LITTLEFIELD v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 16-10184-WGY. (2016)
Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts
Number: infdco20160729a43
Visitors: 7
Filed: Jul. 28, 2016
Latest Update: Jul. 28, 2016
Summary: JUDGMENT WILLIAM G. YOUNG , District Judge . Upon thorough consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court rules that the second definition of "Indian" in Section 479 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 479, unambiguously incorporates the entire antecedent phrase — that is, "such members" refers to "members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction." Thus, no deference is due the Secretary's contrary interpretation. In light of the Supreme Court's interpre
Summary: JUDGMENT WILLIAM G. YOUNG , District Judge . Upon thorough consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court rules that the second definition of "Indian" in Section 479 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 479, unambiguously incorporates the entire antecedent phrase — that is, "such members" refers to "members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction." Thus, no deference is due the Secretary's contrary interpretation. In light of the Supreme Court's interpret..
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JUDGMENT
WILLIAM G. YOUNG, District Judge.
Upon thorough consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court rules that the second definition of "Indian" in Section 479 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 479, unambiguously incorporates the entire antecedent phrase — that is, "such members" refers to "members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction." Thus, no deference is due the Secretary's contrary interpretation. In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of "now under Federal jurisdiction" to mean under Federal jurisdiction in June 1934, the Secretary lacked the authority to acquire land in trust for the Mashpees, as they were not then under Federal jurisdiction. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382-83 (2009).
In keeping with the parties' stipulation, ECF No. 77, and to enable a prompt appeal of this declaration, the Court determines there is no just cause for delay, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and enters this declaratory judgment on the Plaintiffs' first cause of action. The matter is remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Source: Leagle
