NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

McCLENDON, J.

Defendant, Arnold Henry Heron, Jr., was charged by bill of information with attempted simple burglary of property belonging to Lee Davis, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:62. At arraignment, defendant pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged. Defendant filed motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and new trial, which were denied by the trial court. He was sentenced to six years at hard labor with credit for time served. A motion to reconsider sentence was filed, but also denied by the trial court. Defendant now appeals, assigning error to the sufficiency of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lee Davis, the victim and an enforcement agent with the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, testified at trial. He testified that on January 2, 2013, he was living on a forty-acre plot located on Sylvest Road in Franklinton, LA. One of the structures on the property, located at 20208 Sylvest Road, belonged to Davis' grandmother, but no one had lived there in the past eight to ten years. Davis testified that over the years, he had trouble with people "driving in there, parking, stealing stuff, and everything else." In order to prevent these activities, over time, Davis erected fence posts, "no parking" and "no trespassing" signs, barbed wire, deer cameras, and motion lights and detectors to prevent individuals from entering his grandmother's house. Davis testified that in order for the motion detector to go off, an individual would have to cross the threshold of the driveway or the house's front porch.

Davis testified that on January 2, 2013, while he was getting ready for work, the motion detector's alarm went off twice. Davis quickly finished dressing, grabbed his phone and firearm, and ran approximately three hundred yards to his grandmother's house, where he arrived five minutes later. To approach the house, Davis used a side trail, which allowed him to approach the back left corner of the house. Around the house were overgrown bushes, which reached to the top of the house. As he was inspecting the area, Davis heard a noise, and then "saw something dark in the bushes move and [heard] something take off." He indicated this shape was located next to the house. Davis testified that he "got to the front of the house, and I saw the bushes shaking . . ." He stated that he "saw those bushes shake that way so I just hollered, `Freeze. Police.' I ran out there to the edge of that trail, and I'm looking and I'm trying to listen to see if I can hear anything." Davis noted he ran approximately fifty to seventy-five yards, when he "took a few more steps and there was a subject prone, laying out on the ground, with his hands out in front of him, with the crowbar next to him." Davis stated the crowbar was less than a foot away from defendant's left hand. Davis testified that, while on the ground, defendant stated "I wasn't trying to break in." Davis stated that there was no evidence that indicated that defendant attempted to use the crowbar to enter the house, nor did he locate any newly broken windows. While keeping his weapon trained on defendant, Davis called the sheriff's office, and Detective Terry Harris of the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office subsequently arrived.

Detective Harris testified that on January 2, 2013, at approximately 10:00 a.m., he was dispatched to 20208 Sylvest Road regarding an off-duty Wildlife and Fisheries officer needing assistance. When he arrived at Agent Davis' property, he observed defendant lying face-down on the ground, his hands out in front, with Davis standing over him. Detective Harris testified that a crowbar was three to four feet away from defendant's left side. Detective Harris then placed defendant under arrest and conducted a pat-down search, where he found a pair of "cutting pliers" in defendant's right rear pocket. Defendant was then taken to Detective Harris' office for further questioning. At the office, Detective Harris informed defendant of his Miranda1 rights, and also obtained a signed rights form and consent to question form. Detective Harris then conducted a recorded interview with defendant. Later in the day, after defendant's interview was completed, Detective Harris was called back out to Davis' property, regarding a Chevy pickup truck parked in front of the residence in question. According to Detective Harris, Davis had performed a traffic stop, and when Detective Harris arrived, he made contact with the driver, Trudy Lepine.

Though defendant did not testify at trial, the recorded statement he gave to Detective Harris was presented to the jury. The statement included the following exchanges:

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole assignment of error, defendant argues the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Specifically, defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient "to establish that [he] attempted to enter the abandoned house," and that "[a] reasonable hypothesis of innocence is that [he] decided not to enter the house when he saw the dilapidated condition of the house and realized that the house was abandoned." Defendant does not challenge his identity as the person apprehended near the property in question.

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime, and defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime, beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Patton, 10-1841 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/10/11), 68 So.3d 1209, 1224. In conducting this review, we must also be expressly mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, i.e., "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." LSA-R.S. 15:438; State v. Millien, 02-1006 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 506, 508-09.

"Simple burglary is the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, or any cemetery, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, other than as set forth in R.S. 14:60."2 LSA-R.S. 14:62A. Specific intent to commit a felony or theft is required for attempted simple burglary. State v. Moore, 477 So.2d 1231, 1234 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985), writs denied, 480 So.2d 739, 741 (La. 1986). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. LSA-R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting circumstances. Further, specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder. State v. Henderson, 99-1945 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So.2d 747, 751, writ denied, 2000-2223 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1235.

"Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." LSA-R.S. 14:27A. To be guilty of attempted simple burglary, the offender does not have to personally enter, or attempt to enter, the building. Further, a defendant's flight from the scene of a crime may indicate consciousness of guilt, and, therefore, is one of the circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt. State v. Brown, 504 So.2d 1055, 1058 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 506 So.2d 1223 (La. 1987).

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 487, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157, and 2000-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.

In State v. Freeman, 506 So.2d 519, 520-22 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1987), the defendant was convicted of attempted simple burglary of a bank in Franklin, Louisiana. On appeal, he assigned error to the sufficiency of his evidence, arguing the State failed to establish he had the specific intent to enter the building or commit a felony therein. This court noted that on the night of the crime, the bank's silent alarm was triggered, and that within two minutes a police officer arrived, who eventually discovered the defendant hiding underneath a vehicle approximately two hundred feet away from the bank, wearing a camouflage suit, with "several burglary-type tools," including bolt cutters, pliers, a chisel, and a flashlight. Additionally, the police officer found evidence of tampering with the bank's breaker box and telephone wires. This court concluded, that the "facts reasonably support an attempted unauthorized entry of the bank with the intent to commit a theft therein, especially during early morning hours and with burglary-type tools." As such, we concluded that the State proved "each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" and "to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."

Any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of attempted simple burglary. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). No such hypothesis exists in the instant case. Testimony at trial indicated that the motion detectors installed by Agent Davis were activated, and that a few minutes later, defendant was heard and spotted next to the house, then sprinted away, where he was later discovered hiding in overgrown bushes, with a crowbar next to him, and a pair of cutting pliers in his back pocket. Additionally, defendant admitted to Detective Harris that he intended to break into the house and look for items to "make a buck off of." Further, according to defendant's testimony, he had made arrangements to be dropped off at the house and to be picked up two hours later.

This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. Furthermore, the trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Lofton, 96-1429 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 1365, 1368, writ denied, 97-1124 (La. 10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1331.

A defendant's actions that are mere preparation and those that are an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of an object may be understood to exist on a continuum. Further, where a defendant's actions fall on the continuum is a fact question for the jury. In determining whether a defendant's action is an overt act which is an attempt, the totality of the circumstances presented by each case must be examined. The overt act need not be the ultimate step toward or the last possible act in the consummation of the crime attempted. After reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam).

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.