CYPHER, J.
The plaintiff, administrator of the estate of Sophal Chan Chin (decedent), appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his malpractice action against the defendant doctor, Joseph Russo, following an adverse decision of a medical malpractice tribunal and the plaintiff's failure to post a bond. See G. L. c. 231, § 60B. We agree with the plaintiff that his offer of proof was sufficient.
Background.
The two procedures took place between 1:30 P.M. and approximately 6:00 P.M. Russo reported that, as the abdominal wound was about one-half closed, at about 6:03 P.M., the anesthesiologist reported a sudden drop in the decedent's blood pressure. Code emergency procedures immediately were instituted and performed over the next one and one-half hours. The decedent briefly was stabilized to a normal blood pressure and was transferred to the intensive care unit. After about one hour, she suffered cardiac arrest, was unable to be resuscitated, and was declared dead at 9:50 P.M.
The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court on April 17, 2012, alleging that the decedent's death was caused by Russo's negligence. Russo requested a medical malpractice tribunal pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 60B. Following the submission of an offer of proof by the plaintiff, and a hearing, the tribunal issued a report stating that "there is not sufficient evidence to raise a legitimate question as to liability appropriate for judicial inquiry." When the plaintiff failed to post the required bond, judgment entered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. He timely appealed.
We test the sufficiency of an offer of proof by viewing the evidence "in a light most favorable to the plaintiff," Blake v. Avedikian, 412 Mass. 481, 484 (1992), to determine principally whether Russo's "performance did not conform to good medical practice," and whether damage resulted. Santos v. Kim, 429 Mass. 130, 133 (1999) (citation omitted). An offer of proof is sufficient if "anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff." St. Germain v. Pfeifer, 418 Mass. 511, 516 (1994) (citation omitted). See Little v. Rosenthal, 376 Mass. 573, 578 (1978) (tribunal's task similar to trial judge's function in ruling on defendant's motion for directed verdict).
The principal thrust of Dr. Stark's opinion is that Russo deviated from the standard of care by ordering the infusion of a toxic dose of tumescent solution, which caused the decedent's cardiac arrest. Dr. Stark noted that, before the procedures began, by "the end of one hour, this [intravenous (I.V.)] infusion provided the [decedent] a dose of 1 mg epinephrine and 400 mg of lidocaine.... During the ensuing liposuction procedure, Dr. Russo administered a total of 3.85 liters of `tumescent solution' that ... delivered an additional dose of 3.8 mg of epinephrine and 1,340 mg of lidocaine to the [decedent's] subcutaneous tissue." Given these facts, Dr. Stark opined:
Citing opinions of authorities in published papers that "liposuction by local anesthesia is safer than liposuction by general anesthesia,"
In response, Russo claims that he ordered the tumescent solution only to be administered subcutaneously, and not intravenously. Referring to his preoperative orders, he asserts that he ordered standard lactated "Ringer's" solution,
The electronic medication administration record also lists an order for 1,000 milliliters of "lactated Ringer's," specifying the same amounts of lidocaine and epinephrine as the hospital anesthesia record, and adding "label cmts: tumescent anesthesia" scheduled for intravenous route.
Dr. Stark also found that Russo failed to note in his operation report the use of Marcaine (bupivacaine), "a local anesthetic twice as powerful as lidocaine and more cardiotoxic." The use of Marcaine also had not been recorded with the other medications in the decedent's chart. Dr. Stark, however, discovered an entry in a nurse's note that forty-five milliliters of "25 Marcaine & epi[nephrine]" had been administered, apparently during the ACLS protocol. He noted that Marcaine was administered "directly into the area where the surgical incision was made to perform the abdominoplasty."
Finally, Dr. Stark stated that the "hospital record is incomplete and inconsistent as [to] the amount of I.V. fluids given, but at the time [the decedent] was pronounced dead, she had gained 10.4 kg (22+ lbs) due to I.V. fluids (measured during the autopsy)." He stated that pulmonary edema was unavoidable, and that the toxicology report was unreliable because the analgesic medications and epinephrine had been "massively diluted" by the IV fluids.
Specifically, Dr. Stark's letter tracks the breach of Russo's duty to conform to good medical practice with Dr. Stark's statements regarding the administration of a toxic dose of tumescent solution, the use of general anesthesia, and the use of Marcaine. Dr. Stark links these actions by Russo to the decedent's death, satisfying the requirement of causation. Because the plaintiff's offer of proof regarding his claim against Russo contained evidence that, "if substantiated, would reasonably support an inference ... that [Russo's] performance did not conform to good medical practice, and that injury to the [decedent] resulted therefrom," the tribunal erred in holding otherwise. St. Germain v. Pfeifer, 418 Mass. at 518. Thus, the plaintiff was not required to post a bond to prevent dismissal of his claim against Russo.
The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court where the determination of the tribunal is to be substituted by a determination that the plaintiff's offer of proof was sufficient to raise a legitimate question appropriate for judicial inquiry.
So ordered.