ORDER ON MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA

[Docket No. 1]

JENNIFER C. BOAL, Magistrate Judge.

Chad Romero moves to compel third party Smith Management and Consulting, LLC ("Smith") to comply with a subpoena. Docket No. 1.1 For the following reasons, I grant the motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Action

1. Romero's Allegations

On September 13, 2018, Romero filed a second amended complaint against Clean Harbors Surface Rentals USA, Inc. ("Clean Harbors"), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Romero v. Clean Harbors Surface Rentals USA, Inc., No. 18-cv-10702-PBS (D. Mass.) (the "Underlying Action") at Docket No. 26. Romero worked for Clean Harbors from July 2016 to February 2018. Second Amended Complaint in the Underlying Action ("SAC") at ¶ 9. He was a solids control technician, operating Clean Harbors' equipment to separate particles and debris from fluids used for oil and natural gas drilling so the fluids could be reused in the drilling process. Id. at ¶ 23.

Romero alleges he and other similarly situated individuals regularly worked over 40 hours per week. Id. at ¶¶ 49-51. However, Clean Harbors did not pay overtime to Romero or others similarly situated. Id. at ¶ 47. Instead, Clean Harbors paid them a "day rate." Id. at ¶ 43. Romero was paid $275 per day when he started working for Clean Harbors and $325 per day by the time he left, regardless of how many hours he worked. Id. at ¶¶ 44-45. Romero and other day-rate workers often worked 12 hours per day, seven days a week, or at least 84 hours per week. Id. at ¶¶ 50-51. Romero alleges that Clean Harbors misclassified him and other day-rate workers as independent contractors and failed to pay overtime in violation of the FLSA. Id. at ¶¶ 73-76.

2. Conditional Certification Of Collective Action Group And Notice

On March 21, 2019, Judge Saris conditionally certified a collective action group consisting of:

Underlying Action at Docket No. 53 at 21-22. Clean Harbors subsequently moved for clarification of the March 2019 order, requesting that the Court expressly state that any solid control workers who signed arbitration agreements are not part of the collective action group and will not receive notice of the FLSA collective action nor will they be allowed to opt-in to the action. Underlying Action at Docket No. 59. Clean Harbors also requested a protective order prohibiting Romero from inquiring as to the names and contact information of any such solids control workers. Id. In the alternative, Clean Harbors requested that the Court stay the case and certify to the First Circuit the legal question of whether putative group members who signed arbitration agreements can receive notice in an FLSA collective action. Docket No. 60 at 2.

Judge Saris found that the collective action group excludes solids control workers subject to valid, enforceable arbitration agreements. See Underlying Action at Docket No. 78 at 5. Therefore, she revised the group definition to:

Id. However, she also found that workers who signed arbitration agreements ("Arbitration Workers") should receive notice of the collective action even though they ultimately may not be able to participate in the case because of their arbitration agreements. Id. at 9. In so doing, Judge Saris discussed the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re JP Morgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2019), which held "that district courts may not send notice to an employee with a valid arbitration agreement unless the record shows that nothing in the agreement would prohibit that employee from participating in the collective action." Id. at 7. She then noted that Clean Harbors had submitted three sample Consulting Agreements, a sample Master Service Agreement ("MSA"), a sample Arbitration Agreement, and an affidavit averring that the sample MSA and Arbitration Agreements were representative of those signed by other Arbitration Workers. Id. at 10. She found, however, that Clean Harbors' submission had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Arbitration Agreements for all 136 Arbitration Workers are valid. Id.

Judge Saris also noted that Romero had no way of meaningfully contesting the validity of the Arbitration Agreements because he did not yet know the identity of any of the Arbitration Workers or the circumstances in which they signed Arbitration Agreements. Id. at 10-11. In addition, it was not clear that Romero had standing to contest the validity of the Arbitration Agreements for Arbitration Workers who had not yet opted into the action. Id. at 11. Finally, she noted that the Court lacked authority to adjudicate the validity of the Arbitration Agreements, as such questions were reserved for arbitration. Id.

Thus, Judge Saris held that she would not exclude Arbitration Workers from receiving notice of the collective action. Id. She also denied Clean Harbors' request for a protective order and to stay the action and certify it for interlocutory review. Id. at 11, 14. She stated that:

Id. at 12.

2. The Present Dispute

Clean Harbors contracts with third-party staffing companies to supply solids control workers for certain projects. See Underlying Action at Docket No. 78 at 2. One of the third-party staffing companies is Smith. Id.

Clean Harbors contends that it does not have access to the contact information of the 136 solids control workers supplied by Smith and it is therefore unable to aid in getting those workers notice as required by Judge Saris's order. See Docket No. 1 at 1-2. Thus, on May 6, 2019, Romero served a subpoena on Smith seeking the following:

Docket No. 1-2 at 2-3. Smith objected to the subpoena. Docket No. 1-2. Among other things, Smith argued that these requests sought irrelevant information because the requests failed to exclude solids control workers who are subject to arbitration agreements. See id. On October 30, 2019, Romero filed a motion to enforce the subpoena, or in the alternative, to transfer the matter to this Court in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Romero v. Smith Management and Consulting, LLC, No. 4:19-mc-3240 (S.D. Tex.). Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore transferred the motion to this Court pursuant to Rule 45(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Docket No. 2.3

On November 15, 2019, Smith filed an opposition to the motion. Docket No. 7. I heard oral argument on December 18, 2019.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Magistrate Judge's Authority To Rule On The Motion

Although a motion to quash is a usually a non-dispositive matter, judges in this district have held that motions to enforce or quash administrative subpoenas are dispositive motions for purposes of review because they are the entire proceeding before the court. See, e.g., In re Administrative Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 400 F.Supp.2d 386, 389 (D. Mass. 2005) (Saris, J.). Some courts have extended that holding to motions to quash Rule 45 subpoenas issued in out-of-district litigation. See, e.g., Luppino v. Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs., USA, LLC, No. 13-50212, 2013 WL 1844075, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2013) (citations omitted). I disagree with those courts.

An administrative subpoena typically is directed at a single entity or person and seeks to obtain specific information relevant to an investigation. United States v. Michigan Dept. of Community Health, No. 1:10-mc-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *6 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011). "The judicial proceeding to enforce the subpoena typically involves only the government agency seeking to enforce the subpoena and the person or entity in possession of the records." Id. Thus, there is no other proceeding pending in any court.

Unlike administrative subpoenas, Rule 45 subpoenas allow parties to obtain discovery from non-parties in civil proceedings pending before a federal court. To protect non-parties not residing in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, Rule 45 provides for enforcement in the place of compliance, which is generally the non-party's local court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c), (d); Advisory Committee Notes to 2013 Amendments. While in some instances subpoena related motions are the only proceeding pending before one court, they are part of a larger proceeding that happens to be pending in a different court.4 Thus, a court's ruling on a motion to quash a Rule 45 subpoena is a discovery matter not dispositive of the underlying claims. See, e.g., Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Multisorb Tech., Inc., No. 16MC22G, 2016 WL 4267567, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2016) ("[I]n ruling on whether to transfer subpoena-related motions, the Court is not depriving a party of a federal forum to resolve a dispute but is rather transferring the authority to resolve the discovery dispute to another federal court.") (citation omitted). Accordingly, I find that the instant motion to quash is a non-dispositive matter that this Court may consider under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

B. Compliance With Subpoena

Smith argues that the information sought by the subpoena is not relevant because it pertains to Arbitration Workers and such workers are explicitly excluded from the conditionally certified class and should therefore not receive notice of the action. See Docket No. 7 at 5-10. Judge Saris, however, has already rejected that argument and held that Arbitration Workers should receive notice of the action even if they ultimately may not be able to join the class. See Underlying Action at Docket No. 78 at 6-12. Smith is in effect asking for reconsideration of that ruling. See Docket No. 7 at 6-10. It is not clear I have the authority to disturb Judge Saris's ruling and, in any event, I see no reason to recommend that Judge Saris reconsider her decision. Thus, Request No. 1, requesting contact information for the Arbitration Workers, seeks relevant information.

Request No. 2, regarding payroll data and timesheets, seeks information relevant to determining whether workers were paid a day rate.5 Similarly, MSAs and other documents describing the relationship between Smith and Clean Harbors may also shed light on that issue.6

To the extent that Smith objects to producing the requested information on the grounds that such information is confidential, Judge Saris has issued a Confidentiality and Protective Order to protect confidential information. See Underlying Action at Docket No. 63. Smith may designate documents as confidential pursuant to that order. See id. at ¶ 5.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, I grant Romero's motion to enforce. Smith shall comply with the subpoena within 30 days.