberts knew of any existing defect in the house at the time they sold it to Dunford, and therefore, are bad faith sellers, the Burkarts had to come forward with evidence establishing that they would be able to satisfy their evidentiary burden of proof at trial.

In opposing the motion for summary judgment, the Burkarts relied on letters from the Auberts to LCV, the Auberts' petition naming LCV as a defendant, the Auberts' settlement agreement with LCV, depositions of subsequent purchasers, and expert reports. Only the deposition excerpts were attached to the opposition; the remaining evidence referenced in the opposition was attached to the Burkarts' opposition filed in response to a previous motion for summary judgment filed by the Auberts.

Without addressing whether the evidence relied on by the Burkarts was even properly before the court on the motion for summary judgment,3 we find that such evidence was insufficient for the Burkarts to establish that they would be able to prove at trial that the Auberts knew of the alleged defect in the house at the time they sold it to Dunford.

First, although the evidence establishes that the Auberts had problems with the house after their purchase from LCV, the evidence also indicates that the Auberts filed suit against LCV to have those problems resolved and/or repaired, and when the repairs were completed, they dismissed their lawsuit. There is no evidence that the Auberts thereafter experienced any problems with the house.4 Therefore, considering the evidence in the record, the Auberts were reasonable in believing that any defects in the home had been remedied. When a seller has a reasonable basis to believe that a defect has been remedied, the seller is not in bad faith by failing to inform a buyer of the remedied defect. See Kent v. Cobb, 35,663, pp. 15-16 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 3/8/02), 811 So.2d 1206, 1216-1217, writ denied, 02-1011 (La. 6/7/02), 818 So.2d 772; DeSoto v. Ellis, 393 So.2d 847, 851 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1981).

Further, there is no evidence that the Auberts had knowledge that any of the problems they experienced were due to a defect in the construction of the house, i.e., absence of a secondary water barrier. As previously detailed, the Burkarts' own expert determined that a homeowner could not have known of the construction defect in the home by simple visual inspection and without an expert or contractor opening a wall.

Accordingly, given the evidence in the record, we find that the Burkarts failed to present evidence that the Auberts had knowledge of a defect in the house at the time they sold the house to Dunford. Because they did not have knowledge of a defect, they are not bad faith sellers, and the Burkarts were required to file suit against the Auberts one year following the Auberts' sale of the property.5 The Burkarts, however, did not file suit against the Auberts until 2003, approximately five years after the Auberts originally sold the home to Dunford. Accordingly, the Burkarts' action against the Auberts is prescribed, and the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of the Auberts.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs, Sherie Landry and Raymond Burkart.

AFFIRMED.