JAMES F. SCHNEIDER, Bankruptcy Judge.
The matter before this Court is the plaintiff's amended motion for summary judgment [P. 9] on the complaint to compel turnover of debtor's property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) and (h) and request for attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion will be granted.
1. On August 21, 2013, the defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC, ("defendant"), obtained a consent judgment in the amount of $7,164.60 against Matt Guzik ("plaintiff"), in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. On September 5, 2013, a judgment lien was recorded.
2. On April 17, 2014, a writ of garnishment of wages was issued against plaintiff in favor of defendant. Complaint, ¶ 8.
3. The first garnishment was reflected in plaintiff's pay advice dated May 23, 2014, for the pay period May 11, 2014 through May 17, 2014, in the amount of $183.30, reflecting 25% of the plaintiff's salary.
4. On July 29, 2014, the plaintiff filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Complaint, ¶ 10. The plaintiff's pay advices indicate that the garnishments continued until the petition date. As of the petition date, a total of $1,869.45, had been garnished from the plaintiff's wages. Complaint ¶ 11; Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. D.
5. The plaintiff listed garnished wages in the amount of $1,869.00, as personal property on Schedule B of his bankruptcy petition, citing 11 U.S.C. § 547. Voluntary Petition, Schedule B, ¶ 18.
6. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that the garnishment represented a preference in favor of the defendant, that the property would have been exempted if not transferred and that the trustee could have avoided the transfer but has not attempted to do so. Complaint, ¶¶ 13-15.
7. Plaintiff claimed the garnished wages as exempt in Schedule C of his petition, pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-504(b)(5). Voluntary Petition, Schedule C, "Other Liquidated Debts Owing Debtor Including Tax Refund."
8. The plaintiff notified the defendant on the petition date, July 29, 2014, that he had filed bankruptcy and demanded the return of the garnished wages as preferential transfers made during the 90-day preference period set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 547. Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A.
9. On August 7, 2014, the defendant requested copies of the plaintiff's bankruptcy schedules and payroll records for the preference period. Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. B. On August 14, 2014, the plaintiff renewed his demand and provided payroll statements for the period from May 23, 2014 through July 25, 2014, which reflected the first and last garnishments prior to the petition date. Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. C and D.
10. On September 23, 2014, the plaintiff initiated the instant adversary proceeding to recover the garnished wages. Complaint, ¶ 16. The defendant filed an answer on September 30, 2014.
11. On December 4, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, followed by the instant amended motion on December 11, 2014, supported by correspondence between the parties' counsel. The defendant filed an opposition to the instant motion on December 15, 2014, in which it stated that the plaintiff failed to assert any facts supported by evidence in the record that cannot be disputed. Opposition of Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC.
12. At the hearing on the amended motion for summary judgment held on April 20, 2015, counsel for the defendant conceded that Ford Motor Credit had received wage garnishments of at least $1,600.00, but denied receipt of the full amount claimed by the plaintiff of $1,869.00.
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 157 and 1334. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1409. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E).
2. Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court "must consider whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party, taking all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Humboldt Express, Inc. v. The Wise Co. (In re Apex Express Corp.), 190 F.3d 624, 633 (4th Cir. 1999).
4. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. However, the non-moving party "`may not rely merely on allegations or denials in [its] own pleading' but must `set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2508, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
5. A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.
6. The instant complaint to recover preferential transfers was brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 522 and 547.
7. Plaintiff has standing to avoid the transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(h).
8. To avoid a transfer pursuant to § 547(b), a plaintiff must prove that a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property was (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor, (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made, (3) made while the debtor was insolvent, (4) made on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition, and (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive is the transfer had not been made. Because the defendant has admitted the facts that support all of the required findings pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), all of the transfers are avoidable.
9. Neither the definition of transfer in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54),
10. Although the lien that created the garnishment was levied on April 17, 2014, more than 90 days prior to the date of plaintiff's bankruptcy filing, the garnishing lien attached when wages became payable to the defendant. In re Lewis, 116 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) ("[t]he lien attaches to future wages when they become payable.")
11. Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy 67 days after the first garnishment was owed and paid. See, Finding of Fact No. 4, supra. All the wages in question became payable to the defendant within 90 days of plaintiff's bankruptcy filing, and therefore all the wages garnished are subject to Section 547(b) consideration.
12. Furthermore, defendant does not contest the claim that the wages at the heart of this dispute are subject to avoidance pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
13. Nevertheless, defendant opposed plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and contended that it did not actually receive all of wages garnished and should only be required to repay the amounts actually received. Defendant claimed that plaintiff has not asserted any facts that cannot be disputed and that are supported by materials in the record. However, the defendant does not itself dispute any specific facts.
14. Plaintiff supported his claims by citing materials in the record, namely his payroll statements that reflect the amount of each paycheck from which wages were garnished. The defendant has neither contested their authenticity nor their correctness and they are a part of the record that supports the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
15. The supporting evidence offered by the plaintiff establishes the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact and satisfies the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). Therefore, it is appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
(d) When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant. If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. This Rule is made applicable to proceedings in bankruptcy by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056.
11 U.S.C. §§ 522(g) and 522(h).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b).