NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HIGGINBOTHAM, J.

The defendant, Dominique Smith, was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of being a principal to first degree murder, violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:24 and 14:30 (counts 1 and 2), and two counts of being a principal to attempted first degree murder, violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:24, 14:27, and 14:30 (counts 3 and 4).1 He pled not guilty on all counts and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on all counts. The defendant was then sentenced on counts 1 and 2, on each count, to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.2 He was sentenced on counts 3 and 4, on each count, to fifty years at hard labor, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The district court ordered each count to run consecutively. He now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to allow expert testimony. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

The defendant married Latanya Bourgeois in 2002, and they had three children together. During the marriage, Jessica Johnson Palmer, one of the four victims, moved in with the defendant and Latanya. The defendant convinced Latanya that Jessica moving in with them was beneficial because she had a vehicle, and the couple did not have reliable transportation. When the defendant, who was in the Army, left to serve in 2003, Jessica moved out of the family's home. Prior to her leaving, the defendant had an affair with Jessica, resulting in the birth of P.J., another victim.3 Jessica later married Juan Palmer, Sr., and two children, J.P. and R.P., both victims, were born of the union.4

Because of the defendant's military career, the family moved to North Carolina, and the defendant had co-defendant Trendall Matthews move in to serve as a babysitter. She lived with the family in North Carolina from 2006 through December 2007. The defendant also engaged in an affair with Trendall.

The defendant was discharged from the military in January 2008. The family returned to Louisiana, and Latanya enlisted in the military. While Latanya was in military training, the defendant continued his affair with Trendall. The defendant also began having an affair with Michelle Minor, who moved in with the defendant and his children to babysit after Trendall moved out. A child was born as a result of the defendant's affair with Michelle.

On May 1, 2008, Latanya's father, Russell Bourgeois, was served with a copy of pleadings filed by Jessica wherein she was seeking child support for P.J. from the defendant. According to Russell, when the defendant retrieved the pleadings, he became angry. The defendant told Michelle, who lived with him at the time, that P.J. was not his child. According to Michelle, the defendant stated that he was tired of Jessica and wanted someone to "do something" to her. On May 4, 2008, the defendant told Michelle that he had someone who would "do something" to Jessica. The defendant left the house and picked up Trendall, and the two went to Walmart where they purchased gloves, a bat, lighter fluid, and a bottle of Mountain Dew.

The defendant and Trendall drove to a park where they met Jessica. According to Tramica Williams, Jessica's best friend, on the morning of May 4, Jessica told her that the defendant called and asked her to meet him at the park. Jessica drove the defendant's SUV, which she was borrowing at the time, to the park, and the defendant drove Jessica's Alero.

According to Trendall's testimony, the defendant led Jessica and her three children down a pathway in the park. Trendall claimed that she sat in the car, but when she heard yelling and screaming, she walked in their direction. She testified that the defendant hit Jessica with a bat and cut her. Trendall admitted that she hid Jessica's body by grabbing Jessica's feet and moving her body into a ditch. Then, the defendant grabbed J.P. and cut him. Trendall held J.P. and dropped him in a hollow. When J.P. attempted to climb out, Trendall pushed him back. Trendall testified that the defendant cut the throat of P.J., and she threw her in the hollow. The two left six-month-old R.P. to die. The defendant and Trendall attempted to leave the scene in the defendant's SUV, but the defendant did not have the keys. They left the scene in Jessica's Alero and drove to a storage trailer located on the defendant's family property. They changed clothing and burned the clothing they wore during the murders.

According to Michelle, the defendant returned home between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., wearing different clothing than he was wearing when he left that morning. He told Michelle to clean the Alero and to discard its seat and steering wheel covers. The next day, the defendant told Michelle that if anyone asked where he was on May 4, she was to say that he was at a track behind Lane Memorial with her, Tekita Washington, and Trendall.

Jessica's body, along with P.J. and R.P., who were still alive, were discovered the next day by BREC workers who were cutting the grass in Doyle's Bayou Park in Zachary, Louisiana. Police subsequently found J.P.'s body approximately thirty minutes after the body of Jessica was located. East Baton Rouge Parish Deputy Gary Morris responded to the scene. According to Deputy Morris's testimony, when he saw P.J.'s cut throat and asked who did this to her, she stated that it was her dad and that her dad left her in the park.

P.J. and R.P. were transported to the hospital. On the way there, P.J. told a paramedic that a lady she knew, but did not know the name of, killed her brother and mother. Emergency room doctor, Catherine Loe, testified that she treated P.J. and R.P. According to Dr. Loe's testimony, P.J. stated that she had slept in the park and "that lady cut me" using a small knife. She also told Dr. Loe that her brother was sleeping in the park. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office Detective Shawn Lewis spoke with P.J. while at the hospital, and testified that P.J. told her that her dad and an unknown lady had been in the park. P.J. identified Trendall in a photographic lineup as the unknown lady and identified the defendant as her dad.

Detectives tracked down the defendant using information located in his SUV left at the scene. He was transported to the West Feliciana Parish Sheriff's Office. His Miranda5 rights were read to him, and he initially claimed that he was walking around a track with Michelle, Tekita, and Trendall during the time of the murders. The defendant was placed under arrest and transported to the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office, where he gave a recorded statement. Thereafter, the defendant admitted that he was at the park, but denied committing the crimes. He claimed that Trendall committed the crimes. Detectives brought the defendant to the park on May 6, and the defendant led detectives to the crime scene, where a Mountain Dew bottle was collected from the nearest trash can. The defendant then led officers to the trailer where he and Trendall burned their clothes and to another location where a bat that appeared to have been in a fire was located.

Trendall was arrested, and while both the defendant and Trendall were in prison, they wrote numerous letters to each other. The defendant also sent Trendall a book wherein he wrote messages in the margins attempting to set up a plan whereby Trendall would confess, and the defendant's lawyers would assist her after she confessed. According to Trendall, the defendant attempted to get her to "take the rap" so he could go free.

The autopsy performed on Jessica revealed that she had multiple lacerations on her neck and was cut all the way around her neck. Jessica was nearly decapitated. She was also cut in her stomach and chest and had an open contusion in the back of her head, which the coroner testified appeared to be from a single or double hit with a blunt force. The coroner determined that the cause of death was the cutting of her neck with exsanguination.

The autopsy performed on J.P. revealed that his neck had been cut and that he suffered six contusions behind his right ear. According to the coroner, the contusions suggest that J.P. was grabbed forcefully in the back of his neck six times. The coroner stated that coincided with the six incisions on J.P.'s neck. The cause of J.P.'s death was exsanguination, secondary to the cutting of his neck.

DNA tests performed after the murders confirmed that P.J. was the daughter of the defendant. The Mountain Dew bottle located at the scene was tested. The defendant and Trendall could not be excluded as contributors to the mixture of DNA on the bottle. The DNA profile from the Mountain Dew bottle was five-hundred and sixty million times more likely to be a mixture of DNA from the defendant and Trendall than a mixture of DNA from the defendant and a randomly selected individual; nine-hundred and fifty-eight billion times more likely to be a mixture of DNA from the defendant and Trendall than a mixture of DNA from Trendall and a randomly selected individual; and two-hundred and sixty-four quadrillion times more likely to be a mixture of DNA from the defendant and Trendall than a mixture of DNA from two randomly selected individuals. A bloodstain on a sock located in a bag of clothing discarded in a drainage ditch on Ligon Road was also tested and determined to contain a mixture of DNA from which the defendant and Jessica could not be excluded as contributors. Approximately ninety-nine point six percent of the population could be excluded as possible contributors to the DNA in this mixture, and Michelle, J.P., Trendall, R.P., P.J., and M.M. (the defendant's child with Michelle) could all be excluded as contributors.

At trial, P.J. testified that on the day of the murders, she went to the park with Jessica, R.P., and J.P. She testified that her dad and "some lady" were also there. According to P.J., as she, Jessica, and her siblings prepared to eat, the defendant and "some lady" came out of the woods, and the lady beat Jessica with a bat. P.J. testified that the defendant cut Jessica and J.P.'s necks, and threw her, Jessica, and J.P. into a ditch. P.J. stated that the lady put R.P. on a log. She was unsure who cut her neck.

The defendant testified at trial. He admitted meeting Jessica on the morning of the murders, but claimed that he was not at the park and, instead, was exercising at the track where Trendall left him. He denied cutting or hurting Jessica, J.P., and P.J., and denied asking Trendall to murder or hurt them. He testified that he was never in the park with Jessica and that the police manipulated him into making that statement. The defendant testified that while he was being interviewed, he was not offered anything to eat or drink, and he never slept that night.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

In the defendant's sole assignment of error, he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to admit expert testimony on false confessions. Specifically, the defendant contends that the expert should have been allowed to testify at trial about false confessions and the influence of interrogation methods. He argues that this testimony would have assisted the jury in determining whether his statement that he was present during the murders was false. He also contends that the expert testimony met requirements for admissibility under Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a "Motion in Limine To Admit Expert Testimony On False Confessions" and a supporting memorandum. The defendant moved the court to admit expert testimony on the phenomenon of false confessions and personal characteristics increasing an individual's susceptibility to provide a false confession. The defendant argued that his statement that he was present when Trendall attacked the victims was not supported by physical evidence, was false, and was a product of the psychological interrogation techniques employed by investigators coupled with characteristics that made him susceptible to render a false confession. The defendant further argued that the expert's testimony on the matter was necessary to explain how he could admit to witnessing a violent physical attack despite not actually being present.

A hearing was held on the defendant's motion, and the defense presented the testimony of Dr. Mark Vigen. Dr. Vigen outlined his education and experience in the field of forensic psychiatry. In outlining his experience, Dr. Vigen testified that he has attended seminars and reviewed literature related to police interrogation and false confessions. He has been consulted five times in cases involving interrogations and potentially false confessions. Of those cases, he has testified in two. His testimony in one of those cases was related to interrogation techniques and the interrogation itself. In the other case, he analyzed the transcript of the interrogation, and his testimony was related to the dispositional factors of the defendant. Only one of the two cases was a homicide. Dr. Vigen stated that he never gives an opinion on whether a confession or statement to the police is true because that decision is within the province of the trier of fact.

Dr. Vigen explained that the area of coerced confessions, false confessions, and voluntary confessions developed out of social psychology. He stated that the methods used to study police interrogations provide data that is used to determine if a particular theory is correct or verifiable. He outlined a study by Saul Kassin wherein Kassin completed a number of studies under different conditions that reproduced the same phenomena, thus testing for reliability. He explained that other researchers have taken Kassin's method and tested in similar and different circumstances. Because he sees a sequence of literature essentially "saying the same thing but using different methods," he thinks the findings are reliable.

Dr. Vigen opined that principles in the area of influence in the interrogation setting are generally accepted in the scientific community. He also opined that there are misperceptions outside of the scientific community about police interrogation and false confessions, including the idea that people do not admit or confess to things that they did not do. He discussed situational factors that can cause someone to move from a denial to an admission (length of interrogation; sleep, food, or water deprivation; and isolation) and different techniques used by investigators. He clarified that those police techniques are not designed to elicit false statements. On cross-examination, Dr. Vigen admitted that because he was unaware of any studies related to the specific facts of the instant case, he was unable to provide a rate of error.

Dr. Vigen met with the defendant and determined that the defendant had a high need for affiliation, a desire to be part of a group, and personality issues that made him vulnerable to pleasing others. According to Dr. Vigen, because of the defendant's need for affiliation, he wanted to join the investigation process with the detectives. He opined that the detectives implied to the defendant that if he admitted that he witnessed the murders, he could go home free. Dr. Vigen explained that the detectives accomplished this by telling the defendant a story about a man involved in a drive-by shooting. The detectives told the defendant that because that man was only a passenger in a vehicle driven by the shooter, he was considered only a witness and was not prosecuted. Dr. Vigen further opined that the detectives were "theme building," or giving the defendant a story about what happened and that the defendant adopted the theme and made consistent statements. Dr. Vigen concluded that those interrogation techniques coupled with the defendant's dispositional factors made him vulnerable to giving a false confession.

After the hearing, the district court ruled that Dr. Vigen's testimony was inadmissible. The court found that the evidence adduced at the hearing did not satisfy the Daubert requirements and concluded that the relative probative value of expert testimony on false confessions would be outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time.

In its written reasons, the district court explained that although Dr. Vigen's testimony indicated that the phenomenon of false confessions is being studied, it was unclear whether there is any way to test the accuracy of an unconfirmed confession. The court also stated that it was concerned with the omission of testimony relative to the "rate of error."

The court explained that it was convinced that Dr. Vigen's testimony was not necessary to assist the jury in understanding false confessions. It explained that the jurors were questioned extensively during voir dire about their ability to understand and accept the occurrence of false confessions. The court noted that during voir dire, jurors indicated that they believed there were circumstances when a person might make a false confession or false incriminating statement. The court concluded that voir dire, cross-examination, and closing argument were sufficient to allow the defense to present the information to the jury.

The district court further stated that it was concerned with the relevance of Dr. Vigen's testimony because there was no allegation prior to the motion in limine that the defendant's statement was false. The issue was not raised at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress his statement, and at the hearing on the motion to suppress, testimony established that the defendant did not complain of physical distress, ask to end the interview, or request time to sleep or eat.

Preliminary questions concerning the competency or qualification of a person to be a witness or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. La. Code Evid. art. 104A. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. La. Code Evid. art. 403. The district court is vested with wide discretion in determining the competency of an expert witness, and its ruling on the qualification of the witness will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 8 (La. 1990).

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702 dictates the admissibility of expert testimony. At the time of trial, it provided, prior to its revision by 2014 La. Acts No. 630, § 1:

See State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1239, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court has placed limitations on this codal provision in that, "expert testimony, while not limited to matters of science, art or skill, cannot invade the field of common knowledge, experience and education of men." State v. Stucke, 419 So.2d 939, 945 (La. 1982); see State v. Young, 2009-1177 (La. 4/5/10), 35 So.3d 1042, 1046-47, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 597, 178 L.Ed.2d 434 (2010).

In State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La. 1993), the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the test set forth in Daubert, regarding proper standards for the admissibility of expert scientific testimony, which requires the district court to act in a gatekeeping function to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. State v. Chauvin, 2002-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 697, 700-01. To assist the district courts in their preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and can properly be applied to the facts at issue, the United States Supreme Court suggested the following general observations are appropriate: 1) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; 2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error; and 4) whether the methodology is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94, 113 S.Ct. 2796-97. Thus, Louisiana has adopted Daubert's requirement that in order for technical or scientific expert testimony to be admissible under Article 702, the scientific evidence must rise to a threshold level of reliability. Daubert's general "gatekeeping" applies not only to testimony based upon scientific knowledge, but also to testimony based on "technical" and "other specialized knowledge." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999); Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181 (La. 2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 234. The district court may consider one or more of the four Daubert factors, but that list of factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1171. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys with respect to its ultimate reliability determinations. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142, 119 S.Ct. 1171. The purpose of a Daubert hearing is to determine the reliability of an expert's methodology, not whether the expert has the proper qualifications to testify. State v. Lamonica, 2009-1366 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/29/10), 44 So.3d 895, 900-01, writ denied, 2010-2135 (La. 2/18/11), 57 So.3d 331.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling that Dr. Vigen's testimony was inadmissible. Our review of the record convinces us that there is merit to the district court's concerns regarding the scientific reliability and relevance of Dr. Vigen's testimony. At the outset, we note that the defendant did not provide law enforcement with a confession. Rather, he simply stated that he was at the park while Trendall committed the crimes. Further, the State did not introduce his statement into evidence. During the defendant's testimony, he admitted the recorded statement into evidence and explained that it was coerced. Thus, the jury heard testimony regarding the conditions of the interrogation from the defendant himself. They also heard testimony regarding the length of time that the defendant was interrogated, the receipt and waiver of his Miranda rights, and the content of the questions that led to the statement.

Additionally, as noted by the district court, because Dr. Vigen did not indicate how or if studies related to false confessions translate into an ability to determine when a false confession has occurred or how often one may occur, it is unclear whether there is any way to test the accuracy of an unconfirmed confession. Further, the problems with the scientific reliability and relevance of Dr. Vigen's proposed testimony make this case readily distinguishable from Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (blanket exclusion of testimony about the physical environment in which the defendant's confession was obtained deprived him of a fair trial). See State v. Blank, 2004-0204 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 130-131, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494, 169 L.Ed.2d 346 (2007) (recognizing the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense allows him to present evidence on any relevant matter, but does not allow the presentation of unreliable evidence); United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308-09, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1264-65, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (recognizing the defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather subject to reasonable restrictions and "State and Federal Governments unquestionably have a legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial."). The jury was capable of using its common knowledge in deciding the issue of scientific reliability of the defendant's statement and was capable of understanding reasons that the statement may be unreliable without the assistance of expert testimony.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.