NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

THERIOT, J.

Defendant, Cowan Lamar Collins, was charged by bill of information with attempted second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one), and with attempted first degree feticide, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:32.6 (count two). On each count, defendant pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. On count one, the trial court sentenced defendant to forty-five years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On count two, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years imprisonment at hard labor.1 The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant now appeals, alleging that his sentence on count one is excessive and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences. We remand solely for the trial court to correct the minute entry and uniform commitment order by deleting the restriction of benefits on count two.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The victim in this case, Kenyia Houston, dated defendant for approximately four months, from the end of 2012 to approximately February of 2013. In January of 2013, Houston found out that she was pregnant with defendant's child. According to Houston, defendant was unhappy with her pregnancy. Houston testified at trial that defendant advised her to get an abortion and later threatened her, with a handgun, not to mess anything up between defendant and his new girlfriend.

At approximately 4:15 a.m. on August 14, 2013, Houston was leaving her home to drive to work. Shortly upon entering the vehicle, she heard a loud pop. Houston then witnessed as defendant approached her car and fired a handgun at her. Houston stated that defendant was wearing black clothing, with a bandana covering part of his face, but she was positive about his identity as the shooter. One bullet ultimately struck Houston's arm and lodged in her left breast. Despite being shot, Houston was able to drive her car away from defendant. She eventually crashed into a tree down the street. Houston's mother witnessed the shooting from the home's porch, and she called 911. Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office deputies responded to the scene, and Houston identified defendant as the person who shot her. Houston was transported to Baton Rouge General Medical Center. Doctors treated Houston's wounds and delivered her premature baby by emergency C-section. Both Houston and her child suffered lasting effects as a result of the shooting.

On the strength of Houston's identification of defendant as the shooter, defendant was detained and ultimately arrested several hours following the shooting. That same day, he gave a statement denying any involvement in the shooting. However, a search of his current girlfriend's vehicle led the police to discover various items of dark clothing, as well as a box of nine-millimeter cartridges that matched the bullets recovered from Houston's body and vehicle. Defendant testified at trial, again denying any involvement in the shooting and explaining that he was in the area of Houston's home on the night of the incident only to attempt to buy marijuana. A unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged on both counts.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendant presents two assignments of error on appeal:

DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing an unconstitutionally excessive sentence, and in his second assignment of error, he avers that defense counsel's failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. These interconnected assignments of error lack merit.

The record does not contain an oral or written motion to reconsider sentence. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 881.1(E) provides that the failure to file or make a motion to reconsider sentence precludes a defendant from raising an excessive sentence argument on appeal. Ordinarily, pursuant to the provisions of this article and the decision of State v. Duncan, 94-1563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 667 So.2d 1141, 1143 (en banc) (per curiam), we would not consider an excessive sentence argument. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we will consider defendant's argument that his sentence is excessive, even in the absence of a motion to reconsider sentence, in order to address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Wilkinson, 99-0803 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 301, 303, writ denied, 2000-2336 (La. 4/20/01), 790 So.2d 631.

On appeal, defendant only argues that the forty-five year sentence imposed on count one is unconstitutionally excessive. Therefore, we will discuss the constitutionality of the sentence imposed on count one alone.

Failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence in itself does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. However, if the defendant can show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, his sentence would have been different, a basis for an ineffective assistance claim may be found. See State v. Felder, 2000-2887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, 370, writ denied, 2001-3027 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173.

Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. See State v. Hurst, 99-2868 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So.2d 75, 83, writ denied, 2000-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So.2d 962. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hogan, 480 So.2d 288, 291 (La. 1985). A trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed by it should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739, 751 (La. 1992).

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the district court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect that the district court adequately considered the criteria. State v. Brown, 2002-2231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 566, 569.

Whoever commits the crime of attempted second degree murder shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a) & 14:30.1(B). The trial court sentenced defendant to forty-five years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Prior to sentencing, the trial court listened to an impact statement from the victim. Houston described to the court the physical, mental, and emotional trauma that the event has caused both to her and to her daughter. In addition, the trial court considered many letters that were sent on behalf of both the victim and defendant, including one from defendant himself. Finally, the trial court considered the contents of a presentencing investigation report ("PSI"). The PSI, which noted that defendant still did not accept responsibility for the offenses, recommended that defendant receive the maximum-possible sentence on count one (fifty years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence).

In giving his reasons for sentencing defendant, the trial judge found that there was an undue risk that defendant would commit another crime during a period of suspended sentence or probation, that defendant was in need of commitment to an institution, and that any lesser sentences would deprecate the seriousness of the crime. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1(A). In considering the Article 894.1(B) factors, the trial judge found that defendant's conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim, that defendant knowingly created the risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person, that defendant used threats of violence in the commission of the offense, and that the offense resulted in significant permanent injury to the victims and their family. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1(B)(1), (5), (6), & (9).

Furthermore, the trial judge found that defendant knowingly used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense and that he foreseeably endangered human life by discharging that firearm during the commission of the offense, which had an element of the use or attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1(B)(10) & (18). In mitigation, the trial judge noted that defendant did not have a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and that he led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time prior to the commission of the instant crimes. The trial judge also stated that he had considered defendant's age, work status, and social history.

Considering the trial court's stated reasons and the record as a whole, the sentence imposed on count one is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive. Thus, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in imposing sentence.

Because defendant's sentence imposed on count one is not excessive, defense counsel's failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence, even if constituting deficient performance, did not cause any prejudice to defendant. See Wilkinson, 754 So.2d at 303; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Therefore, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not merit relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant-appellant's assignments of error lack merit. The sentence imposed on count one is not unconstitutionally excessive, and defense counsel did not prejudice defendant by failing to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence. Consequently, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences, and remand this matter solely for the trial court to correct the minute entry and uniform commitment order by deleting the restriction of benefits on count two.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF MINUTE ENTRY AND COMMITMENT ORDER.