MEMORANDUM OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, QUIETING TITLE AND DECLARING OWNERSHIP OF REAL ESTATE

ROBERT A. GORDON, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.

I. Introduction

The question presented by this Adversary Proceeding is whether, because there are no longer any traces of vigorous, intermittent, or even docile, agricultural or educational activities initiated or pursued by the Debtor/Defendant, Sojourner Douglas College, Inc. (Sojourner) upon the real estate known as the "Farm Property", the title to the real estate reverted, as a matter of Maryland law, to the Plaintiff, Michael Roblyer, Trustee of, and on behalf of, the Harrell S. Spruill Revocable Trust, and in turn to the co-Plaintiff, Kecia Johnson, the Grantor's heir, (collectively, Spruill Trust), notwithstanding Sojourner's pledge of the Farm Property to lender Revach, LLC (Revach) as collateral for a substantial loan. Sojourner asserts that the pledge of the Farm Property was (and continues to be) an "educational purpose", sufficient to bar the operation of the subject reversionary clause.

There is no Maryland decision precisely on point and, as the Court previously suggested to the parties, the question — which is purely one of Maryland law — would ideally be left to the decisional wisdom of the Maryland Court of Appeals, via certification.1 Nevertheless, and in light of the parties' desire and consent to have the question resolved in this forum, the Court must resolve it with the conclusion that there are no material facts in dispute and because the reversionary condition has been triggered, and the use of the Farm Property as loan collateral constitutes neither an "agricultural" nor "educational purpose", the Farm Property has reverted to the Spruill Trust as a matter of law, and summary judgment should be granted in the Spruill Trust's favor.

II. Procedural Background

The main Bankruptcy, Case No. 18-12191, (Main Case) was voluntarily commenced by Sojourner on February 21, 2018. On February 26, 2018, secured lender, 1880 Bank (1880), filed its Emergency Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 to Pursue the Appointment of a Receiver and/or a Foreclosure of Property (Lift Stay Motion) (Dkt. No. 16, Main Case). On March 9, 2018, the same day that the Lift Stay Motion had already been scheduled to be heard, 1880 filed a Motion to Approve Consent Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee (Trustee Motion) (Dkt. No. 32, Main Case). The thrust of the Trustee Motion was accepted by the Court during the Lift Stay Motion hearing, and a Consent Order Directing the Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee was thereafter entered (Dkt. No. 49). Immediately thereafter, Mr. Goldstein was appointed Chapter 11 Trustee (Dkt. No. 50) and he continues to act in that capacity.

This Adversary Proceeding was commenced on June 19, 2018 by the Spruill Trust's filing of the Complaint to Determine Ownership of Property Claimed by Debtor, against Sojourner and the Trustee. Sojourner, filed its Answer on August 22, 2018 (Dkt. No. 17) and on September 14, 2018, the Trustee filed his Answer and Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. No. 24). Five days later, on September 19, 2018, the Spruill Trust filed the Motion for Summary Judgment (SJ Motion) (Dkt. No. 25) that is resolved by this Opinion. The Trustee and Sojourner together filed an Opposition to the SJ Motion on October 17, 2018 (Dkt. No. 31) and the Spruill Trust filed its Reply on October 19, 2018 (Dkt. No. 34).2

A hearing was scheduled for November 14, 2018 to consider the SJ Motion and Opposition (Dkt. No. 41). However, without addressing the substance of the competing positions, the Court instead suggested that the best course might be to certify the dispute for resolution by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The proposal was made because (a) the merits of this dispute are governed exclusively by Maryland substantive law and (b) any connection to the Bankruptcy Code arises only by dint of the Debtor's decision to commence the Main Case: other than the unilateral selection of this forum, federal law plays no role in the dispute. After discussion, the parties agreed to this approach and December 7, 2018 was fixed as the deadline for them to submit a proposed opinion and order certifying the question presented. In the event the parties could not agree upon the language of the opinion and order, a hearing was scheduled for November 28, 2018 to resolve any differences.

November 28th came and went without any apparent dispute. However, on December 3, 2018, Counsel for the Spruill Trust submitted a letter requesting that the decision to certify the matter be "revisited" and upon further review, undone. In support of this request, Counsel indicated that he had contacted the Maryland Court of Appeals and had come away with the understanding that even if the matter was handled as expeditiously as possible, a decision might not be forthcoming until 2020 at the earliest and, moreover, that it would cost significantly more to resolve the matter in that forum. As a result, a status conference was scheduled for December 18, 2018 (Dkt. No. 48) and after hearing from the parties, the decision was made to forgo certification.3 Hence, the SJ Motion and related papers were scheduled for hearing on February 19, 2019. A hearing was held that day, the parties argued their positions and the matter was taken under advisement (Dkt. No. 51).

III. Background, and Facts not in Dispute4

The underlying real estate transaction, and the controlling grant language under review, is described concisely in the Spruill Trust's Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Dispute (Dkt. No. 25-1), as follows:

President Charles W. Simmons of Sojourner submitted an affidavit (Simmons Affidavit) in the parties' virtually identical, pre-bankruptcy litigation commenced in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County6 and the Spruill Trust relied upon the Simmons Affidavit in its entirety, in seeking summary judgment. It concisely encapsulates the material facts and core issue to be determined. Moreover, every word stands as an evidentiary admission by Sojourner.7 Hence, it is reprinted verbatim here:

Spruill Trust Smt. Mat. Facts, Exh. 4, Simmons Affidavit.

After the commencement of the Main Case, Dr. Simmons was examined under oath at the 11 U.S.C. § 341(a)8 meeting of creditors (Creditors' Meeting) by Counsel for the Spruill Trust. Relevant portions of his testimony are reprinted here:

Spruill Trust Smt. Mat. Facts, Exh. 4, Transcript of First Meeting of Creditors at 2-11.

IV. Jurisdiction, Venue and Choice of Law

The Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and Local Rule 402 of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (K) and (O). The parties have expressly, (Spruill Trust), and, impliedly, (Sojourner) consented and waived any objection to the entry of a final judgment on the merits and therefore this Court finds that the entry of a final judgment will not offend the strictures of Stern, supra, and is in compliance with Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (holding that parties may knowingly and voluntarily consent to final adjudication of a claim by the Bankruptcy Court). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).

It is settled that Maryland law must be applied to the substantive dispute. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 S.Ct. 1188 (1938). This principal applies whether a federal court is sitting in diversity or addressing state law claims under its pendant jurisdiction. In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203, 205 (4th Cir. 1988). "Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding." Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979). While out of state cases are cited for their value and wisdom, there is no dispute that Maryland law controls the outcome of this dispute.

V. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), made applicable by Fed. R Bankr. P. 7056, sets forth the procedure to be followed when a party files a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the out-come of the suit. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A genuine issue of material fact exists where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining the facts for summary judgment purposes, the court may rely on affidavits made with personal knowledge that set forth specific facts otherwise admissible in evidence and sworn or certified copies of papers attached to such affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Permissible inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but if "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," summary judgment may be granted. Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir. 1990).

The Court concludes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact in this adversary proceeding. The only dispute is whether the pledge of the Farm Property as collateral for a $1.975 million loan11 fits within the restrictive language of the Farm Deed as an "educational purpose" such that the title to the Farm Property is spared from reversion to the Spruill Trust. Under Maryland law, the grant language, and the undisputed facts, dictate that the Farm Property's title automatically reverted to the Spruill Trust upon the cessation of agricultural and educational activities and summary judgment in the Spruill Trust's favor must be granted.

B. Relevant Maryland Real Property Law and its Application to this Dispute.

(a) Restrictions Upon the Alienability of Real Estate and the Fee Simple Determinable Estate.

County Commissioners of Charles County v. St. Charles Associates Limited Partnership, 366 Md. 426, 784 A.2d 545 (2001), summarizes controlling Maryland law as to the interpretation of restrictions upon the alienability of land. The Court stated:

Cty. Commissioners of Charles Co., 784 A.2d at 556-59 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original and added).

There is no dispute that the Farm Deed conveyed to Sojourner a fee simple determinable estate interest in the Farm Property. This type of estate in land is recognized in Maryland and its goal is to guarantee that real estate be used only for a certain purpose, often coupled with a public interest. But if the specified purpose ceases, title will revert to the grantor or her heirs. Mayor & City Council of Ocean City v. Taber, 279 Md. 115, 367 A.2d 1233, 1240 (1977). Borrowing from Tiffany's treatise on Real Property, the Taber case adopted this description of the fee simple determinable estate:

Taber, 367 A.2d at 1240 (quoting 1 H. T. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, § 220 (3rd ed. B. Jones 1939)) (citation omitted). "In case of a diversion of the land from the purpose for which it was devised, the heirs of the testator may be entitled to have the land again by reverter." Taber, 367 A.2d at 1240 (quoting Ringgold v. Carvel, 196 Md. 262, 76 A.2d 327, 331 (1950)).

In Taber, a tract of Ocean City land had been granted to the Federal Government, subject to a determinable estate, for use only as a Life Savings Station. 367 A.2d at 1237. The deed's habendum clause provided, "that when the United States shall fail to use the said Life Saving Station, the land hereby conveyed for the purpose aforesaid, shall, without any legal proceedings, suit or otherwise, revert to the said Trustees. . ." Id. at 1236. Because the United States "conveyed" the lot in 1967 via quitclaim deed to the Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, the trial court found that the United States, "fail[ed] to use the said Life Saving Station", effective upon the date of the conveyance. Hence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the concomitant decision that the determinable estate had terminated upon the cessation of the Life Saving Station, holding specifically that:

Id. at 1242 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

The outcome described in the above holding is the result sought by the Spruill Trust in this case. The Spruill Trust contends it is both admitted and undisputed that Sojourner has not conducted any actual agricultural or educational activities at the Farm Property since December 2014, and therefore the Farm Deed's determinable "trip wire" has been cut and the reverter clause irreversibly triggered. The Spruill Trust asserts that using the Farm Property as loan collateral is not an agricultural or educational purpose, a common-sense argument more or less reliant upon a marriage of reality and plain meaning. However, to try and fend off a victory for the Spruill Trust, Sojourner musters the following arguments:

Sojourner Mem. in Opp. SJ Motion, Dkt. No. 31.

Each of Sojourner's contentions is based upon the theory that using the Farm Property as loan collateral satisfies the restriction in the Farm Deed and prevents the operation of the reverter clause. However, the Court concludes the restrictive language cannot be interpreted as embracing conversion into "loan collateral" as an educational or agricultural purpose. Because the actual agricultural and educational activities at the Farm Property ceased long ago, and moreover, because Sojourner is now, and has been for several years, disabled from pursuing such activities as the parties intended, the reverter clause did become operative before the Main Case was filed and the Farm Property is not, and never was, property of Sojourner's bankruptcy estate.

(b) The Utilization of the Farm Property as Collateral for a "Stabilization" Loan does not Qualify as Use for Educational Purposes in Light of the Intent of the Parties as Gleaned from the Language of the Grant and Relevant Extrinsic Evidence.

Sojourner relies upon Atlanta Dev. Auth. v. Clark Atlanta Univ., Inc., 298 Ga. 575, 784 S.E.2d 353 (2016), in support its expansive interpretation of the Deed's restrictive grant. The Court agrees that Clark University is similar to this case in several ways but concludes the holding does not deliver victory to Sojourner. The case involved the grant of 3 parcels by the Appellee, Clark Atlanta University (Clark University), itself a college, to another institution of higher learning, Morris Brown College (Morris Brown), both in Atlanta. The grant restricted the use of the parcels to only "educational purposes" and specifically as follows: "[u]ndergraduate work in the fields of the Arts and Sciences, except that nothing in this clause is to be construed as prohibiting [Morris Brown] from offering graduate course in Theology, . . ." Clark University, 784 S.E.2d at 355. The "determinable" clause provided that if Morris Brown ceased to use the real estate "for the particular educational purposes" identified above, then, "title to said property shall revert to and become vested in the Grantor or its successors." Id. As with Sojourner, Morris Brown was confronted with dire financial problems and filed a Chapter 11 case. Morris Brown then sought to sell "a large portion" of its campus real estate, including the 3 parcels subject to the restriction. The bankruptcy court approved the sale, but noting however, that the sale was only for, "whatever interest [Morris Brown] has," and that the court was not making any findings as to the nature or viability of that interest. Id. at 356.

The matter turned to the state court through Clark University's filing of a complaint for declaratory relief which sought a ruling that the parcels automatically reverted to it per the reversionary clause when Morris Brown stopped using them for educational purposes and sold them to the Appellant, the Atlanta-Development Authority.13 The Appellant countered with the same argument used by Sojourner here, asserting that, the "use" of the property to raise money for the benefit of the institution as a whole was in keeping with a permissible educational purpose under the language of the grant. The Court disagreed and held as follows:

Id. at 359.14

The Georgia Supreme Court's hypothetical observation that, "in another context", the sale of otherwise restricted property with the proceeds used for educational purposes, could satisfy a restrictive grant, is the interpretative "hook" upon which Sojourner hangs its hat. Indeed, the language in this case, that the Farm Property be used only "for agricultural or educational purposes," is less precise, and not quite as restrictive, as that in Clark University, where the categories of qualifying educational studies were specifically delineated. However, the Court concludes that, (a) the reverter clause was triggered as a result of non-use before the Farm Property became collateral and (b) even if there had been some scintilla of overlapping required use, the use of the Farm Property as loan collateral was not intended to be an educational (or agricultural) purpose under the grant language, and that interpretation is confirmed by relevant, extrinsic evidence.

The very timeline relied upon and affirmed under oath by Sojourner in the Simmons Affidavit underpins point (a), above. Per Paragraph 11, Sojourner's, "Middle School/Farm interaction," with "`at risk'" Anne Arundel County . . . Middle School boys", that included tutoring and instruction, "in agricultural and food science . . . lasted until approximately June 30, 2013." Per Paragraph 3, Sojourner's other agricultural activity at the Farm Property ceased completely by December 31, 2014. Per Paragraph 12, Sojourner "offered" the Farm Property as collateral for the loan on January 22, 2015. No other agricultural or educational activity at the Farm Property has been identified by Sojourner, and although Dr. Simmons was reluctant to have his testimony "nailed down" at the Creditors' Meeting, he did not identify any such activity and none has been identified since. That compels the conclusion that all actual educational and agricultural activity, as those terms are commonly understood, ceased before the Farm Property was "offered" as collateral in January 2015, and that cessation is fatal under the common law. Per the rule as expressed in Tiffany; "[a]n estate in fee simple determinable . . . creates an estate in fee simple and provides that the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a stated event. . . ." Tiffany, § 220 at 38315; Taber, 367 A.2d at 1242 (". . . when the United States stopped using the property for a Life Saving Station, there was a diversion of the land from the purpose for which it was conveyed, the estate held by the United States was determined, and automatically a fee simple absolute estate was reestablished in those entitled under the original grantors") (citing Seloff v. Naidetsch, 136 Md. 651, 110 A. 896 (1920))). Again, the reverter clause in this case states, "[i]n the event Grantee, its successors or assigns, does not use the property for agricultural or educational purposes, the title to the property shall revert to Grantor. . . ." Farm Deed (emphasis added). The Court sees no reasonable impediment to the enforcement of this clause to the letter, and as required by law. Unless there is an express limitation upon the operation of a reverter clause — that a reasonable passage of time must elapse before reversion, or, an opportunity to renew the object of the grant afforded, for example — it functions automatically, which leads to the immediate restoration of title in the grantor, or her successors. See Peters v. E. Penn Twp. Sch. Dist., 182 Pa.Super. 116, 126 A.2d 802, 803-04 (1956); Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church v. Parker, 373 Ill. 607,27 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1940).16

Moreover, the Simmons' Affidavit acknowledges at Paragraph 4 that, "[t]he educational mission of [Sojourner] is dependent upon its accreditation as an institution of higher learning, allowing its students to secure federal student loans to pay its charged tuition." (emphasis added). Yet, as Sojourner frankly acknowledges in its Response at page 4, "[it] ultimately lost its accreditation on June 30, 2015, because although it satisfied 13 of the 14 accreditation standards it was unable to satisfy the one having to do with institutional resources." Sojourner Response to SJ Motion at 4. Sojourner apparently fought hard to retain its accreditation but the battle was ultimately to no avail.17 Hence, if its educational mission was dependent upon retaining its accreditation and the same was lost over four years ago, at a time well after the cessation of actual educational or agricultural activities at the Farm Property, how can an unbroken chain of activity supporting a claim to fee simple title be asserted? In short, without accreditation and the sanctioned and authorized abilities to teach that come with it, Sojourner is, and has been, disabled from pursuing an educational purpose. Once accreditation was lost, loan proceeds could not be used for educational purposes because Sojourner could not function as an educational institution, and certainly not in the manner it did when the Farm Property was granted to it per the determinable estate. While not specifically listed in the grant, it is only reasonable to conclude that the Grantor would have understood that Sojourner would have had to maintain its ability to function in toto as an educational institution in order to retain title to the Farm Property. Yet, that ability melted away several years ago.

Clark University, recognizes that the use of proceeds from the sale of a fee simple determinable estate could hypothetically satisfy the condition of the grant language. Clark University, 784 S.E.2d at 359. However, the opinion also acknowledges that it would be impossible to monitor the application of the proceeds to insure they are used in a way that satisfies the restriction. In this case, Sojourner did not even attempt to proffer an accounting of the loan proceeds to establish that the money was used for educational purposes. Indeed, there is no evidence at all as to what the loan proceeds were used for and any such evidence would have to be in the custody and control of Sojourner. At best, Sojourner was only able to assert that to the extent an ambiguity is raised by its counter-argument, then discovery should be permitted.18 But under the circumstances, the Court must conclude that if there were a way to establish that the loan proceeds could be traced to directly support Sojourner's argument, then Sojourner would submit those facts to defend against summary judgment and would not need discovery to do so. But it has not done so, and hence, another sound reason to grant summary judgment in favor of the Spruill Trust becomes apparent.

Finally, to the extent extrinsic evidence is relevant (and helpful) to determine the intent of the restrictive grant, the Simmons Affidavit, and Dr. Simmons' testimony at the Section 341 Meeting, confirm the type of educational and agricultural activity the parties had in mind when the determinable estate was created — actual instruction and interaction with the land itself to primarily impart a knowledge of agricultural and animal husbandry to youngsters, in addition to using the farm's crops to feed students and the poor. Admittedly, neither the Spruill Trust nor Sojourner provided a wealth of detail regarding the instructional programs that previously existed at the Farm Property. But the clipped descriptions available make it clear that they were focused upon teaching the students how to cultivate and harvest the fruits of the earth, and the bounty derived from farm animals. What better proof can there be as to the true intent behind the determinable estate than the actual use to which it was put by Sojourner when the institution was not in a financial crisis? The language of the Deed does not say the Farm Property was granted for, "agricultural, educational and financial purposes." To the contrary, it is limited to the first two adjectives and this Court concludes that Maryland Law requires them to be given their commonly understood meanings. Gunby v. Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass'n, 174 Md.App. 189, 921 A.2d 292, 324 (2007) ("interpreting a deed whose language is clear and unambiguous on its face, the plain meaning of the words used shall govern" (quoting Drolsum v. Horne, 114 Md.App. 704, 691 A.2d 742, 745 (1997))). As defined by Webster's Dictionary, in this context, the word "used" means, "employed in accomplishing something." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2524 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 2002). "Educational" means, "of, related to, or concerned with education or the field of education." Id. at 723. "Education" means, "the act or process of educating or of being educated." Id. "Agriculture", is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as, "[t]he science or art of cultivating soil, harvesting crops, and raising livestock."19 Black's Law Dictionary 76 (8th ed. 2004). Finally, the word, "purpose" means, "something that one sets before himself as an object to be attained: an end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure, exertion or operation; an object, effect or result aimed at, intended or aimed." Webster's at 1847. So, the question to be answered is whether the Farm Property has been employed by Sojourner in accomplishing either (a) the objects of the act or process of educating, or, (b) the science or art of cultivating soil, harvesting crops, and raising livestock, through its use of the Farm Property as loan collateral, or, whether the cessation of activities focused upon those purposes has triggered the reversionary condition. Mindful of the Farm Deed's language, the Grantor's intent, and the commonly understood meanings of the relevant words stated above, the Court cannot find that a purely financial purpose — use as loan collateral to stave off enforcement — is an educational (or agricultural) purpose.

That would neither seem reasonable or rationally in harmony with the common law tradition underlying this type of real estate transaction. Therefore, the Court concludes that the use of the Farm Property as loan collateral is not in keeping with the express purpose of the determinable estate and because those purposes have ceased, the Farm Property automatically reverted as provided under the Farm Deed.

(c) The Plaintiff's Interpretation of the Grant Language Makes Perfect Sense for the Reasons Set Forth Above and as There Is No Ambiguity, There Is No Need for Discovery and a Trial.

Sojourner asserts that if the Spruill Trust's interpretation of the language that creates the determinable estate is given "credence" then there must be ambiguity and that would demand discovery and a trial. The Court disagrees and concludes that summary judgment is appropriate for the reasons explained above. Far from being ambiguous, the language of the Farm Deed is straightforward and easy to understand — the commonly understood meanings of the words "educational" and "agricultural" mesh perfectly with both the Spruill Trust's proffered interpretation, and Sojourner's actual use of the Farm Property, before Sojourner's financial crisis hit.

It is Sojourner's assertion that does not fit either the commonly understood meaning of the words used, or the overall intent as gleaned from extrinsic evidence. In any event, the Farm Deed does not expressly grant the Farm Property for its financial sturdiness, or, more specifically, to be used as collateral. Hence, it is incumbent upon Sojourner to demonstrate some evidence to show that the Grantor intended to have the words stretched in that manner when the grant was made. As explained above, since it has failed in that effort, there thus is no ambiguity and no need for discovery and trial.20

(d) The Maryland Common Law Interpretation of the Phrase "Educational Purposes" in the Context of Determining Property Tax Exemptions Cannot be Applied to the Restrictive Language before the Court Because to do so Would Violate the Fundamental Rule of Interpretation in this Context.

Sojourner relies upon three Maryland decisions — Baltimore Science Fiction Society, Inc. v. State Department of Assessment and Taxation, 384 Md. 402, 863 A.2d 969 (2004); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Maryland State Bar Association, Inc., 314 Md. 655, 552 A.2d 1268 (1989) and Friends School v. Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore City, 314 Md. 194, 550 A.2d 657 (1988) — which decided the extent to which (a) real property and (b) the entity itself, had to be dedicated to educational purposes in order for tax exemptions to apply. Each case is fascinating, but they have little to do with the case at bar. This is so because settled Maryland real estate law controls the outcome here, as reflected in the analysis set forth in Section V(B)(b) above. Stated another way, in each of the cited cases, the courts sought to determine the proper interpretation of the subject exemption statutes, in light of the legislature's intent. That intent has no relevance to the Grantor's intent as reflected in the Farm Deed's language, the circumstances that existed when it was drafted and the extrinsic evidence weighed above. The limited purpose here, as required by Maryland law, was to determine that intent — not the liberal, or conservative, treatment intended for Maryland taxpayers. Accordingly, those cases can be safely disregarded.

(e) Because the Farm Deed Does Not Use the Word "Abandonment", Cases that Analyze the Nature of Abandonment are Irrelevant to the Analysis.

As with the tax cases cited above, Sojourner has also cited a line of cases that consider the question of when real estate has been abandoned. See Ochse, v. Henry, et al., 2009 WL 8603419 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 2009); Messersmith v. Mayor and Common Council of Riverdale, 223 Md. 323, 164 A.2d 523 (1960); Cooper v. Sanford Land Co., 224 Md. 263, 167 A.2d 602 (1961). Ochse considered a fee simple determinable estate wherein the grant language expressly used the word "abandoned" as a reversionary trigger. Ochse, 2009 WL 8603419 at *1. Hence, that case does not apply to this one. Neither Messersmith nor Cooper dealt with fee simple determinable interests and were limited to analyses of the rules underlying "abandonment". Hence, none of the cases have any application to this dispute and as with the tax cases, each may be safely disregarded.

VI. Conclusion

While the Court has great sympathy and compassion for Sojourner's former mission, the plain language of the Farm Deed, and relevant extrinsic evidence, dictates that title to the Farm Property reverted when the estate "determined", as a result of the cessation of agricultural and educational activities. That means summary judgment must be granted in the Spruill Trust's favor. A separate order memorializing this ruling shall be entered.