MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CROCS, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEARNS, District Judge.

This case arose from a regrettable accident on an escalator at the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Aquarium Station. N.K., an eight-year-old girl, caught her shoe in the side skirt of the escalator, injuring her toe. N.K.'s shoe was a popular clog design marketed under the trade name CROCS, by Crocs, Inc. (Crocs), a Delaware corporation with an expansive worldwide distribution network. A five-count Complaint brought on N.K.'s behalf by her mother, Nancy Geshke, alleges a design defect in the CROCS shoe and a failure on the part of Crocs to warn of the latent danger CROCS shoes posed to young children riding escalators.1

Discovery now being complete, Crocs moves for summary judgment. Crocs contends that Geshke's failure to support her claim of a design defect (or the feasability of an "alternative `safer' design") with expert testimony precludes a jury finding of liability. With respect to the failure-to-warn claim, Crocs maintains that Geshke's disregard of the conspicuous warnings posted by the MBTA at the entrance to the escalator obviates any suggestion that an earlier (and redundant) admonition from Crocs would have influenced Geshke's conduct, and through her, that of N.K.

Geshke contends that expert testimony is unnecessary because Crocs itself — in response to prior accidents and the "irrefutable testing and findings of the Japanese government" — has shown that it is possible to design a safer version of the CROCS shoe. Opp'n Mem. at 1-2. Moreover, Geshke alleges that she would never have purchased the CROCS for N.K. had she known of the risk of the shoe becoming entangled in an escalator. Geshke maintains that her testimony to that effect is sufficient to meet her burden of raising a jury-worthy issue of disputed fact on the issue of causation.

BACKGROUND

The following undisputed facts are taken from Crocs's Statement of Facts (SOF) — Dkt # 61, and Geshke's Statement of Additional Facts (SOAF) — Dkt # 64.

In July of 2010, Nancy Geshke, eight-year-old N.K., her nine-year-old brother, and their father, Dr. Peter Kerndt (Nancy Geshke's husband), visited Boston on a vacation trip. On July 19, 2010, the Geshke family boarded an MBTA escalator at the Aquarium Station carrying patrons to the lower-level train platform. There were conspicuous warnings posted at the entrance to the escalator. A bright yellow sign depicted a woman standing next to her child on an escalator and holding the child's hand, accompanied by the following text:

A second yellow warning sign cautioned:

While Nancy Geshke and her husband do not dispute the presence of the warning signs, they each testify as to having no memory of having seen them.2 They do admit to having seen similar warning signs while riding escalators elsewhere.

As the Geshke family stepped onto the escalator, N.K. and her brother went first, several steps ahead of their parents. N.K. was approximately five steps (one witness testified that she was three steps) in front of her mother. Nancy Geshke testified that at ages eight and nine, she felt the children were mature enough to ride the escalator without adult supervision. As the escalator descended, N.K.'s right foot became caught between the moving step and the escalator's static side skirt. Nancy Geshke could see her daughter's right foot "contorted, turned, and standing up" at a 90 degree angle. Geshke Dep. at 57.

Hearing N.K. scream, Waleata Odware, an MBTA employee at Aquarium Station, saw N.K. with her right CROC trapped in the side skirt of the escalator. Odware could see that N.K.'s foot was still in the shoe. Her foot had been twisted sideways as the escalator pulled her downward. Fearing that N.K. might be dragged into the comb plate at the bottom of the escalator, Odware attempted to halt the escalator, but was unable to engage the braking mechanism. N.K.'s father also frantically pressed the escalator's emergency stop button, but with no immediate result.

Alan Dumont, a fellow passenger, witnessed the accident. As he reached the bottom of the escalator, he heard screaming. He turned and saw N.K. and her mother. It was apparent that N.K.'s foot had been caught in the escalator. After a futile attempt to engage the emergency stop button, Dumont ran up the adjacent staircase to assist Nancy Geshke in freeing N.K.'s foot. Dumont saw that N.K.'s "right shoe got ingested and pulled her toe, her big toe into the side of the escalator." Pl.'s Ex. 4. — Dumont Dep. at 9. Dumont testified that, at that point, "we were in a panic. It was coming to the end of the runoff...." Id. In an effort to stop the escalator, Dumont, with as much force as he could summon, jammed the heel of his right sneaker into the side aperture of the moving escalator. Ultimately, Dumont was able to extricate N.K.'s foot from her shoe. He testified that "[t]he mother seemed to be overcome by anxiety or the situation, I helped lift her up, she was about to faint, and I pulled the mother to the side, and I was telling her that her daughter was okay." Id. The escalator came to a stop some 15 to 20 seconds after N.K.'s foot was freed.

In the aftermath of the accident, John Flynn, a KONE Corporation (the manufacturer and installer of the escalator) mechanic, responded to an MBTA service call.3 Flynn inspected the escalator and found it to be in "safe working order." He contacted an inspector at the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, who gave permission to put the escalator back in service. See Pl.'s Ex. 6 — Flynn Dep. at 51, 65, and 78-79.

In May of 2008, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) issued a "Findings Report for Study of Sandal Entrapment Accidents in Escalators." The study was conducted by Japan's National Institute of Technology and Evaluation (NITE). The study analyzed various types of footwear "and their relation to escalator entrapment."4 Id. at 1. It was prompted by "the alarming frequency of these accidents" — "a total of 66... as of the end of March [of 2009]." Id. The style of shoe that appears to most resemble a CROCS was identified in the study as a "resin sandal." NITE's testing determined that a sandal shoe design figured in 65 of the 66 entrapments that had been reported. NITE conducted thousands of tests on resin sandals, rubber boots, sneakers, and flip-flop sandals using different models of escalators. Of the 66 entrapments NITE was able to replicate, all but two involved resin sandals. Id. at 14-18. Video footage of NITE's testing includes a sandal with what appears to be the "CROCS" brand name stamped on its foot strap, being turned and stuck in the side of an escalator, although the report does not identify the CROCS make by name. See Pl.'s Ex. 9.

In the wake of the study, on May 1, 2008, Shigeo Moridaira, the general manager of Crocs-Japan, emailed his colleagues in the United States describing "one of the urgent and most important requests," namely, METI had requested that Crocs develop a "harder cros-lite" material for its footwear marketed in Japan and that it find a "more less friction cubic dip film or paint." Pl.'s Ex. 11. He added that because of the "escalator issue Ministry asked us to start selling new products which can reduce accident by end of July... mid of May they want to test with those samples." Id.

On May 14, 2008, John McCarvel, then Crocs's Vice-President for Asia and worldwide management,5 sent an email to his subordinates in Crocs-Japan, attaching photographs to be used at the "meeting with METI on Thursday" showing Crocs's "redesign" of the CROCS shoe. See Pl.'s Ex. 12 at 1. On July 15, 2008, Megan Welch, Crocs's senior director of merchandising, told McCarvel and Erik Olson6 that the new CROCS design would take into account "friction [as] the most important factor," and that the re-design would incorporate "increased hardness." Ultimately, Crocs decided against a recall of its Japan stock of the original design CROCS shoes because the "[M]inistry has not asked us to pull the current product, they have just asked us to bring a safer, improved product to market."7 Welch further wrote that Crocs's redesigned footwear "should suffice as a long term solution," which it intended to "propose to [the] Japanese ministry showing test results of changes in friction, hardness, etc."8

On August 8, 2008, Olson and others on Crocs's Engineering Change Committee were asked to approve (or reject) an Engineering Change Order (ECO) as a prelude to releasing the redesigned CROCS "Kids Blaze" shoe in Japan and ("later") in "other countries in Asia."9 According to the ECO, the Kids Blaze would be made of a harder material and coated with a matte (non-glossy) finish. The Kids Blaze would also be sold with an escalator warning hangtag. The Kids Blaze was introduced in Japan as an alternative to the traditional CROCS model shoe, but was later pulled from the market because almost no one wanted to buy it.

Sarah DiMartino, currently the manager of Crocs's customer service department, testified that she had received (maybe more than twenty; definitely more than ten) "complaints of CROCS being trapped in an escalator." Pl.'s Ex. 19 — DiMartino Dep. at 8. DiMartino created an escalator incident form for Crocs personnel to use when fielding escalator entrapment complaints. Id. at 55-56. She designed the form with the object of obtaining consistent information from complainants. Id. at 57-58.

DiMartino's records indicate that a handful of customers mentioned that they had heard of "other similar incidents."10 At least one parent inquired whether there was an issue with the "material used for CROCS that would contribute to feet getting caught in escalators." Id. at 89. DiMartino's standard response was to assure callers that "CROCS was committed to safety," "that CROCS shoes are safe and do not present a hazard," and that "CROCS continues to monitor the use and safety performance of its footwear." Id. at 106. In most cases, DiMartino and her co-workers would offer to send a complimentary replacement pair of CROCS to consumers who complained about a mangled shoe. DiMartino did not follow up with parents who complained, nor was she aware of anyone else at Crocs who did so. Id. at 111.

Nancy Geshke filed this action on behalf of N.K. and herself individually against Crocs in September of 2010.11 Crocs filed a third-party complaint against KONE and the MBTA on October 28, 2010. The third-party complaint was dismissed with prejudice on June 18, 2012. The summary judgment motion by Crocs is the only motion presently pending before the court.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "To succeed, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position." Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir.1990). "[C]onjecture cannot take the place of proof in the summary judgment calculus." Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir.2007). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment ... upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Crocs moves for summary judgment asserting that Jerry Leyden, Geshke's designated expert witness, is unable to "testify that Crocs' shoes are inherently defective as designed, or the feasibility of any alternative `safer' design," both of which are essential elements of a defective design claim under Massachusetts law. Crocs also contends that Geshke's failure-to-warn claim fails because of her inability to show causation in light of the fact that she was presented with conspicuous warnings about the dangers of letting young children ride unsupervised on an escalator immediately prior to the accident, warnings which she failed to heed. "Therefore, as a matter of law, no warning from Crocs — at the point of sale eight months earlier — could have changed the circumstances of what occurred." Def.'s Mem. at 2.

The first point of dispute is whether Geshke's claims are to be resolved under Massachusetts or California law. Crocs, a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Colorado, argues that Massachusetts law applies. Geshke, a California citizen who purchased the CROCS in California, asserts that California products liability law is governing (although she opted to file the action in Massachusetts and cites only to Massachusetts cases in her brief).

Massachusetts has supplanted the traditional choice of law rule, which looked to the substantive law of the state where the alleged wrong occurred, with the "functional" approach of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 631, 473 N.E.2d 662 (1985). The "new" approach notwithstanding, under § 145 of the Restatement, unless another state has a more significant relationship to the underlying cause of action, tort claims remain governed by the law of the state in which the alleged injury occurred.12 See Watkins v. Omni Life Sci., Inc., 692 F.Supp.2d 170, 174 (D.Mass. 2010), citing Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 333-334, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983). See also Lou v. Otis Elevator Co., 77 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 583-584, 933 N.E.2d 140 (2010) ("Massachusetts generally follows a functional approach to resolving choice of law questions on substantive matters, eschewing reliance on any particular choice-of-law doctrine.... Though we do not tie our analysis to any single doctrine, examination of our cases reveals that we often find useful guidance in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws."). As the "contacts" identified by the Restatement as the critical considerations to be weighed in deciding the choice of law lean heavily towards the choice of Massachusetts (particularly § 145(2)(a), (b), and (d)), the court will apply Massachusetts law. See Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 359, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976) ("In this Commonwealth, lex loci delicti has been firmly established as the general tort conflicts rule.").

Count I — Negligence/Negligent Design

Proof of design negligence requires satisfaction of the following elements: (1) the manufacturer's failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care under the circumstances;13 (2) proximate causation; and (3) injury and/or loss. See Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 408, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991); Beaver v. Costin, 352 Mass. 624, 626, 227 N.E.2d 344 (1967); Scott v. Thompson, 5 Mass.App.Ct. 372, 374, 363 N.E.2d 295 (1977). "In evaluating the adequacy of a product's design, [the fact-finder] should consider, among other factors, `the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design.'" Back, 375 Mass. at 642, 378 N.E.2d 964, quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 455 (1978). See also Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 880-881, 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978) ("[T]here is a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show an available design modification which would reduce the risk without undue cost or interference with the performance of the machinery.").

Crocs maintains that Geshke's design negligence claim fails as a matter of law because her expert witness, Jerry Leyden, is unable to opine on any of the crucial issues involving matters of product design.14

Def.'s Reply Mem. at 4. Geshke rather oddly responds that Leyden "was never disclosed as an expert on the issue of defective design," Opp'n Mem. at 5 n.1 — oddly, because it is not clear what role Geshke envisions for Leyden other than that of an expert witness at trial. From the pleadings, it appears that Geshke intends to forgo expert testimony, and rely simply on "Crocs' own admissions and the irrefutable METI findings to establish CROCS' defective design."15 Id.

With regard to the METI-NITE findings, Geshke contends that "the Japanese government ... concluded that CROCS were far more susceptible to escalator entrapments than any other type of footwear tested."16 Opp'n Mem. at 6. While one of the NITE videos appears to show a shoe with the name "CROCS" imprinted on a foot strap (it is difficult for the court to discern with any certainty), this cameo glimpse of a single purported CROCS shoes is insufficient to render the NITE report, and more particularly its conclusions as they might relate to CROCS shoes, admissible at trial. Moreover, the METI-NITE report has never been properly authenticated. See Fed. R.Evid. 902(3) (setting out the requirements for authenticating a foreign public document, including its certification by an appropriate foreign official or a U.S. consular officer); United States v. De Jongh, 937 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1991) (finding a public document inadmissible where its proponent failed to comply with the requisites of Rule 902); Starski v. Kirzhnev, 2011 WL 923499, at *5 (D.Mass. Mar. 15, 2011) (same).

Even assuming that the requirements of Rule 902 had been met, there is nothing in the NITE report that Geshke connects by expert testimony or other evidence to the specific facts of N.K.'s case. Specifically, there is no identification of the make or model of the shoes involved in the NITE entrapment replications (NITE tested seven undifferentiated types of resin sandal); the model of the escalator specific to each entrapment (NITE conducted its tests on four different Japanese makes of escalator)17; the sandals' contact location; the tensile and compression loads; the "hardness" or "thickness" of the sandals; the dynamic friction coefficient; and/or the angle of the entrapment. See Pl.'s Ex. 8 at 11-15, 22-30.18 Rule 702 of the Federal Rule of Evidence admits the opinion testimony of an expert witness where the opinion will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Rule 702 is particularly relevant when scientific and technical matters are critical to the resolution of disputed facts. Without expert testimony reliably relating the contents of the METI-NITE report and its conclusions to the circumstances of N.K.'s accident, the report is doubly inadmissible.19

With regard to Geshke's second category of proposed evidence, even assuming the accuracy of Geshke's estimate of some 300 (almost all unidentified) incidents of CROCS escalator entrapments, Geshke offers no evidence about the circumstances in which these alleged entrapments occurred, their cause, whether any personal injury resulted, the types of escalator involved (or their condition), or whether warnings had been posted and ignored. See Fed.R.Evid. 401.

Finally, Geshke's evidence of "Crocs' own admissions" boils down to this. Geshke maintains that Crocs concedes the existence of a safer and feasible alternative design — the Kids Blaze model — and that this is enough to establish her defective design claim. In the first instance, Crocs concedes nothing of the sort. Moreover, while it is undisputed that Crocs designed the Kids Blaze model to mollify METI's concerns, Geshke offers no evidence that the Kids Blaze design was in fact safer for a child to wear while riding an escalator or that the Japanese government ever required any permanent change in the design of CROCS shoes sold in Japan.20

Count I — Negligence, Failure to Warn

A manufacturer has a duty to provide the "average" consumer with adequate warnings and instructions about the nature and extent of any foreseeable danger accompanying the use or foreseeable misuse of the product. See Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 396 Mass. 629, 631, 487 N.E.2d 1374 (1986); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 370 Mass. 69, 75, 345 N.E.2d 683 (1976); Welch v. Keene Corp., 31 Mass.App.Ct. 157, 163, 575 N.E.2d 766 (1991). A product may also be deemed defective by reason of a failed warning if the omitted or inadequate notice or instruction would have reduced or avoided the foreseeable risks of harm. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) (1998). A manufacturer, however, has no duty to warn users of a possible risk that is outside the zone of foreseeable use or misuse of the product. Mitchell, 396 Mass. at 632, 487 N.E.2d 1374.

In this case, in light of the undisputed facts, whether Geshke failed to read the posted warnings, or simply disregarded them, Crocs persuasively argues that an earlier redundant warning would have done nothing to avert N.K.'s accident. When an existing warning21 "clearly called attention to the dangers to be avoided" and "there [is] no evidence that an additional or different warning would have so alerted the plaintiff [so] that the accident would not have occurred," no reasonable jury could find for a plaintiff on a failure-to-warn theory. Bell v. Wysong & Miles Co., 26 Mass.App.Ct. 1011, 1013, 531 N.E.2d 267 (1988) (reversing the trial court and dismissing a failure to warn claim on this basis). See also Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 621 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming directed verdict for manufacturer when the court could "not see how one can reasonably say that defendants were negligent in failing to furnish even more warnings about the dangers" at issue); Bavuso v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 408 Mass. 694, 701-702, 563 N.E.2d 198 (1990) (reversing jury verdict and the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff because "a warning beyond the warnings given could not have made the danger any more obvious").22

Count II — Breach of Express23 and Implied Warranties

Under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 106, § 2-314, "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale.... Goods to be merchantable must at least be ... fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used...." Massachusetts equates "a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, that goods be `fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,' [Mass. Gen. Laws ch.] 106, § 2-314(2)(c), with the sale of an `unreasonably dangerous' product" as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965).24 Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 425 Mass. 650, 660, 682 N.E.2d 1323 (1997). See also Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 446 Mass. 741, 746, 847 N.E.2d 315 (2006) ("Warranty liability is... `congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).'"). "A product may be unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in design.... Alternatively, a product may be considered to be unreasonably dangerous because of the absence of an adequate warning, sufficient to alert those who may be sensitive to the product and to allow users to balance the risk of harm against the product's social utility." Johnson Insulation, 425 Mass. at 661, 682 N.E.2d 1323; see also Haglund, 446 Mass. at 747, 847 N.E.2d 315 ("Warranty liability may be premised either on the failure to warn ... or ... on defective design."). Because Geshke is unable to prevail on either of her negligence claims (defective design and failure-to-warn), it follows that the implied warranty claim fails as well.25

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED. The Clerk will enter judgment for Crocs, and close the case.

SO ORDERED.