Is this, as appellant contends, "nothing more than a palimony case," or is it, as appellee argues, unjust enrichment of one partner in an unmarried relationship at the expense of the other, justifying the imposition of an implied trust? After a February 2009 bench trial, Anne Arundel County Circuit Judge Michele Jaklitsch sided with appellee/plaintiff Donna Zuromski, and against appellant/defendant, Sean Porter. This appeal of the circuit court's decision calls upon us to address, for the first time, property rights issues oft-litigated in other jurisdictions. See Annot., Property Rights Arising From Relationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 69 A.L.R.5th 219 (1999, 2010 Supp.) ("Cohabitation-Property Rights"). For reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
This is a dispute over real property located on Washington Avenue in Shady Side, Maryland. In her March 31, 2007 Memorandum Opinion, the trial judge summarized the relevant facts in this case:
On October 18, 2007, Zuromski filed a six-count complaint in the circuit court, asserting that Porter's actions: 1) warranted imposition of a constructive trust; 2) required the establishment of a resulting trust; 3) unjustly enriched Porter; 4) constituted a promissory estoppel; 5) required entry of a declaratory judgment declaring that Zuromski was entitled to one-half ownership of the property; and 6) mandated injunctive relief.
In February 2009, a two-day trial was held. The following month, the trial judge issued a memorandum opinion and order. The court found that Zuromski had "established the existence of a constructive trust as an equitable remedy for unjust enrichment." It emphasized that in cases where only one party holds title, a constructive trust should be imposed, not only where fraud or misrepresentation exists, but also "when the circumstances render it inequitable for the party holding the title to retain it." The court said that this standard was satisfied in this case.
Finally, the court said that, even absent a confidential relationship between the parties, it would find a constructive trust on the basis of unjust enrichment. As a result, the court declared that the parties each had an "undivided one half interest in the subject property as tenants in common." It denied any specific monetary award, an injunction, and other claimed relief, but did not expressly address the resulting trust claim.
Porter has raised a single issue in this appeal:
Zuromski has raised an alternative ground for upholding the judgment in the circuit court, which we have phrased as the following question:
A constructive trust is a remedy that converts the holder of legal title to property into a trustee for one who in good conscience should reap the benefits of the property. Wimmer v. Wimmer, 287 Md. 663, 668, 414 A.2d 1254 (1980). Its purpose is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the holder of the property. Id. This remedy applies "where a property has been acquired by fraud, misrepresentation, or other improper method, or where the circumstances render it inequitable for the party holding the title to retain it."
At the outset, Porter challenges some of these principles that guided the circuit court's decision. He particularly takes aim at the trial court's reliance on Hartsock v. Strong, supra, 21 Md.App. at 116, 318 A.2d 237, for the proposition that a constructive trust may arise from some equitable principle independent of fraud. He suggests that Hartsock may have been weakened by our decision in Jahnigen v. Smith, 143 Md.App. 547, 795 A.2d 234 (2002), where, at one point in our opinion, we noted: "[T]he facts as presented do not support an action for constructive trust because there has been no allegation of misrepresentation, fraud, or other improper methods of obtaining title." Id. at 557, 795 A.2d 234. However, Jahnigen flatly states that, in addition to fraud and these other grounds, a constructive trust may be found "where the circumstances render it inequitable for the party holding title to retain it." Id. at 556, 795 A.2d 234. Moreover, just six months after Jahnigen was decided, we once again restated the principles governing imposition of a constructive trust, noting that the remedy could be invoked for inequitable circumstances independent of fraud. Turner v. Turner, 147 Md.App. 350, 421-22, 809 A.2d 18 (2002).
Porter also contends that Wimmer undercuts the circuit court decision here. In Wimmer, the Court of Appeals overturned the imposition of a constructive trust upon a one-half interest in a marital home purchased with the husband's funds and titled in his name. In rejecting the wife's claim, the Court emphasized that the wife parted with no money or labor with respect to the property and thus, the title holder was not unjustly enriched. Wimmer, 287 Md. at 672, 414 A.2d 1254. The very facts found missing in Wimmer are present here. To be sure, the Wimmer court also noted that the husband made no misrepresentations as to the title to the property. Id. at 671, 414 A.2d 1254. But Wimmer is clearly not a case of absence-of-fraud equals no-claim. It is one "where the circumstances [did
Porter denigrates Zuromski's constructive trust claim as a palimony action not recognized in this State. This argument is misplaced here. The appellee was not seeking "alimony from or for a pal." See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ficker, 319 Md. 305, 320, 572 A.2d 501 (1990).
Porter contends that "[a] key element of Appellee's case and the trial court's decision was that the parties established a joint bank account into which Appellant deposited virtually all of the funds while Appellee used her money to pay rent to her mother, in whose house the parties were living." He goes on to argue that "[t]he law is that no gift of Appellant's funds to the Appellee was complete until she withdrew them from that joint account, which she did not do, and that, to the extent Appellant may have withdrawn any funds she had deposited into that account, a gift from her to him was completed at that time."
A fair reading of the trial court's opinion does not support the contention that the joint banking account for the house was a "key element" of the decision to impose a constructive trust. What was critical was that Zuromski made substantial financial contributions toward the purchase of the house and paid half of the mortgage charges and other home expenses.
This is not a case where one party to a joint banking account claims an interest in property purchased with funds withdrawn solely by the other account holder, exclusively for his own purposes. See Hamilton v. Caplan, 69 Md.App. 566, 586, 518 A.2d 1087 (1987). Nor does Zuromski assert that Porter's withdrawal of funds from the account were improper. See Kornmann v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 180 Md. 270, 23 A.2d 692 (1942). Rather, when the Shady Side property was purchased in 1999, both parties drew checks on the account to pay the down payment: Porter's was payable to the lender and Zuromski's was payable to Porter, apparently
A volley of additional legal arguments from Porter's scattershot attack on the circuit court decision all miss their target. He contends that the trial court should not have ignored his testimony that he never intended that Zuromski have title to the property. However, a constructive trust is independent of any agreement between the parties. Restatement of the Law, Restitution at § 160 Comment b. ("A constructive trust is imposed not because of the intention of the parties but because the person holding the title to the property would profit by a wrong or would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the property."); 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 132 (2005) ("A constructive trust is independent of any agreement between the parties..."). Even if the circuit court found Porter's testimony credible, it would have not called into question the trial judge's conclusion that, by operation of law, a constructive trust was required to be imposed.
Porter also asserts that the circuit court erred in granting Zuromski a one-half interest in the property, because she did not pay one-half of the purchase price of the Shady Side property. Although he cites a resulting trust case for this proposition, Jahnigen, 143 Md.App. at 558, 795 A.2d 234, a constructive trust decision, Martin v. Farber, 68 Md.App. 137, 147, 510 A.2d 608 (1986), states that a constructive trust cannot be imposed "over the entire estate without regard to the amounts actually contributed." It is true that the parties' contributions to the down payment were not equal. Nevertheless, the trial court did not focus, in myopic fashion, on the down payment for the purchase of the home. Among other items, the rent payments made by Zuromski that helped the couple to save for the purchase, and the court's finding that Porter "stripped a substantial portion of the equity out of the property," had to be factored into the equation. On this record, we find no error in the relief ordered by the trial court as a result of its imposition of a constructive trust.
Finally, Porter argues that Zuromski "committed fraud on her creditors and that she knew she had no right to the property" when she claimed no interest in the property in her 1999 bankruptcy filing. In our view, whatever impact Zuromski's filing had on creditors is irrelevant to this case. But, in any event, the circuit court correctly concluded that Zuromski committed no impropriety because she was not listed on the title to the property when she filed for bankruptcy.
Porter's question presented asks whether "[o]n the facts of this case" the
The evidence in this case clearly supports the imposition of a constructive trust. Porter testified that he told Zuromski he would put her on the title to the property, but privately he never really intended to do so. Such conduct smacks of misrepresentation if not fraud. But fraud need not be found here to uphold the circuit court's judgment. Zuromski's monetary and non-monetary investments in the property demonstrated that she clearly relied on Porter's representation that she would become co-owner of the house. In our view, these circumstances would render it inequitable for Porter to retain exclusive title and would justify imposition of a constructive trust.
On this record, the same result is reached if Porter's conduct is examined as an abuse of a confidential relationship. We think there is no doubt that a confidential relationship existed between the parties. This Court recently noted that, in the context of prenuptial agreements, while there is no presumption that spouses are in a confidential relationship, an engaged couple could occupy a confidential relationship. Lasater v. Guttmann, 194 Md.App. 431, 459 n. 19, 5 A.3d 79,95 (2010). Out of state cases, more directly on point, also recognize that couples cohabitating or planning to marry can be parties to a confidential relationship, the breach of which can lead to imposition of a constructive trust on property. See Hatton v. Meade, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 356, 502 N.E.2d 552, 557 (1987); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Mo.App.1987); Rhue v. Rhue, 189 N.C. App. 299, 658 S.E.2d 52, 59 (2008). See generally Cohabitation-Property Rights, supra, 69 A.L.R.5th at § 3.
Other factors support the finding of a confidential relationship here. Porter's sole name on the title made him a dominant party in the relationship and, by his representation that he would put Zuromski on the title, she was justified in assuming that Porter would not act inconsistent with her welfare. See n. 11 supra. Porter's attempt to profit from the relationship by solely retaining title to the property abused the confidential relationship, shifting the burden to him to show the fairness and reasonableness of his action. See Wimmer, supra, 287 Md. at 668, 414 A.2d 1254. On this record, he has failed to meet this burden and a constructive trust was justified.
In the alternative, Zuromski contends that the record before the trial court also supported the finding of a resulting trust. In Jahnigen, supra, 143 Md.App. at 558, 795 A.2d 234, we noted that "[w]here a transfer of property is made to one person, and only a part of the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom said payment is made. ..." A resulting trust has also been described in the following fashion:
76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 135.
One legal observer, seemingly predicting the scenario of this case, has said:
Mary L. Bonauto, Advising Non-Traditional Families, 40 Boston Bar Journ. 10, 11 (Sept.-Oct. 1996). In a resulting trust, the intent of the parties that a trust relationship result is important. 76 Am. Jur.2d, Trusts, supra at § 132.
Some of the facts of this case raise the possibility of a resulting trust and courts in other jurisdictions—where circumstances required—have found a resulting trust where unmarried cohabitants were involved. See Cohabitation-Property Rights, supra, 69 A.L.R.5th at § 3. However, this is an issue the circuit court did not decide, and we need not decide it here. For all of the reasons set forth above, we affirm the circuit court's imposition of a constructive trust, its declaration that each party has an undivided interest in the property, and the appointment of a trustee to transfer title.
