RYA W. ZOBEL, District Judge.
Plaintiff Mr. Naeem Ahmed, domiciled in Karachi, Pakistan, filed this action "to protect its (sic) established and licensed trademark JANG and GEO . . . in the United States and United Kingdom . . . against very serious nature of infringements regarding the same trademarks . . ." (Complaint, ¶ 1). The named defendants are Apple Inc. ("Apple"), and two John Does. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §1332. Given the vague and contradictory allegations of the complaint, Apple moved to dismiss or for a more definite statement. The court denied the former without prejudice but allowed the latter, particularly, with respect to plaintiff's standing as reflected by his rights to each mark in issue and the basis for the court's subject matter jurisdiction, including specifically the citizenship of the John Doe defendants.
In his response plaintiff asserts that he has been using both marks since 1998 in connection with news publication, broadcasting, entertainment and the like, that he is "the bona fide and established owner of the marks," and that, on November 20, 2013, he applied in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for registration of the JANG mark and in the Intellectual Property Office of the United Kingdom for registration of the GEO mark (Docket # 19). Concerning the citizenship of the John Doe defendants, plaintiff acknowledges that he and defendants must be citizens of different states and assures the court that he easily meets this requirement as "plaintiff is a resident of Massachusetts and the Defendant No. 1 [Apple] is from California and Defendant No. 2 and 3 [the John Doe defendants] are presumably from Delaware, therefore there is complete diversity supporting subject matter jurisdiction."
As to jurisdiction, plaintiff's response to the order for a more definite statement provides no facts to support the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. In fact, the issue is more muddled now than it was before that response.
Whatever leeway a court may appropriately grant to pro se litigants is insufficient to sustain a complaint that continues to rely on facts shown by public documents to be missing or wrong.
In another of plaintiff's actions in this court, Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc., et al., No. 14-10025-RGS, Judge Stearns has set forth in detail the history and use of the same trademarks asserted in this lawsuit, which I adopt. That history, which is also set out in the supporting papers in this case, makes clear that, contrary to plaintiff's wholly unsupported assertions, plaintiff has no rights in the asserted trademarks and thus no right to claim infringement by defendant.
The motion to dismiss (Docket # 20) is ALLOWED. Judgment may be entered dismissing the complaint with prejudice.