EDWARD F. HARRINGTON, Senior District Judge.
Watersedge Group, LLC ("Watersedge") was formed as a Connecticut limited liability company on January 15, 2008. John H. Baxter ("Baxter") signed the Articles of Organization and was listed as Watersedge's organizer, resident agent, President and CEO. Cornelius B. Prior, Jr. ("Prior") became a member and manager of Watersedge at about the time of its formation in January of 2008. Prior made an equity contribution to Watersedge of $350,000 at the time he became a member and made additional equity contributions to Watersedge consisting of a $300,000 equity infusion in April 2008, a $100,000 equity infusion in June 2008, and a final equity infusion of $100,000 in October 2008. Prior owned eighty (80%) percent of Watersedge and Baxter owned the remaining twenty (20%) percent.
Watersedge's business plan was to provide customers access to a fleet of luxury yachts on a time-share basis. Watersedge purchased the motor vessel Osprey on or about March 27, 2008. Watersedge was the record owner of the Osprey at all times relevant to this dispute until the date of the court-ordered interlocutory sale on June 4, 2010. Watersedge also purchased one other vessel, the Osprey II, that is not the subject of this dispute.
Between March and June of 2008, Prior made loans to Watersedge evidenced by a secured note.
The loans were secured by a first preferred ship mortgage on the Osprey in the maximum principal amount of $1,250,000.00 (the "Mortgage"). The Mortgage was filed with the U.S. Coast Guard Documentation Center on April 2, 2008. On November 19, 2008, Prior made an additional $100,000 loan to Watersedge secured by the mortgage and evidenced by a supplemental secured note. Prior assigned his interests in the loan notes and the mortgage to Tropical on June 16, 2009. Prior is the President and sole shareholder of Tropical. The assignment was filed
In March of 2008, Robert Jarrett ("Jarrett") was hired as a Senior Vice President of Watersedge. In or about March and early April of 2008, Jarrett, on behalf of Watersedge, entered into an agreement with L & L whereby L & L would install certain electronics on the Osprey. Jarrett asked L & L to allow for certain payments to be deferred because Baxter was waiting to receive his next funding check from his "partner in the Islands," referring to Prior. L & L performed the contracted work. Watersedge made an initial $12,000.00 down-payment but failed to pay a remaining balance of $26,720.30 for the work performed in June and July of 2008. L & L has a valid maritime lien for necessaries in that amount. L & L's maritime lien arose after the Mortgage was recorded on April 2, 2008. The Court finds that there was no fraud or misrepresentation with respect to Jarrett's statements.
In or about early April of 2008, Baxter, on behalf of Watersedge, entered into an agreement with Essex whereby Essex would perform certain work on the Osprey. Baxter told Essex that Prior was the "backer" or "money man" that would be financing Essex's work. Essex performed the work pursuant to the agreement. Watersedge, however, failed to pay Essex $54,253.22 for the work billed between May 29, 2008 and September 22, 2008. Essex has a valid maritime lien for necessaries in that amount. Essex's maritime lien arose after the Mortgage was recorded. The Court finds that there was no fraud or misrepresentation with respect to Baxter's statements.
Throughout the existence of the company, Prior did not exercise any control over the daily operations of Watersedge. The management of the daily operation was Baxter's responsibility. Prior had no responsibility with respect to the management of Watersedge and had no dealings with vendors or contractors providing goods or services to Watersedge, including L & L and Essex. Prior did not use the Osprey or other assets of Watersedge for personal purposes. No evidence was introduced as to Watersedge's revenues or expenses with respect to its operations.
In March through June of 2009, Watersedge failed to make loan payments to Prior and defaulted on the notes. On or about June 3, 2009, Prior resigned as a manager of Watersedge and declared the notes to be in default and accelerated the balances due. In mid-June of 2009, Watersedge ceased operations and, in late 2009, Tropical, having been assigned the Mortgage, took possession of the Osprey pursuant to the terms of the Mortgage. Watersedge filed articles of dissolution on November 12, 2009. The principal, interest and late charges outstanding on Tropical's secured notes is $724,785.24.
On February 5, 2010, the Osprey was placed under arrest by the United States Marshal Service. On or about June 4, 2010, the United States Marshal conducted the Interlocutory Sale of the Osprey. Tropical purchased the Osprey at the sale for $140,000.00. Tropical deposited the full purchase amount in the registry of this Court and has received title to the Osprey.
Under the Ship Mortgage Act, Tropical's first preferred ship mortgage would ordinarily take priority over L & L and Essex's maritime liens. See 46 U.S.C. § 31326(b)(1). L & L and Essex, however, contend that the Mortgage should not take priority under the so-called "stranger to the vessel" doctrine. The "stranger to the vessel" doctrine dictates that owners of a vessel, or those that have authority over a vessel such that they are in a similar position to owners, are denied maritime liens.
The Court shall not extend the "stranger to the vessel" doctrine to preferred ship mortgages. The "stranger to the vessel" doctrine was developed in the limited context of maritime liens. As the First Circuit has noted:
Mullane v. Chambers, 438 F.3d 132, 138 (1st Cir.2006). The purpose of a maritime lien, therefore, is to encourage the provision of goods and services, especially in distant ports, by providing an In rem claim against the vessel itself should the party controlling the vessel's affairs abscond. Id. Since owners are the ones that control the vessel's affairs, or have access to the entity that controls the vessel's affairs, they do not require such a mechanism. See id. The "stranger to the vessel" doctrine, accordingly, exists to exclude owners from the protection of maritime liens.
By contrast, the purpose of a mortgage is to encourage private investment by protecting creditors in the cases of default. See Custom Fuel Services, Inc. v. Lombas Indus., Inc., 805 F.2d 561, 569 (5th Cir.1986). There is no similar justification, as there is with maritime liens, for excluding owners from such protection. Rather, affording owners the protection of a mortgage directly facilitates private investment. An owner that lends money to
The Court also notes that preferred ship mortgages are distinct from maritime liens in that preferred ship mortgages must be recorded in order to be valid while maritime liens need not be recorded. See P.R. Ports Auth. v. Barge KATY-B, 427 F.3d 93, 104 (1st Cir.2005) ("A maritime lien is silent and need not be recorded in order to retain its vitality."); 46 U.S.C. § 31343 (providing for permissive recording of a maritime lien); 46 U.S.C. § 31321 (mandating that mortgages be recorded). A party contracted to provide necessaries to a vessel, therefore, may be unaware that the owner doing the contracting also holds a maritime lien against the ship should the enterprise fail. Here, L & L and Essex were on constructive notice of Prior's interest in the Osprey before they commenced their services. The priority of preferred ship mortgage must, therefore, be sustained absent fraud, unfair dealing, or other inequitable conduct.
The Court concludes that Tropical's first preferred ship mortgage takes priority over L & L and Essex's maritime liens. Tropical is, therefore, entitled to the full amount of the proceeds of the sale of the Osprey. The Court orders that Tropical be awarded the $140,000.00 plus any interest thereon that may have accrued.
SO ORDERED.