NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

CRAIN, J.

Defendants appeal a judgment that dismissed with prejudice a third-party demand filed against their general liability insurer. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

This proceeding arises out of an altercation between Ronald P. Guste and Earl Albert Lirette, III that occurred at Tiger Audio, LLC. Guste filed suit against Lirette and Tiger Audio seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained in the altercation.1 After Lirette filed an answer in proper person, Guste obtained a preliminary default against Tiger Audio and filed a motion to set the case for trial. The trial court responded with an order signed on February 7, 2014, that set a trial date and established deadlines for discovery, amendment of pleadings, and other pretrial matters. In relevant part, the pretrial order directed that the joinder of additional parties and any incidental demands "shall be filed within thirty (30) days of this order." (Emphasis omitted.).

Less than two weeks prior to trial, an attorney appeared of record on behalf of Lirette and Tiger Audio and filed a motion to continue the trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the attorney withdrew shortly thereafter. On the day of trial, June 9, 2014, another attorney enrolled on behalf of Lirette and Tiger Audio and filed a second motion to continue the trial, which also was denied. The trial proceeded as scheduled, and after the presentation of evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement and instructed the parties that, at a future date, it would receive oral arguments and issue its decision in open court.

While the case was still under advisement, Lirette and Tiger Audio filed a third-party demand against Montpelier US Insurance Company, alleging that Montpelier issued a policy of general liability insurance to Lirette and Tiger Audio that provided coverage for any judgment that may be rendered herein against them. On July 3, 2014, the trial court signed an order directing that the pleading be filed and served. The trial court also inserted handwritten language in the order reserving all parties' rights to file any pleadings or motions.

On August 8, 2014, the trial court reconvened for closing arguments and to render its decision. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court addressed the defendants' third-party demand and ordered that the claim be severed. The trial court further specified that the third-party demand was "not part of the Court's ruling and judgment today, and . . . will be handled as a separate claim." After hearing arguments on the principal claim, the trial court found in favor of Guste and awarded damages against Lirette and Tiger Audio in the total amount of $373,374.94, plus expert fees, court costs, and legal interest. A judgment was signed thereafter on August 28, 2014, setting forth that award and ordering that the third-party demand against Montpelier "be and hereby is severed to be tried separately."2

Montpelier subsequently filed a response to the third-party demand in a pleading captioned "EXCEPTIONS," wherein the insurer asserted that the defendants' claim should be dismissed on the grounds of improper joinder of parties, preclusion by judgment, and estoppel. In support of the exceptions, Montpelier argued that the third-party demand was filed after the applicable deadline in the pretrial order, without leave of court, and after the trial on the merits. In the same pleading, Montpelier requested that the trial court enforce its pretrial order by dismissing the third-party demand with prejudice.

In response, Lirette and Tiger Audio asserted that an exception of improper joinder was inapplicable because all parties shared a community of interest, jurisdiction was present, venue was appropriate, and all actions employed the same form of procedure. The defendants further pointed out that the exception was mooted by the trial court's order severing the third-party demand and ordering a separate trial for the claim, which is the appropriate relief if an exception of improper joinder is sustained. Lirette and Tiger Audio also contended that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not recognize an exception of preclusion by judgment or an exception of estoppel. To the extent the pleading could be construed as an exception of res judicata, the defendants argued that the judgment in favor of Guste did not bar their third-party demand, because the claim was severed from the main demand and was to be tried separately.

The trial court held a hearing on the exceptions and rendered the following ruling in favor of Montpelier:

The trial court ordered that the third-party demand be dismissed with prejudice, prompting counsel for Lirette and Tiger Audio to interject that the proper remedy was a dismissal without prejudice, as only procedural issues were before the court, not the merits of the case. The trial court responded, "If it's untimely, then you don't get to file it at all." A judgment was signed on November 14, 2014, that sustained the exceptions of improper joinder of parties, preclusion by judgment, and estoppel, and dismissed the third-party demand with prejudice and at the defendants' costs. Lirette and Tiger Audio appeal.

DISCUSSION

Before addressing the applicable standard of review, we reiterate that the judgment on appeal sustains certain exceptions filed by Montpelier, namely exceptions of improper joinder of parties, preclusion by judgment, and estoppel. The judgment is not an order enforcing the pretrial order or imposing sanctions for any violation thereof. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1551C. While we recognize that the trial court relied upon the pretrial order in rendering its judgment, appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment. See Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572.

When evidence is introduced at the trial of an exception, the trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. See Cichirillo v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 04-2894 (La. 11/29/05), 917 So.2d 424, 428 n. 7; Warren v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 14-0310 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/20/14), 168 So.3d 436, 439, writ denied, 15-0068 (La. 4/2/15), 163 So.3d 795. However, questions of law are reviewed under the de novo standard of review to determine whether the ruling of the trial court was legally correct. Woodard v. Upp, 13-0999 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/18/14), 142 So.3d 14, 18.

In support of its exception of "preclusion by judgment," Montpelier relies upon Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 425A, which provides, "A party shall assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation." Under that provision, according to Montpelier, Lirette and Tiger Audio were required to assert their third-party demand in this proceeding, but they failed to do so in a timely manner under the pretrial order. Montpelier thus contends that the third-party demand is precluded by the August 28, 2014 judgment on the principal demand.

This court has previously recognized that Article 425 contains no penalty provision and is merely a reference to the principles of res judicata. See Butler v. United States Automobile Association Insurance Company, 04-2562 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.2d 53, 55, writ denied, 06-0182 (La. 4/24/06), 926 So.2d 546. Article 425 operates in tandem with the doctrine of res judicata and must be read in para materia with the statutes governing that doctrine. See Eddy v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 09-0874, 2009WL4983596 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/09); Butler, 928 So. 2d at 55. Accordingly, an exception of res judicata is the proper procedural vehicle to enforce Article 425's mandate barring claims that were or could have been litigated in a previous lawsuit. Butler, 928 So. 2d at 55.

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231, which provides in relevant part that "a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties." The doctrine is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is that a judgment does not bar another action if the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action. See La. R.S. 13:4232A(3). The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Pierrotti v. Johnson, 11-1317 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/19/12), 91 So.3d 1056, 1063.

The August 28, 2014 judgment expressly provides that the defendants' third-party demand "be and hereby is severed to be tried separately in accordance with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1038."3 In light of this reservation, the third-party demand is not barred by the principles of res judicata under Subsection 13:4232A(3) or Article 425A. See Butler, 928 So. 2d at 55. The trial court erred in sustaining the exception of preclusion by judgment.4

In its "exception of estoppel," Montpelier asserts that Lirette and Tiger Audio should be estopped from pursuing the third-party demand. A party invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel must prove the facts upon which estoppel is based and must establish all three elements of estoppel: (1) a representation by action or word, (2) justifiable reliance on the representation, and (3) a detrimental change in one's position because of the reliance. In re Ourso, 05-0543 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 748, 753-54, writ denied, 06-2205 (La. 11/17/06), 942 So.2d 542. Equitable estoppel is not favored. In re Ourso, 938 So. 2d at 754. The record contains no factual or legal basis for finding that Montpelier detrimentally relied on a representation by Lirette and Tiger Audio that they now seek to change. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the exception of estoppel.5

In its final exception, Montpelier asserts that it was improperly joined as a party. The improper joinder of parties is included in the objection of improper cumulation of actions, which is raised through a dilatory exception. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 926A(7). The exception is applicable when multiple claims by one or more plaintiffs have been improperly cumulated in the same action against one or more defendants. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 461-463; Blakely v. Powers, 590 So.2d 1286, 1289-90 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991). Two or more parties may be joined in the same suit as defendants if: (1) there is a community of interest between the parties joined, (2) each of the actions cumulated is within the jurisdiction of the court and is brought in the proper venue, and (3) all of the actions cumulated are mutually consistent and employ the same form of procedure. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 463; Blakely, 590 So. 2d at 1290; see also La. Code Civ. Pro. arts. 1032, 1036.

Montpelier does not dispute that the defendants' third-party demand complies with the requirements of these provisions. Instead, Montpelier suggests that its exception of improper joinder "is not the variety contemplated by Article 926 and Blakely, but rather, [is] one that qualifies as a peremptory exception" under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 927 (emphasis added).

The function of a peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff's action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 923. According to Montpelier, its "peremptory exception of improper joinder" was properly sustained because the defendants "forfeited" their right to assert the third-party demand by not filing it before the pretrial order deadline. Pretermitting whether our law recognizes a peremptory exception of improper joinder, we find no merit to Montpelier's underlying contention that the defendants' demand is "legally nonexistent" or "barred by effect of law" because it was filed after the applicable deadline in the pretrial order.

A trial court may render a pretrial order that "controls the subsequent course of the action." See La. Code Civ. Pro. 1551B; Highlands Underwriters Insurance Company v. Foley, 96-1018 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 1336, 1339. Here, the trial court adopted a pretrial order that included a deadline for filing incidental actions. Although Lirette and Tiger Audio do not dispute that their third-party demand was filed after that deadline, the lapse of the deadline did not render their claim against Montpelier "legally nonexistent" or "barred by effect of law." Rather, unless the trial court ordered otherwise, the passage of the deadline meant the third-party demand could not be filed in this action. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1551B (the pretrial order "controls the subsequent course of the action" (emphasis added)). If Lirette and Tiger Audio had not been allowed to file the third-party demand in this action, they would have retained the right to file the claim in a separate proceeding. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1113. That right would have been lost only if Montpelier proved that it was prejudiced by the defendants' failure to bring the insurer into the original proceeding as a third-party defendant or by their failure to apprise it of the suit. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1113.

We need not make that determination under Article 1113 because the trial court granted leave to the defendants and allowed the third-party demand to be filed in this proceeding. The trial court then entered a judgment that severed the third-party demand and ordered that it be tried separately. At that point in the proceeding, which is when Montpelier filed its purported "peremptory" exception of improper joinder, the third-party demand was properly pending and was not "legally nonexistent" or "barred by effect of law." See La. Code Civ. Pro. arts. 923, 1033, and 1111. Whether the exception is considered dilatory or peremptory, Montpelier has failed to identify any legal basis for finding an improper joinder of parties. The trial court erred in sustaining the exception.6

CONCLUSION

The November 14, 2014 judgment is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Montpelier US Insurance Company.

REVERSED; REMANDED.