MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

STEARNS, District Judge.

In March of 2009, the United States Department of the Treasury announced the details of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a component of the optimistically styled "Making Home Affordable Program." Under the provisions of HAMP, mortgage loan servicers contract with Fannie Mae, the designated financial agent of the United States, to modify certain mortgage loans in their portfolios in exchange for financial incentives. This multi-district litigation (MDL) consolidates homeowner lawsuits brought in a number of jurisdictions alleging that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), breached the terms of plaintiff's trial mortgage modification agreements, made false and misleading promises to homeowners about the prospects of a mortgage modification, managed the modification process with gross ineptitude, and, in some cases, foreclosed on homes despite promises to homeowners that they could remain in their homes while negotiating new payment terms with Chase.1

On October 11, 2011, the MDL was formalized, and on March 5, 2012, Chase filed a motion to dismiss certain claims set out in the consolidated Amended Complaint (CAC) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to join necessary parties. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6) & (7). The court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss on July 12, 2012.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs have set out their claims under four group headings. Group 1 plaintiffs allege that Chase "systemically breached obligations set forth in form contracts that it sent to its borrowers pursuant to HAMP,"3 despite the fact that plaintiffs kept their end of the bargain by submitting the required documentation and making the adjusted mortgage payments. Id. ¶ 2.4 Group 2 plaintiffs, alleging State consumer protection statute violations and a theory of promissory estoppel, claim that "Chase deceived, strung along, and misled [them]." Id. ¶ 3. The Group 3 plaintiffs maintain that Chase breached their negotiated "Loan Modification Agreements."

Id. ¶ 4.5 Finally, Group 4, represented by a single plaintiff, asserts a claim under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that Chase has engaged in unfair, deceptive, and abusive debt collection practices. Id. ¶ 5.

Part I — TPPs6

In 2008, Chase received $25 billion from the United States Government as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 12 U.S.C. § 5211. In July of 2009, Chase agreed to participate in HAMP. A Service Participation Agreement signed with the Department of Treasury obligated Chase to follow all HAMP guidelines, procedures, and directives. CAC ¶ 67-68. Among these was the requirement that mortgage servicers "use a uniform loan modification process to provide a borrower with sustainable monthly payments." Id. ¶ 68, citing HAMP, Supplemental Directive 09-01, 4/6/2009, at 1 (HAMP SD). Servicers were also required to suspend foreclosure proceedings during the HAMP evaluation process and during any ensuing trial modification period. CAC ¶ 69.

A HAMP modification (as envisioned) consists of two stages. In the first, a Participating Servicer accepts applications from borrowers, and, if they meet certain criteria, offers them a TPP.7 The TPP initiates a three-month period during which the homeowner is to make the modified mortgage payments. If the homeowner successfully completes the TPP, at the second stage of the process, the servicer offers the homeowner a permanent mortgage modification. The goal of the HAMP modification is to give the home-owner-occupant a five-year breathing space in which to reorganize his or her finances and avoid foreclosure. Id. ¶ 70.

The first sentence of the form HAMP TPP Agreement states:

Id. ¶ 74. Section 3 of the form HAMP TPP Agreement iterates:

Id. ¶ 75.

The TPP Agreement requires borrowers to undertake duties that are outside the ordinary covenants of a mortgage. The borrower must agree to undergo credit counseling, submit additional financial information, establish escrow accounts, and divulge details of his or her personal economic circumstances. Id. ¶ 77. With some minor exceptions, HAMP directs that "[i]f the borrower complies with the terms and conditions of the Trial Period Plan, the loan modification will become effective on the first day of the month following the trial period as specified in the Trial Period Plan." Id. ¶ 78, quoting HAMP SD 09-01.8

Part II — Modification Process and Oral Assurances

The crux of the Group 2 complaint is the allegation that Chase engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct while processing modification applications. According to plaintiffs,

Id. ¶ 299.

Instead of receiving TPPs, the plaintiffs in Group 2 were sent either a Forbearance Agreement or a Repayment Agreement. Chase employees allegedly represented to the plaintiffs that upon completion of the preliminary "plans" outlined in these Agreements, they would be notified as to whether they qualified for a mortgage modification. Id. ¶ 315. Despite Chase's assurances that plaintiffs could make reduced payments for a period of time without risk of foreclosure or negative credit reporting, foreclosure proceedings were begun against them. Id. ¶¶ 316, 482-489.

According to plaintiffs, even in those instances in which Chase modified their mortgages, the Loan Modification Agreements captured the interest and fees that had accrued over the months or sometimes years during which Chase had procrastinated in processing the applications, while adding the accrued balances onto the principal balance of plaintiffs' loans. Chase also assessed inexplicable fees that it refused to explain other than with gibberish like "corporate adv statutory exp disb, corp adv — attorney advance disb," see id. ¶ 388, and "G Speedpay Fee, Corp., Advance Adjustment, Late Charge, Misc. F/C and B/R Expenses, Misc. Corporate Disbursement, and Property Preservation." See id. ¶ 368.

Part IV — Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)

In 2002, Donna Follmer took a mortgage loan at a 9.45% interest rate from Long Beach Mortgage Company, a subsidiary of WaMu. Chase acquired the servicing rights to Follmer's loan on September 25, 2008. Id. ¶ 793. At the time, Follmer was delinquent on her mortgage payments. Id. ¶ 796. She entered into a Loan Modification Agreement with Chase in October of 2008. The modification agreement lowered Follmer's fixed interest rate and reduced the amount of her monthly payment. Id. ¶ 797.

However, "in January 2009, after paying under her modified loan for three months, Chase inexplicably raised her monthly mortgage payment by over 30%." Id. ¶ 798. In May of 2009, when Follmer stopped making the monthly payments, Chase initiated a foreclosure proceeding. In response, Follmer reapplied for a loan modification. In March of 2010, Chase sent Follmer a TPP.9 Id. ¶ 801. Follmer signed it and returned it to Chase, together with the required documentation. Id. "Follmer timely made all three of the payments required by the TPP, all of which Chase accepted. Yet following completion of the TPP, she was sent neither a modification, nor notification that she was denied." Id. ¶ 802. When Follmer inquired of Chase, she was told to make another TPP payment, which she did. Chase accepted the payment. However, in September of 2010, a Chase employee telephoned Follmer to tell her that her modification application had been denied. No explanation was ever given. Id. ¶¶ 804-805.

DISCUSSION

"A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is appropriate when the plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claim." Edelkind v. Fairmont Funding, Ltd., 539 F.Supp.2d 449, 453 (D.Mass.2008) (citation omitted).

Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 806 F.Supp.2d 452, 456 (D.Mass.2011), quoting Ne. Erectors Ass'n of the BTEA v. Sec'y of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 62 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir.1995).

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citations omitted). See also Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95-96 (1st Cir.2007). The court may also look to documents, the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties, to documents central to the plaintiffs claim, and to documents referenced in the complaint. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction — Financial Institution Supervisory Act (FISA)

In April of 2011, Chase entered into a Consent Order with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b).10 The Consent Order, which covers Chase and thirteen other mortgage loan servicers, is meant to remedy questionable mortgage servicing and foreclosure practices like those alleged in the CAC.11 The "comprehensive action plan" laid out in the Consent Order requires Chase to provide

Id. at 5-6. The Consent Order also required Chase to

Id. at 17.

In the motion to dismiss, Chase offered assurances that "[w]ork is well under way on the actions necessary to comply with the consent orders." Def.'s Mot. at 10, citing Dep't of the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency, Interim Status Report: Foreclosure Related Consent Orders, at 4 (Nov.2011). According to the motion, "the OCC expects servicers to [have] complete[d] [the process] during the first half of 2012." Def.'s Mot. at 14. The expectation proved aspirational at best. At the July 12 hearing, Chase's counsel, by way of extenuation, explained that an independent consultant, Deloitte & Touche, has been commissioned to review all of the fourteen servicers' high risk loans to make individual determinations of those loans for which financial remediation is required. This "lengthy and detailed process" requires "legions of individuals" who are now, according to Chase, expected to finish their work by September 30, 2012.

In response, plaintiffs' counsel provided the court with an OCC publication, entitled Financial Remediation Framework ("Framework") Frequently Asked Questions ("FAQ"). See Dkt. #91. The Framework is the OCC-approved mechanism for implementing the mandated action plan. The document is written for borrowers and explains the remediation process. It states that the Framework was developed

FAQ ¶ 1.13 The FAQ explains that the Framework's fixed dollar payments are intended as approximations of the

Id. ¶ 5. Finally, the FAQ makes clear that the review process is final and that there is no appeal. As a consequence, "[t]he results of the Independent Foreclosure Review are not intended to have an impact on any other options the borrower may pursue related to their mortgage loan." Id. ¶ 42. More specifically, the borrowers were told that "[submitting a request for an Independent Foreclosure Review will not preclude borrowers from pursuing any other legal remedies available related to their foreclosure." Id. ¶ 33.

Id. ¶ 34.

Chase argues that FISA precludes subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in Part I, II, and IV of the CAC because FISA § 1818 prohibits any action that "could affect" the enforcement of an OCC consent order.14 Chase argues that a review by this court of plaintiffs' claims may well yield a result inconsistent with the Consent Order and its purpose of proving a uniform remediation process applicable to all fourteen servicers, a result which Congress intended to avoid.

The jurisdictional bar of § 1818(i)(l) must, however, be read in the context of the entire statute, the primary purpose of which is to prevent federal courts from usurping the OCC's power to enforce its own consent orders against parties to the orders. Congress did not intend to also prohibit non-parties from exercising their separate remedies at law. See Ridder v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 146 F.3d 1035, 1039 (D.C.Cir.1998) ("To prevent regulated parties from interfering with the comprehensive powers of the federal banking regulatory agencies, Congress severely limited the jurisdiction of courts to review ongoing administrative proceedings brought by banking agencies.").

E. Nat'l Bank v. Conover, 786 F.2d 192, 193 (3d Cir.1986). It is significant that there is no provision in the statute for a non-party to a consent order to challenge findings made pursuant to the Order. It follows that the jurisdictional bar is not meant to displace a non-party's right to present its claims to a federal court, or the jurisdiction of the court to hear those claims — an interpretation buttressed by the OCC's own FAQ publication, which assures borrowers that participation in the Review process does not result in a waiver of their right to pursue legal remedies.15 The OCC further warns borrowers that the Review process "will not necessarily affect, stop, or delay the foreclosure sale date.... [Borrowers should continue to work with their servicer to prevent a foreclosure sale using every avenue possible." FAQ ¶ 43. This warning would hardly be necessary if the OCC thought that Congress's intent was to block off the avenue leading to the state and federal courts.

It is telling that Chase can point to no case that lends support to its reading of the statute. The cases Chase does cite are readily distinguishable as they each involve a party attempting an end run around a consent order.16 The most relevant of the cases cited by the parties is Am. Fair Credit Ass'n v. United Credit Nat'l Bank, 132 F.Supp.2d 1304 (D.Colo. 2001). In that case, a non-party to an OCC consent order sued two parties (parent and subsidiary companies) for breach of contract. The consent order prohibited the parent company from making any payments to the plaintiff, but also required the subsidiary to assume all of the parent company's contingent liabilities. When defendants raised § 1818 as a jurisdictional bar, the court determined that the plaintiff could proceed against the subsidiary because a monetary award assessed against the subsidiary would not be inconsistent with the OCC order. The court did, however, dismiss the claims brought against the parent company because "[i]f this case went forward as currently pled and Plaintiff prevailed, Defendant [parent] would be required to pay money damages included in the judgment in direct contravention of the [consent order]." Id. at 1312.

As emphasized in American Fair Credit, federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce contracts,17 and can do so even where a party is subject to a consent order — so long as the enforcement action does not "affect" (or upset) the underlying order. Here, where plaintiffs allege that Chase breached the TPP agreements, § 1818 does not preclude the court from acting to remedy the breach as the result would not be inconsistent with the Consent Order. With respect to the state consumer protection act claims, the Order is clear that its enforcement is not affected by compliance with state laws — indeed, the Order requires Chase to comply with all applicable federal and state laws. The Order (and the OCC's FAQ) make abundantly clear that the Framework and the Review process do not establish an exclusive remedy for plaintiffs' financial injuries. All they prohibit is a borrower obtaining a duplicative recovery,18 an issue that will not arise until the claims here are finally adjudicated and any off-set can be calculated.19

Failure to State a Claim — 12(b)(6)

Part I — TPPs

"To state a claim for breach of contract under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must allege, at a minimum, that there was a valid contract, that the defendant breached its duties under its contractual agreement, and that the breach caused the plaintiff damage."20 Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 957 F.Supp. 306, 316 (D.Mass. 1997) (citations omitted). To establish a breach, a plaintiff has the burden of proving the failure of the defaulting party to conform to one or more of the contract's material terms. A term is material when it involves "an essential and inducing feature" of the contract. Buchholz v. Green Bros. Co., 272 Mass. 49, 52, 172 N.E. 101 (1930).21

Plaintiffs allege that the form TPP Agreement constituted an offer by Chase that plaintiffs accepted by executing the Agreements and returning them to Chase, along with the supporting documentation.22 The subsequent breach of the TPP contract by Chase cost plaintiffs the opportunity to pursue other options in the effort to salvage their homes (such as restructuring their debts under the bankruptcy code), or remedying the default by renting or selling the home or looking elsewhere for cash. To add insult to injury, Chase compounded plaintiffs' predicament by tacking improper fees and servicing costs on loans that already were in default. CAC ¶ 246.23

Chase concedes (as it must) that in Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2010 WL 4825632 (D.Mass. Nov. 24, 2010), this court rejected Chase's arguments against a similar theory of lost opportunity damages. See id., at *3-4 (holding that plaintiffs had set forth a viable claim for breach of contract where as consideration plaintiffs had agreed to assume duties beyond their preexisting legal obligations, such as agreeing to undergo credit counseling). This court also held that the TPP Agreements were sufficiently definite to survive a motion to dismiss, as any missing material terms were "easily determinable through the mathematical formulas set out in the HAMP regulations and are thus `not open to negotiation or discretionary alteration by either side.'" See id. (citation omitted).24

Instead, Chase moves to dismiss a discrete set of those claims "in light of the relevant recent decisions by California, Florida,[25] and Pennsylvania[26] courts." Def.'s Mot. at 37. Chase relies on Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 200 Cal.App.4th 1499, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 (Cal.Ct.App.2011), for the argument that under California law the form TPP Agreements are not to be interpreted as potentially binding contracts. Id. at 1504-1505, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 (dismissing breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims where the form TPP Agreement relied on was identical to the one at issue here). There is, however, an important distinction between Nungaray and this case. Nungaray was decided on a motion for summary judgment after the undisputed evidence established that plaintiffs had failed to provide the financial documentation required by the TPP Agreement, and thus, they had not satisfied the terms of the offer. A district judge in the Central District of California recently pointed to the same distinction. See In re Citimortgage, Inc. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Litig., 2012 WL 1931030, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 17, 2012) (in Nungaray, "the plaintiffs/borrowers did not satisfy all of their obligations under the loan modification contract, [citation omitted]. Therefore, although lack of the lender's signature is listed as a failed condition, [the court] did not address the question of whether withholding of the lender's signature, by itself, renders a modification contract unenforceable where the borrower had completely performed."). The district court also rejected an argument for dismissal identical to the one Chase is making here. See id. ("It is certainly a reasonable interpretation of the TPP that it is intended to be a binding `test' agreement — if Plaintiff performs the conditions in the TPP then Defendant will provide a permanent modification."). Absent clearer direction from the California state courts, the contract claims based on California law will not be dismissed.27

Part II — Modification Process and Oral Promise Plaintiffs

Chase challenges the consumer protection and promissory estoppel claims brought by the Group 2 plaintiffs. At issue are the statutes of four states — Michigan, Washington, New Jersey, and California. Chase asserts that the unfair or deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) claims brought under these statutes are either preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), or, in the alternative, plaintiffs' fail to state a claim because of their inability to show an "economic loss."28 Finally, Chase asserts that the Group 2 plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a theory of promissory estoppel.

UDAP Claims — Preemption Under NBA

A "state law may be preempted by the National Bank Act when it frustrates or limits the ability of a national bank to exercise its statutorily granted powers." SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 531 (1st Cir.2007), citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33-34, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996). The OCC is charged with promulgating regulations under the NBA, including regulations that are intended to constrain interference by States with a national bank's federal lending powers. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)-(b).29 Chase contends that plaintiffs' claims constitute a backdoor attempt to regulate Chase's "processing, origination, [and] servicing" of mortgages in contravention of the NBA. See id.

It is well settled that the NBA does not preempt all state consumer protection laws.30 National banks remain "subject to state laws of general application in their daily business to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes of the NBA." Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A, 550 U.S. 1, 11, 127 S.Ct. 1559, 167 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) (citation omitted). In Wigod, the Seventh Circuit rejected Wells Fargo's argument that litigation of a borrower's consumer protection claim would impede Wells Fargo's ability to process residential mortgage loans or to carry out the objectives of the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA).31 The Court observed that some state law causes of action complement the purposes of HOLA (such as breach of contract and fraud), while others are in conflict, and are thus preempted (such as allegations of "exorbitant and usurious mortgages"). Wigod, 673 F.3d at 578-579, citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643-644, 647 (7th Cir.2007). The Court further held the consumer protection claim was not preempted because "[a]llowing these claims to proceed against Wells Fargo would not create state-law duties for servicing home mortgages, let alone ones that `actually conflict' with HOLA `or federal standards promulgated thereunder.'" Wigod, 673 F.3d at 579, quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000). See also Wigod, 673 F.3d at 579, quoting Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 645 ("Wigod's [Illinois Consumer Protection statute] claims `sound[ ] like conventional fraud charge[s],' the prosecution of which appears perfectly consistent with federal mortgage rules.").

The Seventh Circuit also rejected Wells Fargo's contention that consumer protection suits brought under differing state laws have the potential effect of subjecting mortgage servicers to differing standards of conduct, a contention that Chase repeats here.

Wigod, 673 F.3d at 580, citing Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 556 (7th Cir. 2010).32

Plaintiffs argue (and Chase agrees), that national laws do not preempt state laws "that are predicated on the duty not to deceive." Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008).33 To the extent that plaintiffs' consumer protection claims are based on alleged conduct that would be deemed fraudulent in any business context, the claims do not undermine the uniform "processing, origination, and servicing" of mortgages among national banks. Indeed, it would be a matter of no small surprise if the business practices of Chase or any other national bank were found to be predicated on fraudulent conduct formally sanctioned by bank officials.

In recognition of this point, Chase does not contest plaintiffs' claims that sound in fraud or misrepresentation. It instead attacks those allegations that stem from the procedures that Chase has devised to service its mortgage loans (for example, the training that it gives to account representatives who handle telephone calls, file documents, and send out documentation requests). See Def.'s Mot. at 19, citing CAC ¶¶ 306-310, 504. With respect to a number of Chase's examples (like the ones just recited), the preemption argument is sound. But not as to all. In this regard, it is easier for the court to list what is not preempted than to specify what is. The practices that are not preempted (as culled from the CAC) are:

See CAC ¶¶ 512-514.

UDAP Claims — Economic Loss

Chase next argues that even if not preempted, plaintiffs have not made out UDAP claims under New Jersey, California, and Washington law, each of which requires a showing of economic loss caused by Chase's conduct. While the court agrees with Chases's description of the statutory requirements,34 it is not persuaded by the argument. The Group 2 plaintiffs allege that they owe more to Chase now, after participating in the modification process, than they would have owed had they not participated. Plaintiffs allege that numerous additional fees were assessed and added to the balance of their loans as a result of fraudulent conduct by Chase employees, while payments were made (or not made) in vain based on erroneous advice offered by these same employees. Even more aggrieved were plaintiffs who allege that they would have fared better economically had their homes been foreclosed by Chase at the outset instead of at the end of a drawn-out and ultimately futile modification process that Chase had no real intention of honoring.35 These are, of course, allegations — but for present purposes, the court must credit them. See Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.2005).

Promissory Estoppel

Chase also contends that the Group 2 plaintiffs have not pled viable claims of promissory estoppel (based on the alleged verbal promises made by Chase employees that plaintiffs were imminently eligible for permanent modifications of their mortgages). Generally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable when a promise has been made, but there is no tangible consideration offered in return; instead, detrimental reliance acts as a substitute for actual consideration. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981).36 Chase first argues that the Statute of Frauds bars plaintiffs' claims in Michigan and Washington. The Michigan Statute of Frauds states:

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 566.132(2). A "financial institution" is defined, in part, as a "national chartered bank." Id. § 566.132(3). The only Michigan case plaintiffs cite in response is Darcy v. Citi-Financial, Inc., 2011 WL 3758805 (W.D.Mich. Aug. 25, 2011). In that case, the court refused to dismiss a claim as barred by the Statute of Frauds, but as the decision makes clear, it did so because the estoppel claim was in fact based on "a writing" — the TPP. Id., at *8. Here, the estoppel claims do not stem from a writing, but from the alleged verbal promises. The court thus agrees with Chase that the Michigan Group 2 estoppel claims (brought by the Fischer plaintiffs) must be dismissed on Statute of Frauds grounds.37

With respect to the remaining Group 2 estoppel claims, Chase asserts that the alleged promises were devoid of any definite terms and, as a result, plaintiffs cannot show reasonable reliance. As Chase points out, roughly half of the Group 2 plaintiffs did eventually receive permanent modifications of their mortgages, and thus, the estoppel claims are necessarily premised on alleged inconsistencies between the oral statements made by Chase representatives and the terms of the modifications that plaintiffs ultimately received. As these inconsistencies (as pled) are either unspecified or unprovable, Chase contends that there is no oral agreement to enforce. See Glen Holly Entm't, Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1095 (C.D.Cal.1999) ("[T]o be enforceable under a theory of promissory estoppel, the promise must be clear and unambiguous.").

Plaintiffs' estoppel claims follow the same general pattern. Plaintiffs Cureton and Leopold sought modifications from Chase in 2009. They were each told by a Chase representative to stop making payments on their mortgages to make themselves HAMP-eligible. What followed was a sea of frustration and confusion that spawned modification agreements boosting rather than lowering the principal balance of plaintiffs' mortgages, while tacking on ballooning charges and fees (including late fees for the missed payments that Chase representatives told plaintiffs not to make). Nonetheless, these two plaintiffs did eventually receive the promised modifications, and although the principal balances of their mortgages may have increased, the monthly payments did decrease, as promised. While Chase's conduct may have been deceptive and unfair, these plaintiffs (and others with similar complaints who also received permanent mortgage modifications) have not shown that a sufficiently definite promise was made, relied upon, and then broken.

The result is no different with respect to plaintiffs who were orally promised mortgage modifications and never received them (Green, Keller, Pacheco, and Sabouhi). Again the factual patterns are almost identical: plaintiff requests a mortgage modification; he or she is told to miss payments to become HAMP-qualified; he or she eventually receives a forbearance or "repayment" agreement;38 plaintiff complies with the agreement; he or she contacts Chase at the end of the forbearance period; he or she is again promised a permanent modification; plaintiff continues to make (and Chase accepts) at least some of the modified payments; and plaintiff never receives the promised modification. The law in California, New Jersey, and Washington with respect to estoppel claims is similar enough (for present purposes) to merge the analysis.39

Although the forbearance agreements clearly instruct borrowers to contact Chase representatives by telephone in order to discuss other "workout" options, the agreements offer no specifics as to the terms or even the nature of the "workout" option for which a particular borrower might be eligible. Moreover, plaintiffs provide no specifics about the oral promises Chase representatives are alleged to have made, other than the vague assurance that some kind of modification would be forthcoming. This falls far short of the pleading necessary to make out an estoppel claim. See Mejias v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 2011 WL 3235711, at *5 (D.N.J. Jul. 27, 2011) ("Indefinite promises or promises subject to change by the promisor are not `clear and definite' and cannot give rise to a claim for promissory estoppel.") (citations omitted). See also Erickson v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 2011 WL 830727, at *6 (W.D.Wash., Mar. 2, 2011) (the "first element requires a `clear and definite' promise" — "Plaintiffs have not provided specific evidence sufficient to establish a service agent made a promise over the phone.").

Although the reasonableness of a plaintiffs' reliance on an alleged promise is typically treated as a question of fact for the jury, this is one of those exceptional cases where, based on the pleadings and their attachments, the court can conclude that any reliance by the borrower-plaintiffs on the alleged oral representations of Chase representatives was unreasonable as a matter of law. This is because the forbearance agreements that Chase mailed to plaintiffs specifically stated that any permanent modification plan would be forwarded in a writing that would "outlin[e] the terms of the program for which you qualify."40 See CAC, Ex. 11.

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

"California has adopted a state version of the FDCPA, called the Rosenthal Act. See Cal. Civ.Code § 1788, et seq. The Rosenthal Act mimics or incorporates by reference the FDCPA's requirements,... and makes available the FDCPA's remedies for violations. Id. § 1788.17." Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.2012).41

Gomez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 2012 WL 1189439, at *5 n. 8 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 9, 2012), citing Austero v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 1585530, at *8 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 27, 2011); Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., 2009 WL 5062192, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 22, 2009); Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC, 589 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1199 (C.D.Cal.2008). See also Austero, 2011 WL 1585530, at *8 ("Thus, a mortgage servicer may be a `debt collector' under the Rosenthal Act even if it is the original lender, whereas, such an entity would be excluded from the definition of debt collector under the federal act.").

The California plaintiffs base their claims on the conduct previously described, namely, that Chase violated the Act by using false, deceptive, and misleading statements and omissions in connection with the collection of their mortgage loan debts. See CAC ¶¶ 532-540. Chase argues that the claims fail because in each instance the borrowers contacted Chase (as opposed to Chase initiating communication with the borrowers). Plaintiffs admit that they contacted Chase representatives, but only after first being prompted to do so by communications from Chase bruiting the possibility of obtaining a mortgage loan modification. These notices specifically stated that "we are attempting to collect a debt, and any information [provided by you] will be used for that purpose." See CAC, Ex.'s 8-9. The notices continued: "More importantly, if you have any questions please don't hesitate to call us directly at [ ]." See id. When plaintiffs did so they would typically be sent a forbearance agreement that stated: "If the signed agreement and/or payment are not received by the due date indicated, the forbearance plan will be declined and all foreclosure activity will resume." See CAC, Ex. 10.

"[W]hether [an] initial communication violates the FDCPA [and the Rosenthal Act] depends on whether it is likely to deceive or mislead a hypothetical `least sophisticated debtor.'" Riggs, 681 F.3d at 1102 (citations omitted). "In [the Ninth Circuit], a debt collector's liability under § 1692e of the FDCPA is an issue of law." Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1061 (citation omitted).

Id. at 1061-1062 (citations omitted). Here, as a matter of law, the court can reasonably conclude that the phrasing of the initial "invitations" to participate in the HAMP process, coupled with the overt threat set out in the forbearance agreements sent to respondents, namely that if payment or a signed agreement was not forthcoming, the foreclosure process would be initiated or resumed, could have misled the recipients as to the true range of options available to them. See Gaudin v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 5825144, *4 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 17, 2011) (finding no basis to dismiss the Rosenthal claim where facts alleged demonstrated that the "TPP [document] was at a minimum misleading," because the loan servicer "utilized the TPP ... to induce her to make payments.").42

Part IV — Violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)

The CAC asserts one claim of an FDCPA violation on the part of an Ohio resident (plaintiff Follmer). See CAC ¶¶ 677-683. Chase responds with its same Rosenthal Act arguments. These, however, are precluded by the Sixth Circuit's holding in Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 359 (6th Cir.2012), that an entity such as Chase, when acting as a loan servicer, is either a creditor or a debtor and cannot "define itself out of either category" in order to avoid being subject to the FDCPA's prohibitions.43

Id. (citations and footnote omitted). "Although there is no statutory definition of `loan servicer' under the Act, a loan servicer will become a debt collector under § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) if the debt was in default or treated as such when it was acquired." Id., at 360 n. 4. See also Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir.2003) ("In other words, the Act treats assignees as debt collectors if the debt sought to be collected was in default when acquired by the assignee, and as creditors if it was not."); FTC v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 171-173 (3d Cir.2007) (same).44

Chase argues in the alternative that because it did not "hound" Follmer with dunning notices, its conduct does not fall within the purview of the FDCPA. As support, Chase cites the Seventh Circuit's Bailey decision. In Bailey, the Court held that the FDCPA did not apply where the loan servicer's communications with plaintiffs related to the forbearance agreement, and not the original loan (which was in default). Bailey, 154 F.3d at 387. The Court took specific note of the fact that the servicer had not attempted to collect (or threaten to take action) on the underlying note. See id. at 388 ("[I]f [the defendants] had tried to collect a different amount — perhaps the amount owed under the original loan in default — surely the Baileys would have (correctly) pointed to the terms in the superseding forbearance agreement."). Bailey on its facts is inapplicable as Follmer specifically alleges that Chase attempted to collect an amount in excess of that agreed to in her forbearance agreement (or the subsequent modification agreement).45

Failure to Join Necessary Parties pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7)

Finally, Chase moves to dismiss nine named plaintiffs for failure to join their coborrowers who it asserts are necessary parties pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a).46 At the motion hearing, plaintiffs' counsel agreed and represented to the court that the co-borrowers would promptly be added to the CAC as named plaintiffs.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Chase's motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to the Part I claims; DENIED with respect to the Washington, New Jersey, and California UDAP claims and the Rosenthal Act claims set out in Part II; ALLOWED as to the Part II claims identified by the court as preempted by the National Banking Act; ALLOWED with respect to the Part II promissory estoppel claims (except as to plaintiff Green); and DENIED with respect to the Part IV FDCPA claim. Plaintiffs will within fourteen (14) days voluntarily dismiss the Part II Michigan UDAP claims and all claims brought by plaintiff Franco. Plaintiffs will also comply with their undertaking with respect to adding the unnamed necessary parties to the CAC. As of the date of this Order, the stay on discovery deadlines is lifted. The parties will within ten (10) days of today's date jointly submit a proposed revised scheduling order.

SO ORDERED.