HIGGINBOTHAM, J.
This appeal concerns the dismissal of a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance (Commissioner) to conduct a hearing regarding a challenge to a 2003 approval of an automobile insurance rate increase.
The history of this case is long and convoluted. In 2003, Progressive Security Insurance Company (Progressive) proposed a rate increase for its automobile liability insurance policies issued in Louisiana. On July 7, 2003, the increased rate was approved by the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission (the LIRC) and was later implemented by Progressive.
Progressive responded to Mr. Katz's first complaint and, at Mr. Katz's request, the matter was then set for a hearing, pursuant to former La. R.S. 22:1412(B) and former La. R.S. 22:1351(2), before a hearing officer for the LIRC on March 16, 2005. Mr. Katz and his attorney, as well as counsel for Progressive, attended the hearing where evidence was presented. After the hearing, the hearing officer recommended that the LIRC "revisit the approval" of Progressive's rate increase due to the need for clarification as to how the rate increase was to be implemented. The day after the hearing, on March 17, 2005, Mr. Katz filed a petition against Progressive in the 24th Judicial District Court, Suit Number 618-133 (hereafter referred to as "Katz I"), seeking recovery, individually and as a representative of a purported class of all others similarly situated, of alleged excessive premiums paid.
Meanwhile, as the administrative process proceeded, Mr. Katz's first complaint was added to the agenda of the LIRC's meeting held on April 26, 2005. Mr. Katz was not present at the meeting, but his first complaint was considered by five of the seven members of the LIRC, along with Progressive's response and the hearing officer's recommendation that the LIRC revisit Progressive's rate-increase approval. At the conclusion of that meeting, the LIRC voted to reject the hearing officer's recommendation by a 3-to-2 vote. Mr. Katz was notified in writing of the LIRC's action, as well as his right to request a hearing before the full LIRC board within thirty days; however, Mr. Katz never filed a hearing request. No further administrative relief was sought within the required thirty-day time period.
Although he did not seek the outlined administrative remedy, Mr. Katz continued to pursue his Katz I lawsuit, wherein Progressive had filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Eight years after Katz I was filed, a judgment was rendered in the 24th Judicial District Court on March 7, 2013, sustaining Progressive's exceptions and dismissing Mr. Katz's claims "without prejudice to any rights he may have to pursue administrative remedies[.]" No appeal was taken from the judgment dismissing Katz I.
After the dismissal of Katz I, Mr. Katz filed a second complaint with the Department on May 30, 2013, reiterating the same allegations as in his first complaint from 2004. On June 26, 2013, the Department responded to Mr. Katz's second complaint, advising him, through his attorney, that the Department had "no statutory basis to hear the same complaint twice and therefore, there are no further additional (sic) actions the [Department] can take" to resolve his second complaint that obviously involved "the same parties, the same rate issue[,] and . . . the same set of operative facts[.]" The Department's position was that, because Mr. Katz's first complaint was previously heard and decided by the LIRC and Mr. Katz never requested an administrative hearing within the mandatory statutory time frame, he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and therefore, the matter became final and non-appealable.
Once again, Mr. Katz did not request a hearing within thirty days of being notified of the Department's position as to his second complaint.
Progressive responded to the Katz II petition by filing a peremptory exception of res judicata and a motion for sanctions, asserting that Mr. Katz's claims against Progressive had already been adjudged and are frivolous. Mr. Katz then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss his petition in Katz II, without prejudice, on April 24, 2014, wherein he admitted that he had "not yet exhausted his administrative remedies." On May 8, 2014, the trial court signed a judgment of voluntary dismissal in Katz II, thereby ordering that all of Mr. Katz's claims against Progressive be "DISMISSED without prejudice to any rights he may have to pursue administrative remedies." Additionally, in light of the voluntary dismissal, the trial court denied Progressive's motion for sanctions.
A few days later, on May 12, 2014, Mr. Katz, through his attorneys, directed a third complaint and written demand to the Department, demanding that the Commissioner "properly invoke those procedures set forth to hear his [second] complaint against Progressive as set forth in the Louisiana Administrative Code." Mr. Katz also requested a hearing regarding the Department's handling of his second complaint filed on May 30, 2013, wherein the Department refused to hold a second hearing concerning Mr. Katz's first complaint against Progressive. In addition, Mr. Katz filed a petition for writ of mandamus directed to the Commissioner on August 15, 2014, in the same Katz II lawsuit that had been voluntarily dismissed three months earlier. Pursuant to former La. R.S. 22:1367, Mr. Katz requested a writ of mandamus compelling the Commissioner to set a hearing on his complaint.
The Commissioner filed exceptions to Mr. Katz's writ of mandamus on September 9, 2014, raising the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata, prescription, failure to exhaust and/or timely assert administrative remedies, and failure to state a cause of action and/or a right of action for mandamus. The matter came for hearing before the trial court on November 17, 2014, and the trial court signed a judgment on December 2, 2014, granting all but one of the Commissioner's exceptions. Additionally, due to the rulings on the exceptions, the trial court denied Mr. Katz's writ of mandamus with prejudice. It is from this judgment that Mr. Katz appeals, generally assigning error to each of the trial court's rulings regarding the Commissioner's exceptions and on the mandamus action.
According to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1, "[j]urisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties, and to grant the relief to which they are entitled." The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by consent of the parties or waived; a judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void.
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.
Mr. Katz exercised his right to voluntarily dismiss Katz II without prejudice. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing Mr. Katz's lawsuit against Progressive in Katz II, without prejudice, on May 8, 2014.
While a judgment of dismissal without prejudice does not bar the filing of another suit on the same cause of action, it terminates the instant suit and generally deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to take further action in the same case that is no longer pending before it.
For the above reasons, we affirm that portion of the trial court's judgment granting the Commissioner's exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and consequently denying Mr. Katz's petition for mandamus with prejudice. All other portions of the trial court's judgment are vacated because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment on the remaining exceptions. We find that this ruling moots the remaining assignments of error. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff-appellant, Richard L. Katz.
Former La. R.S. 22:1351 provided, in pertinent part: