NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

McDONALD, J.

This is a companion case to Crosstex Energy Services, LP, et al. v. Texas Brine Company, L.L.C., et al., 2015-0600 (La. App. 1 Cir. __/__/__) (unpublished), handed down this same day. The background facts and procedural history of the matter are set forth in that case and will not be repeated herein. In that case, the district court granted summary judgment finding that the Pollution Exclusion and Radioactive Matter Exclusion did not bar coverage by Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. (LIUI) for the claims asserted by EnLink Midstream Operating, LP, EnLink LIG, L.L.C., and EnLink Processing Services, L.L.C. (the EnLink plaintiffs) and Texas Brine (as a third-party plaintiff), and certified the judgment as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915B(1). In this case, at the same hearing and for the same reasons, the district court granted summary judgment finding that the Known Loss Exclusion raised by LIUI did not bar coverage for the claims asserted by the EnLink plaintiffs, and certified the judgment as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915B(1). LIUI and Great American Assurance Company (GAAC) have appealed that judgment.

For the reasons set forth in Crosstex Energy Services, LP v. Texas Brine Company, L.L.C., et al., 2015-0600 (La. App. 1 Cir. __/__/__) (unpublished), we find that the district court prematurely granted summary judgment finding that the Known Loss Exclusion in the LIUI policy did not bar coverage for the claims for damages asserted by the EnLink plaintiffs, as there are genuine issues of material fact and there was not enough time for discovery. The summary judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the district court. The costs of this appeal are assessed against EnLink Midstream Operating, LP, EnLink LIG, L.L.C., and EnLink Processing Services, L.L.C.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED; MATTER REMANDED.

McCLENDON, J., concurring.

Although the trial court designated the partial summary judgment as final under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B), that designation is not determinative of this court's jurisdiction. Van ex rel. White v. Davis, 00-0206 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So.2d 478, 480. Applying the precepts set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122-23, I conclude that the trial court improvidently certified the judgment as final such that our appellate jurisdiction does not attach. Even so, under the specific factual circumstances of this case, I would convert the instant appeal to a writ application and consider the merits under our supervisory jurisdiction. Because there has not been an opportunity for adequate discovery, I concur with the result reached by the majority.