AMENDED MEMORANDUM & ORDER1

INDIRA TALWANI, District Judge.

This putative class action is brought by participants in a 401(k) plan2 against institutional and individual defendants3 alleging breaches of fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Second Consol. Am. Compl. ("Second Am. Compl.") ¶ 1 [#54].4 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint [#63]. After a hearing, the court denied the motion as to Counts I, II, V, VI, VII, and VIII, and took Counts III and IV under advisement. See Elec. Order [#93]. The court subsequently issued a Memorandum and Order [#102] allowing Defendants' motion as to Count III and denying the motion as to Count IV. On Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration [#105], the court has corrected portions of the Memorandum and Order [#102] to address issues of law raised by Defendants. However, for the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint [#63] as to Count IV must still be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following facts are relevant to Counts III and IV:

Eligible employees of GE and participating affiliates can participate in GE's 401(k) Plan, a/k/a the GE Retirement Savings Plan ("the Plan") by investing up to 30% of their eligible earnings in any of a number of investment options within the Plan. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 70 [#54]. This action pertains to Plaintiffs' investments in five mutual funds among these options: the GE Institutional Strategic Investment Fund ("Strategic Investment Fund"), the GE Institutional Small Cap Equity Fund ("Small Cap Equity Fund"), the GE Institutional International Equity Fund ("International Equity Fund"), the GE RSP Income Fund ("Income Fund"), and the GE U.S. Equity Fund ("US Equity Fund") (collectively, the "GE Funds"). Id. at ¶¶ 1-2.

The GE Funds are the only actively managed funds open to eligible employees of GE and participating affiliates. Id. at ¶¶ 70-71. Employees and affiliates can also participate in the Plan by investing in the GE Stock Fund, six collective trust index funds, Target Date Funds, and/or a Money Market Fund. Id. at ¶ 71. GE required that certain proprietary investment options, the Income Fund and the US Equity Fund, be offered to Plan participants. Id. at ¶ 72.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used the Plan participants to offset an investor exodus from the underperforming GE Funds despite the fact that the Plan participants could have been better served by investment options from unaffiliated companies that were cheaper and better performing. Id. at ¶ 5. As of December 31, 2015, the Plan owned the vast majority of assets in the GE Funds; assets from Plan participants ranged from approximately 40% of all fund assets to approximately 96% of all fund assets, depending on the fund and the year. Id. at ¶ 91.

All of the Plan's actively managed funds were managed and sponsored by GE's whollyowned subsidiary, GE Asset Management, until July 1, 2016, when GE sold the subsidiary to State Street for a reported $485 million. Id. at ¶¶ 75, 78. Plaintiffs allege that GE retained the poorly performing proprietary funds as a constant source of fees and to help inflate the market value of GE Asset Management prior to its sale to State Street. Id. at ¶ 78. Of the total $28 billion value of the Plan, at the time of its sale, GE Asset Management managed $8 billion in Plan assets. Id. at ¶¶ 66, 78. Furthermore, from 2010 to 2016, GE earned more than $175 million in fees from the proprietary funds. Id. at ¶ 7.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that Counts III and IV are barred because of the statute of limitations. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2):

Prior to 1987, 29 U.S.C. § 1113 contained a constructive knowledge provision in which the limitations period began when a plaintiff "could reasonably be expected to have obtained knowledge of a breach or violation." Edes v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 417 F.3d 133, 141 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "Actual knowledge" in the current version of the statute consists of awareness of "the essential facts of the transactions or conduct constituting the violation." Id. at 142. The question of when actual knowledge exists thus is dependent on the facts of each individual case. Id. Distinguishing between the former constructive knowledge requirement and today's actual knowledge requirement, the First Circuit explained that "[w]here the alleged breach arises out of a financial transaction involving ERISA plan funds, determining where the distinction between actual and constructive knowledge lies in a particular case may depend on the level of generality employed in characterizing the transaction at issue, which may depend, in turn, on an examination of the complexity of the underlying factual transaction, the complexity of the legal claim and the egregiousness of the alleged violation." Id. at 141. Although mere knowledge that "something was awry" is insufficient for actual knowledge, "we do not think Congress intended the actual knowledge requirement to excuse willful blindness by a plaintiff." Id. at 142. The First Circuit applied this rule in Edes, finding that the plaintiffs, who claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by failing to classify them as ERISA plan participants, had the requisite "actual knowledge" shortly after being hired, as "the breach of fiduciary duty arises not from an intricate financial transaction."5 Id.

Under Count III of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the offering of the GE Funds as the sole actively managed investment options constitutes a prohibited transaction in violation of ERISA §§ 406(a)(1)(A), (C), and (D). Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 176-186 [#54]. Plaintiffs allege that each of them were participants in the Plan and invested in the GE Funds during the class period, which began in September 2011. Id. at ¶¶ 1-2, 14-23. The fact that these were proprietary funds would have been immediately known to Plaintiffs, as the funds are labeled as GE Funds, e.g., the GE Institutional Strategic Investment Fund, the GE Institutional Small Cap Equity Fund, the GE Institutional International Equity Fund, the GE RSP Income Fund, and the GE US Equity Fund. Id. at ¶ 2. To the extent that the basis of Plaintiffs' claim is that Defendants only offered proprietary funds as the sole actively managed investment options of the Plan, Plaintiffs had actual knowledge the day Plaintiffs elected their Plan options. Thus, Count III is barred by the statute of limitations.

Under Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that GE, the Benefit Plan Investment Committee Defendants, and the Asset Management Defendants offered GE Funds as the sole actively managed investment options of the Plan despite high costs and poor performance in order to generate management fees and maintain GE Asset Management's performance. Id. ¶¶ 187-197. Because the fees were for the financial benefit of GE and the Asset Management Defendants, Plaintiffs argue that these acts constitute a prohibited transaction in violation of ERISA §§ 406(b)(1) and (3). Id.

Although Plaintiffs could have easily discerned that the funds were proprietary funds, and even that they were paying fees to GE Asset Management, the question of whether Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of high costs and poor performance is much more complex. There are no facts in the Second Amended Complaint to suggest that Plaintiffs had actual knowledge that their funds were performing poorer and their fees cost higher compared to other funds. Even if they did, Plaintiffs would certainly not have known about the sale of GE Asset Management to State Street prior to the sale on July 1, 2016. Plaintiffs not only allege that Defendants profited from the management fees, but that they also profited from the financial health of GE Asset Management due to the selection and presence of the GE Funds in GE Asset Management's portfolio. Id. at ¶ 191. This financial benefit materialized in the sale of GE Asset Management for a reported $485 million. Id. at ¶ 78. As July 2016 is within the three-year statute of limitations, Count IV is not barred by the statute of limitations.

B. Defendants' Further Arguments

Defendants raise two further arguments regarding prohibited transactions: (1) that ERISA § 406 does not apply because the management fees are not a "plan asset," and (2) that even if management fees are a "plan asset," Plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed because Plaintiffs did not plead a non-exempt prohibited transaction. Defs.' Mem. 24-26 [#64].

Count IV is brought under ERISA § 406(b)(1), which prohibits fiduciaries with respect to the Plan from "deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account," and ERISA § 406(b)(3), which prohibits a fiduciary from "receiv[ing] any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan." Although ERISA does not contain a definition of "plan assets," the First Circuit has found "persuasive" the Department of Labor's formulation (also adopted by other Circuits) that "`assets of a plan generally are to be identified on the basis of ordinary notions of property rights under non-ERISA law. . . .'" Merrimon v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 758 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting US Dep't of Labor, Advisory Op. No. 93-14A, other citations omitted); see also In re Fidelity ERISA Float Litig., 829 F.3d 55, 60-62 (1st Cir. 2016) (same).

In In re Fidelity, the First Circuit held that cash provided to plan participants through an intermediary, Fidelity, no longer constituted a "plan asset." 829 F.3d at 62. "As between the plan and the participant, it is the participant who has the superior claim to property in the cash after redemption. And that is a good reason to reject the claim that the cash should be treated as a plan asset for the purpose of enforcing fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA." Id.; see also Velazquez v. Massachusetts Fin. Servs. Co., 320 F.Supp.3d 252, 261 (D. Mass. 2018) (holding that monies paid out of a fund, rather than the plan, are not considered a plan asset); Fleming v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust Co., No. 16-cv-10918, 2017 WL 4225624, at *8 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2017) (citing In re Fidelity to hold that management fees collected are not "assets of the plan" within the meaning of ERISA "because the fees that the mutual funds and [third party that charges for individual investment advice] collect from the Plan do not go to, and are not intended to go to, the Plan itself, they do not qualify as `assets of the plan,' as required to make out a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D)"); Brotherston v. Putnam Invs., LLC, No. CV 15-13825-WGY, 2017 WL 1196648, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2017) (cash held by mutual funds are not "assets of the plan;" only shares of funds owned by plan are considered plan assets), rev'd on other grounds, 907 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-926 (Jan. 16, 2019).

In contrast to these cases however, Plaintiffs are not simply alleging that Defendants received financial benefit from the fees. Rather, Plaintiffs claim that as the GE Funds failed to perform and as other outside investors left the funds, the number of Plan participants in the funds continued to increase.6 Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 87, 92, 191 [#54]. Because Plaintiffs' claim is broader and also encompasses the shares of the funds that financially benefitted Defendants, Plaintiffs' argument would not be precluded by these cases. Plaintiffs' claim would properly fall under ERISA § 406(b)(1).

To the extent that Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim falls under PTE 77-3, an exemption issued by the Department of Labor, this argument also fails. Although PTE 77-3 exempts "the acquisition and sale of shares of a registered open-end investment company (`mutual fund') by an employee benefit plan which covers employees of the mutual fund or the mutual fund's investment adviser or principal underwriter, or an affiliate thereof" the exemption does not relieve a fiduciary from other provisions of ERISA, including "any prohibited transaction provisions to which the exemption does not apply." 42 Fed. Reg. 18,734. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that beyond merely investing in in-house funds (the GE Funds), Defendants did so as part of a strategy to prop up the apparent value of GE Asset Management before its sale to State Street, and that this sale profited Defendants' own account in violation of ERISA § 406(b). Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 187-97 [#54]. This allegation, if substantiated, may constitute a prohibited transaction beyond the scope of the PTE 77-3 exemption since the allegations concern self-dealing beyond the mere acquisition and sale of shares of an in-house fund. Accordingly, and without prejudice to any subsequent argument regarding the applicability of PTE 77-3, the court concludes that Count IV's allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint [#63] is ALLOWED as to Count III and DENIED as to Count IV.

IT IS SO ORDERED.