ORDER

INDIRA TALWANI, District Judge.

Before the court are plaintiffs' Motion to Compel the Production of Documents [#32] and defendants' Motion for Protective Order and/or Order Quashing the June 11, 2015 Subpoena Issued by Plaintiffs [#34]. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants plaintiffs' motion to compel and denies defendants' motion for protective order.

I. Background

Plaintiffs served their initial request for production of documents, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, on January 27, 2015. Request Prod. Doc. [#32-3] at 37. The request sought production "no later than thirty days of service of this request." Id. at 4. At defendants' request, plaintiffs agreed to an extension of time to respond to March 16, 2015. Mot. Compel [#32] at 4. On March 15, 2015, defendants served their responses to the request for production, stating that subject to broad objections, defendants would "produce non-objectionable, non-privileged, responsive information in their possession, custody and control." Defs.' Resp. [#32-4]. Defendants subsequently stated, however, that they were unwilling to produce most of the documents without entry of a protective order. Flynn Decl., Exh. 5 [#32-6] at 19. The court entered the protective order on April 29, 2015. Order [#31]. Defendants nonetheless produced no further documents.

Among the requests for documents were requests for exhibits and transcripts of certain proceedings. Request Prod. Doc., Request 31, 33. Defendants objected to producing such documents "to the extent the . . . documents are protected from disclosure by confidentiality agreements, stipulations, orders or other confidentiality obligations" and also "on the grounds that it request nonpublic personal information protected from discovery under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act." Defs.' Resp., Resp. 31, 33. Plaintiff subsequently provided to defendants a letter from parties to an arbitration covered by the requests, but defendants continued to refuse to provide those documents on the ground that the request was "overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissive evidence." Flynn Decl., Exh. 5 at 12.

On June 11, 2015, plaintiff filed the motion to compel, and also served a subpoena on the third-parties seeking the arbitration transcript, exhibits and confidentiality agreement. Defendants responded with the motion for a protective order and to quash the subpoena, and two motions for extensions of time to respond to the motion to compel. The requests for extension of time asserted that defendants were in the process of retaining new counsel. The court allowed both extensions, but conditioned the second extension on defendants' substitute counsel filing a notice of appearance no later than July 31, 2015. Order [#47]. The court's order extended defendants' time to respond to the motion to compel to August 7, 2015. Id. Although defendants' counsel did file a notices of appearance on July 30, 2015, they did not begin to receive the file and documents until the week of August 3, 2015. Opp. Mot. Compel [#52] at 2. By August 7, 2015, defendants' counsel still had not received the entire file. Id. In opposition to the motion to compel, defendants' counsel made no firm commitment to produce the overdue documents, and stating instead that "[d]efendants expect to begin producing documents to Plaintiffs beginning sometime the week of August 10, 2015, and will thereafter produce documents on a rolling basis". Id. at 2.

ii. Discussion

A party responding to a request for production of documents must either state that inspection "will be permitted as requested" or state an objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). An objection to part of a request must specify that part and must still permit inspection of the rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C); see also Local Rule 34.1(c)(2) ("[n]o part of a document request shall be left unanswered merely because an objection is interposed to another part of the document request").1 In their March 16, 2015 response to plaintiffs' request for production, defendants objected to each request, and specified that they would produce "nonobjectionable, non-privileged responsive information" for nearly every request. Those documents to which defendants did not object should have been produced to plaintiffs on March 16, 2015, or at the very latest, when the protective order was entered on April 29, 2015. Accordingly, except as to documents covered by the objections and specific claims of privilege set forth in the response to request for production of documents, defendants are ordered to produce the responsive documents, as set forth below.

With regard to the arbitration documents, defendants assert in their opposition to the motion to compel and in their motion seeking to quash the third-party subpoena that the documents are not relevant because they involve an investment advisory relationship with the third party and at least some investments do not overlap with the investments at issue in this case. Defendants contend further that much of the information sought constitutes nonpublic personal information of the third-party defendants that is protected from discovery under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Defendants offer to produce exhibits from that arbitration to the extent that such exhibits (i) do not reflect confidential information specific to the third-party's account, and (ii) involve investments at issue in this case. Defendants also contend, however, that they do not possess the hearing transcripts from the arbitration. Opp. Mot. Compel at 11-12.

Defendants' concerns that the arbitration transcript and exhibits are protected from discovery by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and that the third-party's confidentiality needs to be protected are unpersuasive. First, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not prohibit the disclosure of otherwise protected information "to respond to judicial process" or with "the consent or at the direction of the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(2), (8); See Marks v. Global Mortgage Group, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 492, 495-96 (S.D.W.Va. 2003) (holding that under the "judicial process" exception, a defendant financial institution "may disclose its customers' nonpublic personal information in response to the plaintiffs' discovery request."). Here, the third-party advised defendants of their consent, and have served no objections to the subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B) (requiring objections to be served before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served). Finally, to the extent that the third-party arbitration concerned allegations of fraud by defendants, the documents and exhibits may be relevant to plaintiffs' claims and are therefore discoverable pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), even though different parties and some different investments are involved. In light of the defendants' claimed burden and the assertions that they do not have the transcripts, the court allows plaintiffs to obtain exhibits and transcripts pursuant to the third-party subpoena.

Accordingly,

(A) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel [#32] is ALLOWED. Except as to documents covered by their objections and specific claims of privilege set forth in the response to request for production of documents, defendants are ordered to produce to plaintiffs the following documents no later than August 19, 2015:

IT IS SO ORDERED.