NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KUHN, J.

This case is a mass tort action resulting from chemical emissions. For the following reasons, the judgment is amended in part and, as amended, is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Beginning at 6:22 p.m. on October 15, 1999, the first of two chemical emissions was released by Pearl River Polymers, Inc., (PRP) a chemical plant located in Pearl River, Louisiana. A second chemical emission followed shortly thereafter.

On October 18, 1999, a class action petition was filed in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court on behalf of certain persons and other persons similarly situated, alleging that the chemical emissions caused direct and/or consequential injury and damage to a large number of people. PRP, the owner of the plant, and Rich Rosenkoetter, the PRP plant manager at the time of the incident, were named as defendants. Subsequently, Chemineer, Inc. was added by plaintiffs as an additional defendant. After hearing plaintiffs' motion to certify a class action, the court found that ordinary proceedings, consolidated as provided by law, would be an effective and efficient means for adjudication of the controversy, and class certification was denied.

After various procedural motions and exceptions, the defendants eventually stipulated to liability, reserving the issue of fault allocation between them. For trial purposes, counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants agreed to choose ten plaintiffs each for submission to the court as "bellwether" plaintiffs. Designated for trial by the plaintiffs were: Ronald Carver; Joy Nesbit; Briana J. Spano, a minor, through her mother, Erica Spano; Roger D. Crowe;1 Felton J. Lathen; Roselee Dumas; Keitha Marie Brauckhoff; Michael Brauckhoff; Marjorie Toalson; and Katelyn Ragsdale, a minor. The defendants, PRP and Chemineer, Inc., filed a joint designation of bellwether plaintiffs as follows: Francisco Bullock, Kenneth Cooper, Gerald Craddock, Larry Edmondson, Janeiro Johnson, Sherman Jordan, Ottis Mitchell, Alberta Taylor, Stanley Weiskopf, Jr., and Samuel Michael Ferguson. The plaintiffs later filed a motion to substitute Darlene Woods as a plaintiff, and the trial court signed an order so providing.2

Trial of the claims of seventeen of the original twenty3 bellwether plaintiffs was held from August 9, 2010 to August 13, 2010.4 Although the defendants, PRP and Chemineer, Inc., stipulated to negligence, reserving the right to a determination of fault allocation, they did not stipulate to causation for any alleged damages. The plaintiffs also stipulated that their damages were less than the jury threshold for each plaintiff.

There was evidence from both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' experts that allyl chloride (AC) was the compound released during the emissions with the potential for adverse effects from exposure.5 There was also agreement that there were two emissions, the first lasted for approximately 90 seconds and began about 6:22 p.m., and a second, residual release that lasted approximately ninety minutes, ending about 7:52 p.m. The plaintiffs' and the defendants' respective experts disagreed sharply, however, on other pertinent points.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued twenty-seven pages of detailed reasons for judgment on August 10, 2011. The court found that the chemical release resulted in the release of AC and DMAA into the atmosphere in two phases, one lasting ninety 90 seconds and one lasting 90 minutes. The chemicals were released in different quantities and mixtures. However, the trial court found that harmful levels of AC totaling at least two parts per million were released. The trial court noted that although both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' air modeling experts attempted to modify their input data to arrive at more accurate predictions of the chemical dispersion path, they acknowledged that the chemical dispersion modeling opinions could be wrong up to fifty percent of the time.

Further, even though the drawing of an exposure zone diagram is an imprecise process that may result in some claims being excluded because the claimants were on the wrong side of an imaginary line, the trial court noted that such a line needed to be drawn in the instant cases to define an exposure zone. After considering the data presented by the experts, the trial court decided that the exposure zone should be defined as 2.9 miles from the site of the release to the west, northwest, south, and southwest. The trial court found that the evidence did not support a finding that the chemicals were dispersed in an easterly direction, although the plaintiffs' expert maintained that it did. The trial court also defined a high concentration zone within the exposure zone that extended 1.5 miles from the site of the release to the west, northwest, south, and southwest.

Further, the trial court found that those plaintiffs whose only alleged exposure occurred at locations outside the 2.9 mile exposure zone failed to meet their burden of proving exposure to harmful levels of chemicals. The plaintiffs within the 2.9 mile exposure zone bore the burden of proving exposure to harmful levels of AC and that their symptoms and injuries were caused by the chemical exposure.

Relative to general causation, the trial court found that a person exposed within the exposure zone could experience irritant symptoms. Symptoms could include nausea, vomiting, and irritation of the eyes, nose, mouth, upper respiratory system, and skin. While these expected symptoms would be mild and transient, lasting anywhere from minutes to days in most people, the trial court determined that persons with hypersensitivity and preexisting conditions might react differently from the norm.

The trial court carefully reviewed the particular facts concerning each plaintiff. Before rendering a decision on damages, the trial court considered where each person was located at the relevant times, their symptoms, whether they sought medical attention, the dates of treatment, and any preexisting conditions that would make them more susceptible to reaction from the exposure. Utilizing these specific findings, as well as the findings of fact it made in common to all the plaintiffs, the trial court determined that: Roger Crowe, Briana Spano, Darlene Woods, Joy Nesbit, Larry Edmondson, Ottis Mitchell, Ronald Carver, Katelyn Ragsdale, and Gerald Craddock were in the exposure zone, specifically the high concentration zone; they were exposed to chemicals released from PRP; they suffered symptoms of a mild and transient nature consistent with such exposure; those symptoms were, in fact, related to the exposure; and they were entitled to damages. Additionally, the trial court found that the same facts applied to Marjorie Toalson, but that her symptoms were worse because of an aggravation of her preexisting conditions.

Based on these findings, the court made the following damage awards:

Additionally, the trial court denied the claims of plaintiffs, Sherman Jordan, Sam Ferguson, Roselee Dumas, Keitha Marie Brauckhoff, and Jamerion Johnson, finding that they were not in the exposure zone at the time of the chemical releases and failed to prove sufficient chemical exposure to causally relate their symptoms to the chemical releases. The trial court further concluded that plaintiff, Felton Lathen, was in the exposure zone, specifically in the high concentration zone; that he was exposed to chemicals released from PRP; that he suffered symptoms of a mild and transient nature that could be consistent with such exposure; but that he failed to meet his burden of proving that his symptoms were, in fact, related to the chemical exposure. Therefore, Mr. Lathen's claim was denied. Additionally, the trial court found that plaintiff, Francisco Bullock, was in the high concentration zone, but that he did not experience any symptoms as a result of chemical exposure; therefore, he did not meet his burden of proof, and his claims were denied.

In accordance with its reasons for judgment, the trial court rendered a written judgment on August 10, 2011 against PRP, Rich Rosenkoetter6, and Chemineer, Inc., jointly and in solido, and in favor of the ten plaintiffs named above, in the amounts shown above, and in favor of the defendants in the cases of the other seven plaintiffs named above whose claims were dismissed. The defendants appealed, as did fifteen of the plaintiffs. Ms. Toalson and Ms. Ragsdale later dismissed their appeals, leaving appeals by thirteen plaintiffs.7

On appeal, the defendants raise several assignments of error in which they complain that the trial court erred in: awarding excessive general damages for mild and transient health effects; in awarding property damages to a subsequent purchaser of the property; in awarding special damages without sufficient supporting evidence; in awarding damages to a plaintiff who failed to appear at trial; in failing to exclude certain "expert" testimony; and, in casting judgment against Mr. Rosenkoetter, who had been dismissed, with prejudice, prior to trial.

The plaintiffs asserted numerous assignments of error, alleging that the trial court erred in: setting the parameters both of the general chemical exposure zone and the high concentration zone; awarding inadequate damages for mental and physical pain and suffering to various plaintiffs; failing to award full medical expenses (including pharmacy expenses) to various plaintiffs; failing to award property damages for the loss of livestock and catfish; failing to award lost rentals; awarding inadequate damages for evacuation and inconvenience to various plaintiffs; and, finding that certain plaintiffs were not in the exposure zone and/or did not prove that their symptoms were related to the chemical emissions.

DISCUSSION

As previously mentioned, the trial court provided twenty-seven pages of detailed, thorough reasons for judgment. Each of the seventeen plaintiffs' situations was thoroughly examined in determining if he/she was entitled to any damages, and if so, the amount. In our review of the circumstances pertaining to each plaintiff, we are mindful of the applicable standard of review. General damages involve mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, loss of gratification or intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other losses of lifestyle that cannot be measured definitively in terms of money. Boudreaux v. Farmer, 604 So.2d 641, 654 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 605 So.2d 1373, 1374 (La. 1992). The factors to be considered in assessing quantum of damages for pain and suffering are severity and duration. Jenkins v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 06-1804 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/19/08), 993 So.2d 749, 767, writ denied, 08-2471 (La. 12/19/08), 996 So.2d 1133. Special damages are those that refer to specific expenses that may be quantified and that arose because of the defendant's behavior. See Pirtle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 11-1063 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/4/12), 92 So.3d 1064, 1067, writ denied, 12-1268 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 839.

Much discretion is left to the judge or jury in the assessment of general damages. La. C.C. art. 2324.1. In reviewing a general damage award, a court does not review a particular item in isolation; rather, the entire damage award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Goetzman, 97-0968 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 720 So.2d 39, 48. The standard of review for special damages is manifest error or clearly wrong. Kaiser v. Hardin, 06-2092 (La. 4/11/07), 953 So.2d 802, 810. Thus, we will examine each award or refusal to make a general damage award for an abuse of discretion and each award or refusal to make a special damage award for manifest error.

We have carefully examined the arguments of both the plaintiffs and the defendants regarding each of the alleged errors in the general and special damage awards made by the trial court, as well as the trial court's refusal to award any damages to particular plaintiffs and/or to award certain types of damages to other plaintiffs. In considering each of the alleged errors, we have individually considered the claims of the defendants and the plaintiffs, giving particular attention to each plaintiff's proximity to the release site; the evidence of his/her symptoms; the nature and duration of the symptoms; the medical treatment and diagnosis received; and, whether each plaintiff was required to evacuate from his/her home. Based on our review of the entire record, as well as the trial court's detailed reasons for judgment, we find no manifest error in the factual findings made by the trial court relative to its quantum determinations, including its determinations as to which plaintiffs sustained damages from the chemical release and/or the types of damages suffered. Further, we find no abuse of the trial court's broad discretion in the general damages awards made.8 Our review also revealed no manifest error either in the special damages awards made by the trial court, other than in the medical expenses awards made to Darlene Woods, Joy Nesbit, and Briana Spano, or in the trial court's refusal to award special damages sought by particular plaintiffs.

In awarding medical expenses to Ms. Woods, the trial court disallowed charges for two visits to a dermatologist. However, considering that the trial court found there was a correlation between the chemical exposure and the rash problems Ms. Woods suffered through December 1999, the trial court erred in excluding these charges, which totaled $80.00. Accordingly, Ms. Woods' award for medical expenses will be amended to increase it from $1,455.49 to $1,535.49.

Further, there is merit in Ms. Nesbit's contention that the trial court erred in not awarding all of her actual medical expenses. Therefore, her award for medical expenses will be increased from $1,107.20 to $1,543.20, the actual amount of her medical expenses.9

With respect to the $455.00 award for medical expenses made on behalf of Briana Spano, the trial court did not specify how it calculated that award. It appears from our review, however, that the court may have only allowed recovery for her first two visits to Dr. Paul Reyes, a finding in which we find no manifest error. Nevertheless, since the costs of those two visits totaled $450.00, we will amend the medical expenses award made on behalf of Briana Spano to correct the apparent mathematical error by reducing the award from $455.00 to $450.00.

Finally, we find no merit in the defendants' argument that the trial court erred in not excluding the expert testimony of Dr. Reyes. In Louisiana, admissibility of expert testimony is governed by La. C.E. art. 702, which provides:

A trial court is accorded broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony should be admissible and who should or should not be permitted to testify as an expert. Whether a witness meets the qualifications of an expert witness and the competency of the expert witness to testify in specialized areas is within the discretion of the trial court. A trial court's decision to qualify an expert will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Cheairs v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development, 03-0680 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 536, 541, citing State v. Castleberry, 98-1388 (La. 4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749, 776.

In ruling that Dr. Reyes' expert testimony was admissible, the trial court gave the following reasons:

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is amended in the following respects:

The portion of the judgment providing that judgment be rendered against PRP, Chemineer, and Richard Rosenkoetter is hereby amended to provide that judgment is rendered only against PRP and Chemineer, all claims against Richard Rosenkoetter having been dismissed prior to trial;

The portion of the judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, Darlene Woods, and against defendants, PRP and Chemineer, jointly and in solido, awarding her medical expenses in the amount of $1,455.49 is hereby amended to increase that award to $1,535.49, resulting in a total award to Ms. Woods of $12,386.85;

The portion of the judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, Joy Nesbit, and against defendants, PRP and Chemineer, jointly and in solido, awarding her medical expenses in the amount of $1,107.20 is hereby amended to increase that award to $1,443.20, resulting in a total award to Ms. Woods of $5,481.10;

The portion of the judgment rendered on behalf of plaintiff, Briana Spano, and against defendants, PRP and Chemineer, jointly and in solido, awarding her medical expenses in the amount of $455.00 is hereby amended to reduce that award to $450.00, resulting in a total award to Ms. Woods of $950.00.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects. The costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to plaintiffs, Roger Crowe, Briana Spano, Darlene Woods, Joy Nesbit, Sherman Jordan, Felton Lathen, Larry Edmondson, Samuel Ferguson, Gerald Craddock, Ottis Mitchell, Francisco Bullock, Roselee Dumas, and Ronald Carver, and one-half to defendants, PRP and Chemineer.

AMENDED IN PART AND, AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.