WILLIAM C. HILLMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.
The matter before the Court is the "Objection to Confirmation of Debtor's First Amended Plan of Reorganization Filed on April 27, 2011" (the "Objection") filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
On May 14, 2009, the Debtor and Ludmila Pittnerova filed a joint voluntary Chapter 7 petition.
On September 6, 2010, a little over a year after the Debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, he filed the present Chapter 11 case. According to the Debtor's Second Amended Disclosure Statement (the "Disclosure Statement"), the purpose of this case is to "provide for payment in full of claims that are actually secured by real estate, as well as any non-dischargeable tax claims."
One of the properties owned by the Debtor is located at 119 Randall Street, in North Easton, Massachusetts (the "Property") and is purportedly his principal residence. According to the Disclosure Statement, the Debtor and his family live in the basement apartment while the rest of the Property has been rented to a tenant whose rent is scheduled to be $2,100 per month. Deutsche Bank holds a mortgage (the "Mortgage") on the Property and as of the petition date, the estimated loan payoff was $571,944.28.
On July 21, 2011, Deutsche Bank filed the Objection, asserting that the Plan is neither feasible nor complies with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor filed the Response on July 25, 2011. I held a hearing on the Objection on July 27, 2011, and at its conclusion, took the matter under advisement.
Deutsche Bank objects to the Plan for several reasons. First, it contends that the Mortgage is not modifiable because the Debtor previously discharged his liability for the underlying note. Deutsche Bank explains:
Alternatively, Deutsche Bank asserts that its claim is protected from modification under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) because the Property is the Debtor's principal residence.
Second, Deutsche Bank argues that the Plan cannot be confirmed because it does not satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) because the proposed rate of interest fails to adequately compensate Deutsche Bank for the time value of money and the risk of the Debtor's default. In light of the Debtor's significant contractual default, his failure to demonstrate resources to maintain expenses attendant to the Property, his minimal alleged operating income which barely covers the proposed principal and interest payment, and the fact that Deutsche Bank's claim is based upon the Property alone, Deutsche Bank suggests that the risk factors should dictate an interest rate of at least 8% or 9%. Deutsche Bank contends, however, that if a sufficient interest rate were used, the Plan would not be feasible.
Third, Deutsche Bank asserts that the Plan as proposed is unfeasible because there is no proof that the Debtor will receive $2,100 per month from a tenant. Moreover, even if such rent were proven, it fails to account for the payment of real estate taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance, and other property expenses.
In opposition, the Debtor contends that he is not seeking to avoid Deutsche Bank's lien in toto, but merely to the extent that it exceeds the value of the property as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). He asserts that whether a claim has survived a prior discharge has no impact on whether it is modifiable, and that Deutsche Bank has cited no authority in support of that position. While the Debtor concedes that the Property is his principal residence, he notes that it is also an income producing property, which is supported by his operating reports, and argues that a claim is nonetheless modifiable when it is secured by more than the Debtor's principal residence.
With respect to the interest rate, the Debtor contends that the proposed rate of 5% is 1.75% above the prime rate of 3.25% and comports with the requirements of Till v. SCS Credit Corp.
From the outset, I note that whether the Plan is "fair and equitable" under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) or feasible in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) are, in this instance, questions of fact that require evidence. Additionally, to the extent that the modifiability of Deutsche Bank's claim is dependent on whether the Property is, in addition to serving as the Debtor's principal residence, income producing, a further developed record may be required.
Deutsche Bank's remaining argument, namely, that its claim is not modifiable because the lien survived discharge in the Debtor's prior case, is wholly unsupported. The parties agree that the Chapter 7 "discharge extinguishes only `the personal liability of the debtor' . . . [and that] the Code provides that a creditor's right to foreclose on a mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy."
Because the Debtor has no in personam liability on account of the claim, the value of Deutsche Bank's claim cannot exceed the value of the Property. This, of course, is logical because the secured creditor is afforded the same treatment it would receive if it attempted to foreclose on the Property where the deficiency had already been discharged. Therefore, I will overrule the Objection in part.
In light of the foregoing, I will enter an order overruling the Objection in part and scheduling the matter for an evidentiary hearing.