NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PARRO, J.

The defendant, Lazarious Dwayne Clayton, was charged by bill of information with aggravated assault with a firearm, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:37.4 (count 1); aggravated criminal damage to property, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:55 (count 2); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:95.1 (count 3). The defendant pled not guilty to all counts and, following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged on count 3. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts 1 and 2, and the state subsequently dismissed those counts. The defendant was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine. The state filed a habitual offender bill of information, alleging the defendant was a second-felony habitual offender based on a prior conviction for possession of oxycodone. Following a hearing on the matter, the defendant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender, his twenty-year sentence was vacated, and he was resentenced to thirty-five years of imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence; at a hearing on that matter, the trial court granted the motion, vacated the thirty-five year sentence, and resentenced the defendant to twenty-two years of imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.

FACTS

On the evening of July 16, 2011, Ulysses Jones was in the barbershop where he worked with his father, who owned the shop. Located on a one-way street off North Acadian Thruway in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the barbershop was a small, paneled structure with a tin roof and two windows in the front. Jones testified at trial that Aaron Rogers, a customer who had stepped outside to smoke, informed Jones that the defendant was parked across the street in a grocery store parking lot. According to Jones, there was "bad blood" between him and the defendant, because Jones had a relationship with Eletta Guillory, the defendant's girlfriend and mother of his child, while the defendant had been in jail. Jones testified that he saw the defendant across the street in his Monte Carlo. As the defendant was backing up to leave, he looked at Jones and gave him a threatening look. About an hour later, a four-door dark-colored Honda Accord pulled up to the front of the barbershop. Jones testified that the defendant got out of the back seat with a gun. The people in the barbershop went to the ground as the defendant fired shots into the building. Jones thought that he heard about ten shots and that the defendant had "emptied the clip." Jones testified that he saw Elliot Guillory, Eletta's brother, driving the Accord, and Robert Lee, Elliot's friend, in the front passenger seat. Jones also recognized that the car was Eletta's Accord. A police officer arrived on the scene sometime later and observed the damage to the barbershop. He did not take pictures or call the Crime Scene Unit (because no one had been shot or hurt), but he did collect several cartridge cases (the empty bullet casings fired from a semi-automatic weapon) that were on the ground in front of the barbershop.

On July 19, 2011, Detective Jeffery Anders, with the Baton Rouge Police Department, interviewed Jones. Jones identified the defendant as the shooter and the Accord he was in as Eletta's. Jones also told Detective Anders that every day the defendant dropped off Eletta at Virginia College where she took classes. Detective Anders's partner, Detective Kwouska Lee, also with the Baton Rouge Police Department, was working in the Cortana Mall area, near Virginia College. On that same day (July 19), Detective Anders contacted Detective Lee, relayed the information to him, and told him to be on the lookout for the defendant and Eletta in a green Honda Accord going to Virginia College. Detective Lee recognized Eletta from a previous case. Detective Anders told Detective Lee that if he saw the Accord, he needed to contact uniform patrol to conduct a violator stop. Detective Lee was in an unmarked unit and uniform patrol would be in marked police units. A short while later, Detective Lee observed Eletta get out of the driver's seat of the Accord at Virginia College. The defendant, who was with her, moved from the passenger seat to the driver's seat and drove off. Detective Lee contacted Corporal Ken Stelly, with the uniform patrol of the Baton Rouge Police Department, and asked him to stop the defendant in the Accord. Corporal Stelly effected a violator stop and had the defendant throw his keys on the ground. He then removed the defendant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of his police unit. The defendant and Eletta's young child was in the back seat. When Detective Lee arrived at the scene, he could not find the keys to the Accord. After removing the child, Detective Lee went back to the car to look for the keys. As he passed the opened rear door, he saw the handle of a handgun in a seat pouch on the back of the front passenger seat. The gun had a magazine in it with live rounds. He retrieved the gun and secured it. The gun and the cartridge cases found in front of the barbershop were submitted for testing. No DNA or fingerprints were found on the gun, but the cartridge cases were found to have been fired from the same gun that was in Eletta's Honda Accord. According to Detective Anders, when he interviewed Eletta, she told him that she had seen the gun before with the defendant and another guy.

The defendant did not testify at trial.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress. Specifically, the defendant contends that both the stop and the subsequent search of the Honda Accord that he was driving were illegal.

Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress. State v. Long, 03-2592 (La. 9/9/04), 884 So.2d 1176, 1179, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125 S.Ct. 1860, 161 L.Ed.2d 728 (2005). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 09-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.1

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Subject only to a few well-established exceptions, a search or seizure conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is constitutionally prohibited. Once a defendant makes an initial showing that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, the burden of proof shifts to the state to affirmatively show it was justified under one of the narrow exceptions to the rule requiring a search warrant. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Young, 06-0234 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1118, 1122, writ denied, 06-2488 (La. 5/4/07), 956 So.2d 606.

The first time Detective Anders met with Jones, a few days following the shooting, Jones identified the defendant as the person who shot at him in the barbershop. Jones then identified the defendant in a photographic lineup and also signed a photographic lineup statement that the defendant was the shooter. Jones also provided Detective Anders with the make and model of the car, a green or blue Honda Accord, that the defendant was in when he shot at Jones. The barbershop had also been hit by several bullets, and several cartridge cases in the street in front of the barbershop were collected by the officer on the scene. Jones further informed the detective that Eletta drove to Virginia College every day, near Cortana Mall, and that the defendant took her car after she went to class.

Detective Anders contacted his partner, Detective Lee, who was on duty in the Cortana Mall area, and told him to be on the lookout for the dark-colored Honda Accord. When Detective Lee spotted the car, he contacted Corporal Stelly who was nearby to conduct a violator stop. Detective Anders was in an unmarked police unit, so he wanted Corporal Stelly, who was in a marked unit, to effect the stop. Corporal Stelly testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he was advised by Detective Lee that the defendant was wanted in connection with a shooting. When Corporal Stelly stopped the defendant, he had the defendant throw his keys to the ground. The defendant was then removed from the vehicle, patted down, and handcuffed. Corporal Stelly Mirandized the defendant, informed him that he was a suspect in a shooting and under arrest, and placed him in the back of his police unit.

It does not appear from the record that Detective Anders relayed to Detective Lee all the information he had about the shooting. Detective Anders testified at trial that he called Detective Lee and gave him a "heads up" about the situation. When Detective Anders was asked why he contacted Detective Lee for assistance regarding the defendant, Detective Anders testified, "To arrest him." Corporal Stelly testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he was advised by Detective Lee that the defendant was wanted in a shooting and may be armed. When Corporal Stelly saw the defendant in the Honda Accord, he conducted a "modified" felony stop. Corporal Stelly testified at trial that he did not personally speak to Detective Anders, but that he (Corporal Stelly) was told by Detective Lee that the defendant was wanted in connection with a shooting.

In suggesting that Detective Anders had something less than probable cause to arrest, the defendant in his brief argues that Jones falsely told Detective Anders during his interview on July 19, 2011, that the defendant had shot him in another incident that occurred on January 25, 2011. The defendant could not have. shot Jones at the time of the previous shooting on January 25, 2011, because, as the defendant points out, he was in jail at that time. Jones, however, never suggested the defendant shot him; he well knew the defendant was in jail at the time of the January 2011 shooting. Nevertheless, in his testimony at trial, Jones felt the defendant was somehow involved with his being shot in January. According to his testimony at trial, an unknown male drove up and stopped in front of the barbershop in January of 2011. When Jones approached him, thinking he was a customer, the unknown assailant shot him. Given the alleged animosity between Jones and the defendant, Jones thought the defendant was behind the shooting. Jones testified that, just prior to the January shooting, he had received a text message from the defendant that said to leave Eletta alone or "it would get ugly."

Detective Anders testified that, based on his conversation with Jones on July 19, he looked at older police reports regarding information related to the defendant and Jones. Detective Anders stated he knew Jones had been shot in January of 2011, but did not know who shot him. The detective further stated that he knew the defendant was in prison at the time Jones was shot. Based on the foregoing, the defendant is incorrect in his assertion that "Ulysses Jones had accused him, yet again, of shooting at him."

A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense, although not in the presence of the officer. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 213(3)2; State v. Billiot, 370 So.2d 539, 543 (La.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 284, 62 L.Ed.2d 194 (1979). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing an offense.3 State v. Leatherwood, 411 So.2d 29, 32 (La. 1982). Although mere suspicion is insufficient to justify an arrest, an officer does not need sufficient proof to convict in order to make an arrest. See State v. Thomas, 349 So.2d 270, 272 (La. 1977) (per curiam); State v. Randolph, 337 So.2d 498, 499 (La. 1976). See also State v. Brown, 395 So.2d 1301, 1309-10 (La. 1981). Accordingly, based on the information provided by Jones, particularly his eyewitness account of the defendant as the shooter and the evidence that the barbershop had, in fact, been hit with gunfire, Detective Anders had probable cause to arrest the defendant. See Brown, 395 So.2d at 1309-10 (police had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on information from the victim that the defendant had shot her and on the existence of a bullet wound to her head); State v. Brumfield, 05-2500 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/20/06), 944 So.2d 588, 594 n.3, writ denied, 07-0213 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So.2d 353.

Furthermore, probable cause can rest upon the collective knowledge of the police, rather than solely on that of the officer who actually makes the arrest. United States v. Klein, 93 F.3d 698, 701 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1048, 117 S.Ct. 624, 136 L.Ed.2d 547 (1996). See United States v. Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 967, 117 S.Ct. 392, 136 L.Ed.2d 308 (1996) ("Probable cause can also be demonstrated through the collective knowledge of police officers involved in an investigation, even if some of the information known to other officers is not communicated to the arresting officer."). Under the circumstances of this case, it is fair to consider the three officers as part of a single investigative team operating in close concert and to impute one officer's knowledge, that the defendant had been recently involved in a shooting, to the officers who ultimately arrested the defendant. See State v. Weber, 13-1851 (La. 5/30/14), 139 So.3d 519, 521-22 (per curiam). See also United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1100, 128 S.Ct. 2919, 171 L.Ed.2d 853 (2008) ("When officers function as a search team, it is appropriate to judge probable cause upon the basis of their combined knowledge, because `we presume that the officers have shared relevant knowledge which informs the decision to seize evidence or to detain a particular person.'"); State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830, 833 n.5 (La. 1983); State v. Jones, 99-0861 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/21/00), 769 So.2d 28, 37-38, writ denied, 00-2183 (La. 9/28/01), 797 So.2d 685. Accordingly, Detective Anders's probable cause to arrest the defendant was imputed to the other officers and, regardless of the specifics that Detective Lee and Corporal Stelly may or may not have known at the time, Corporal Stelly had probable cause to arrest the defendant.

The defendant argues in brief that Detective Lee did not have probable cause to search the vehicle, because the defendant was not stopped pursuant to a traffic stop, and the defendant did not give consent to search the vehicle. Further, according to the defendant, the officers "crossed constitutional boundaries" when they arrested him and then "proceeded to search the vehicle for evidence when it was out of reach of any of the occupants."

Probable cause to believe contraband is present is necessary to justify a warrantless search. Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. This determination must be made from the totality of the circumstances, based on the objective facts known to the officer at the time. Mere probable cause does not provide the exigent circumstances necessary to justify a search without a warrant. In determining whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist to justify the warrantless entry and search or seizure, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances and the inherent necessities of the situation at the time. Further, the scope of the intrusion must be circumscribed by the exigencies that justified the warrantless search. See State v. Warren, 05-2248 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1224. Exigent circumstances may arise from the need to prevent the offender's escape, minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation which could cause injury to the officers and the public, and preserve evidence from destruction or concealment. State v. Brisban, 00-3437 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927-28.

Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a police officer can search a vehicle based on probable cause alone. The United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144. L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam), held that under the "automobile" exception, there is no separate exigency requirement. Further, if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.

Following the defendant's arrest, he was handcuffed and placed in the back of Corporal Stelly's police unit. While the defendant was clearly not within reaching distance of the vehicle's passenger compartment at the moment the gun was found, Detective Lee could have searched the vehicle for a weapon based on a reasonable belief that the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest, i.e., a firearm based on information the defendant had been involved in a shooting.4 As such, the search for a weapon in the vehicle, given the information that the defendant was wanted in connection with a shooting, would have been proper as a search incident to arrest. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S.Ct. at 1723.

The validity of the search incident to arrest notwithstanding, the circumstances in this case reveal that the handgun was in plain view when Detective Lee was searching for the keys and was, therefore, properly seized. Under the "plain view" doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature which is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-08, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). A seizure is reasonable under the "plain view" doctrine if the officer has probable cause to believe the item seized was associated with criminal activity. State v. Bush, 12-0720 (La. 6/1/12), 90 So.3d 395, 396 (per curiam).

When Corporal Stelly effected the stop, he had the defendant throw his keys on the ground. Corporal Stelly never picked up the keys. When Detective Lee arrived at the scene, one of his first objectives was to find the keys to secure the vehicle. When he could not find the keys (prior to removing the child), Detective Lee moved his unmarked unit in front of the Accord to block it and prevent someone from driving the vehicle away. After removing the crying child from the vehicle and bringing her to the defendant, Detective Lee returned to the vehicle to search for the keys. The detective had not been informed by Corporal Stelly that the defendant had tossed the keys on the ground from the driver's seat. Detective Lee testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he was not looking for a gun inside the vehicle. When asked why he was looking for the keys, Detective Lee explained: "That we could secure the vehicle. We didn't know who else was going to come up to the vehicle and try to get something out while our attention was diverted toward handling Mr. Lazarious, and it's our practice and we didn't want to lock the keys up in the car."

When he walked toward the back of the vehicle to search, Detective Lee saw the gun before he even entered the vehicle. From the opened rear passenger door, he noticed the back of the gun handle protruding from the storage pouch attached to the back of the front passenger seat (immediately in front of where the child had been sitting). He removed the gun and secured it. After seeing the gun in plain view, Detective Lee had the right to seize it as possible evidence. Moreover, we find the gun was legally seized by Detective Lee pursuant to the "public safety" exception. Detective Lee had a duty to the public to remove the gun from a place where it would be accessible to any passer-by. See State v. Obran, 496 So.2d 1132, 1134 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986). See Brisban, 809 So.2d at 927-28; Brumfield, 944 So.2d at 595-98.

The defendant argues in brief that Detective Lee kicked the keys away from the vehicle as a pretext to search the vehicle, ostensibly for the keys. Corporal Stelly's dashboard camera on his unit recorded Detective Lee's search of the Accord. The video was played at trial and at the motion to suppress hearing. The video reveals that at some point when Detective Lee walked toward the vehicle, he kicked the car keys that were on the ground. According to the defendant, Detective Lee "had little explanation when it was pointed out to him that the video showed he had kicked the keys he claimed he was looking for."

Detective Lee, however, made it clear at the motion to suppress hearing that he was looking for the keys when he saw the gun. He testified that at no time did he see the keys on the ground, and he had no information where they might be. Detective Lee indicated that he saw in the video where he had kicked the keys, but testified that at that time, he was not aware that he had kicked them. At trial, Detective Lee stated he did not remember kicking the keys and that he did not feel them when he kicked them.

Based on the foregoing, the stop of the defendant and subsequent seizure of the handgun from the vehicle that the defendant had been driving were both reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress.

This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Specifically, the defendant contends that the state failed to prove his actual or constructive possession of the handgun found in the vehicle.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; LSA-Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that, in order to convict, the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 01-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.

Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:95.1, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of certain felonies to possess a firearm. To prove a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:95.1, the state must prove: 1) the defendant's status as a convicted felon; and 2) that the defendant was in possession of a firearm. See State v. Mose, 412 So.2d 584, 585 (La. 1982). The state must also prove that ten years have not elapsed since the date of completion of the punishment for the prior felony conviction. See LSA-R.S. 14:95.1(C).

The only issue raised by the defendant is possession.5 The defendant asserts that the state failed to prove that he ever actually possessed the gun or that he was in constructive possession of the gun. The defendant points out that fingerprint and DNA tests failed to link him to the gun found in Eletta's vehicle.

Under LSA-R.S. 14:95.1, actual possession is not a necessary element of the offense and there is no requirement that the defendant have the firearm on his person to be in violation. Constructive possession satisfies the possessory element of the offense. State v. Day, 410 So.2d 741, 743 (La. 1982). Constructive possession of a firearm occurs when the firearm is subject to the defendant's dominion and control. See State v. Plain, 99-1112 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/18/00), 752 So.2d 337, 340-41 (constructive possession found where the defendant admitted to having the weapon underneath the mattress in his bedroom); State v. Frank, 549 So.2d 401, 405 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1989) (constructive possession found where a gun was in plain view on the front seat of a car the defendant was driving and of which he was the sole occupant).

Dominion and control over a weapon constitutes constructive possession even if it is only temporary and even if the control is shared. See Plain, 752 So.2d at 340; State v. Melbert, 546 So.2d 948, 950 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1989); State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248, 1250 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 (La. 1988). Further, the jurisprudence has added an aspect of awareness to the offense of LSA-R.S. 14:95.1. Therefore, the state must also prove that the offender was aware that a firearm was in his presence and that the offender had the general criminal intent to possess the weapon. State v. Lamothe, 97-1113 (La. App. 5th Cir. 6/30/98), 715 So.2d 708, 712, cert. granted in part on other grounds, 98-2056 (La. 11/25/98), 722 So.2d 987 (per curiam). See State v. Woods, 94-2650 (La. App. 4th Cir. 4/20/95), 654 So.2d 809, 811, writ denied, 95-1252 (La. 6/30/95), 657 So.2d 1035. Mere presence of a defendant in the area of the contraband or other evidence seized alone does not prove that he exercised dominion and control over the evidence and therefore had it in his constructive possession. State v. Johnson, 03-1228 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 995, 999.

Whether the proof is sufficient to establish possession turns on the facts of each case. See State v. Harris, 94-0970 (La. 12/8/94), 647 So.2d 337, 338-39 (per curiam); State v. Bell, 566 So.2d 959, 959-60 (La. 1990) (per curiam). Further, guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Johnson, 870 So.2d at 998.

Jones testified at trial that he saw a four-door dark-colored (blue or green) Honda Accord stop right in front of the barbershop. Jones recognized that it was Eletta's vehicle. Elliott Guillory (Eletta's younger brother) was driving and Robert Lee was in the front passenger seat. Jones knew both Elliott and Robert. The defendant got out of the vehicle from the rear-door driver's side (the side closest to the barbershop) with a gun in his hand and began shooting at Jones in the barbershop. Officer Joseph Valencia, with the Baton Rouge Police Department, was the first officer to respond to the scene. He observed the damage to the barbershop caused by the shooting, and he picked up several cartridge cases on the ground near the barbershop. The handgun that Detective Lee found in the seat pouch of Eletta's vehicle was a Springfield XD .40 caliber semi-automatic. Jeff Goudeau, an expert in firearm identification, testified that the cartridge cases found by Officer Valencia near the barbershop were fired in that same .40 caliber handgun found in Eletta's vehicle.

Several witnesses for the defense testified. Eletta testified that the defendant drove her car, but Elliott (her brother) did not. She further testified that she did not know that a gun was in her vehicle. Elliott testified that he never drove Eletta's car and that he was not in her car when the shooting took place. According to Detective Anders, Robert Lee also denied being in the car. Aaron Rogers, a customer in the barbershop at the time of the shooting, testified that he knew the defendant. He stated that during the shooting, he briefly saw the shooter, and it was not the defendant. He also testified that he did not see any vehicle near the shooter. He denied that he told Jones that the defendant was across the street prior to the shooting.

The jury heard the testimony and viewed the physical evidence presented to it at trial and found the defendant guilty as charged (on count 3). In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 03-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a "thirteenth juror" in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. See State v. Mitchell, 99-3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83. The fact that the record contains evidence that conflicts with the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient. State v. Quinn, 479 So.2d 592, 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).

When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier of fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. State v. Orgeron, 512 So.2d 467, 469 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 113 (La. 1988). In finding the defendant guilty, the jury clearly rejected the defense's theory of innocence. See Moten, 510 So.2d at 61. The jury's verdict reflected the reasonable conclusion that, based on Jones' eyewitness account of the shooting and the forensic evidence, the defendant constructively possessed the handgun found in Eletta's car. The defendant was identified as the shooter who was in Eletta's car at the time of the shooting, and the gun that was used in the shooting, based on the cartridge cases on the ground at the scene, was found in Eletta's car; and according to Eletta, the only two people with access to her car were her and the defendant. Accordingly, the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant was aware of the gun and that the gun was under his dominion and control at the time the car was stopped. The jury's conclusion is supported by the fact that the gun was visible to the defendant and was within his reach and easily accessible. Such dominion and control is sufficient to constitute constructive possession. See State v. Storks, 02-754 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/30/02), 836 So.2d 638, 642-43. See also State v. Allen, 12-0412 (La. 10/26/12), 101 So.3d 41, 42-43 (per curiam) (defendant's possession of the car gave him dominion and control over the handgun concealed under the backseat); State v. Major, 03-3522 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 802-03; State v. McKinney, 44,269 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 5/13/09), 12 So.3d 422, 426.

The foregoing addresses constructive possession of the gun based on events on July 19, the date of the defendant's arrest. Given that the physical evidence, however, tied the defendant to the gun and, further, that Jones identified the defendant as the shooter at the barbershop, the jury could have concluded the defendant was in actual possession of the gun on July 16, the date of the shooting.

After a thorough review of the record, we find the evidence supports the jury's unanimous verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was in actual and/or constructive possession of a firearm as a convicted felon and that he had the general intent to possess the weapon. See State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam); Storks, 836 So.2d at 643.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.