RICHARD G. STEARNS, District Judge.
Defendant Gator Swansea Property, LLC (Gator) moves, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), to alter or amend the court's decision and judgment of December 12, 2018, entered after a jury-waived trial. Specifically, Gator asks the court to amend Paragraph 14 of its Ultimate Rulings of Fact and law by revising its reading of Article 13 of the disputed Ground Lease and to award Gator the attorneys' fees and costs that it incurred in the underlying litigation. Article 13 states in relevant part: "If Landlord or Tenant shall incur any expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, in instituting, prosecuting, or defending any action or proceedings instituted by reason of default by the other, the defaulting party shall reimburse the other for the amount of such expenses."
Gator's revisionist argument is based on a technical reading of the Ground Lease that gives the word "default," as it is used in Article 13, a strict and unconditional meaning. More particularly, Gator would have the court hold that the "notice and cure" provisions set out in Article 12 do not apply to Article 13. Under Gator's new reading, Article 13 should be understood as a pure fee-shifting mechanism triggered by any default, however consequential. To pose the question is to give the answer. As 58 Swansea correctly observes, over the prolonged course of this litigation, which has involved numerous motions, many of a substantive nature, as well as multiple days of trial, Gator has never raised either of these arguments.
It is hornbook law, that "Rule 59(e) relief is granted sparingly, and only when `the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations.' . . . A motion for reconsideration is not the venue to undo procedural snafus or permit a party to advance arguments it should have developed prior to judgment. . . ." Biltcliffe v. Citimortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014). Rule 59(e) motions, in other words, "are aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration." F.D.I.C. v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992).
There is one respect, however, in which Gator is correct. As the prevailing party, however barely, it is entitled to its reasonable costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Gator's motion to alter or amend the judgement is
SO ORDERED.