HARRELL, J.
We are asked here to construe and apply Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-202,
Ali claims here, as he did in each court in this litigation, essentially that a federal bankruptcy petition is not a "petition in insolvency," considering that the Maryland Legislature did not designate these terms expressly as synonymous, even as it recodified repeatedly the tolling provision over a period of time during which federal bankruptcy proceedings were proliferating nationally and in Maryland. As such, Dr. Ali claims that § 5-202 did not operate to toll the three-year limit, and thus CIT's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. In response, CIT argues that the Legislature's frequent recodifications of § 5-202 during the 19th and 20th centuries—a time period during which bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, for the most part, were shifting from the state to the federal arena—evinces a clear legislative intent to include the filing of a federal bankruptcy petition within the meaning of "petition in insolvency," as used in § 5-202. We hold, as explained more fully infra, that the plain meaning of § 5-202, confirmed by its legislative history and legislative purpose, supports the conclusion of the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals that a federal bankruptcy petition constitutes a "petition in insolvency," as contemplated by § 5-202. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
In a 17 June 1997 lease, CIT's predecessor leased medical equipment to Dr. Ali (Petitioner or "Dr. Ali") for a period of sixty months, payable in monthly payments of $3,097.49. Included in the lease was an acceleration clause, providing that, upon Petitioner's default, CIT could declare all rental payments immediately due and could recover interest and attorneys' fees in pursuit of the accelerated debt. Roughly midway through the lease period,
On 11 June 2001, Dr. Ali filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. At that time, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay of pursuit of CIT's claim went into effect, meaning that CIT was barred from filing suit against Petitioner for breach of contract. At some point prior to September 2003, CIT filed a motion to be relieved of 11 U.S.C. § 362's automatic stay, which the bankruptcy court granted on 4 September 2003. Petitioner's bankruptcy case continued otherwise. On 21 June 2006, allegedly because Petitioner did not comply with bankruptcy procedures in completing an acceptable plan of reorganization, the bankruptcy court dismissed Petitioner's bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
Approximately six months after the bankruptcy case was dismissed, on 18 January 2007, CIT filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to enforce its rights under the lease, and sought attorneys' fees, prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, and costs. Before the Circuit Court, Respondent presented testimony that Petitioner breached the lease and established the amount of damages recoverable. Petitioner did not deny that he breached the lease; rather, he contended (and contends today) that CIT's suit was barred by § 5-101's three-year statute of limitations.
Dr. Ali appealed timely to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 188 Md.App. 269, 981 A.2d 759 (2009), undertook a lengthy and impressive survey of the history of state insolvency laws and federal bankruptcy law. See Ali, 188 Md.App. at 277-85, 981 A.2d at 764-68. In affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals explained:
Ali, 188 Md.App. at 285-87, 981 A.2d at 768-69. (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Dr. Ali filed timely a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, Ali v. CIT Tech., 412 Md. 255, 987 A.2d 16 (2010), to consider "whether the lower court erred when it upheld the trial court's decision which held that the statute of limitations on respondent's claim had not expired at the time the instant complaint was filed."
There is no material factual dispute in this case. The arguments before this Court center on the trial court's legal conclusion that Petitioner's filing of a bankruptcy petition fell under the ambit of § 5-202, thus tolling the statute of limitations. It is well settled that "where an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are `legally correct' under a [non-deferential] standard of review." Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006); see Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 618, 994 A.2d 411, 418 (2010); Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002).
In Maryland, the general rule is that "[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues...." Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-101. This statute of limitations
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362,
With no protective mechanism, however, "a petition in bankruptcy could sometimes give a debtor unfair advantage over a claimant by allowing the debtor to remain under the protection of the automatic stay until the limitation period ... had expired...." In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 566 (2d Cir.1989); see Meyer v. Cunningham, 196 Ark. 1097, 121 S.W.2d 90 (1938) (holding a claimant's claim to be barred by the statute of limitations, as the statute of limitations was not tolled during the automatic stay imposed by the bankruptcy proceedings). As such, in 1978, Congress passed what is codified now as 11 U.S.C. § 108, which states, in pertinent part:
That is, "[f]ederal law assured the plaintiffs 30 days in which to pick up the baton; if states want to give plaintiffs additional time, that is their business." Pettibone Corp. v. Easley, 935 F.2d 120, 121 (7th Cir.1991). It is at this point that Md.Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-202 becomes relevant, as the Maryland Legislature has made it its business to give plaintiffs additional time.
Section 5-202 provides: "[i]f a debtor files a petition in insolvency which is later dismissed, the time between the filing and the dismissal is not included in determining whether a claim against the debtor is barred by the statute of limitations." The issue before this Court is whether Dr. Ali's (or anyone's) federal bankruptcy petition constitutes a "petition in insolvency." Petitioner contends that the Legislature could not have intended a federal bankruptcy petition to constitute a "petition in insolvency," within the meaning of § 5-202, as no federal bankruptcy procedures were authorized in 1814—when the tolling provision was first enacted—and because the Legislature failed over the ensuing years to designate expressly those terms as synonymous, even as it continued to recodify the provision during times in which bankruptcy and insolvency matters were moving increasingly from the state fora to the federal arena. Respondent, however, spins the same rationale differently, contending that the Legislature's repeated recodification of the tolling provision, during the time when federal bankruptcy practice burgeoned, evinces its intent for the state provision to apply to federal bankruptcy petitions. Simply put, CIT claims that § 5-202 operated to toll the statute of limitations for a period of time sufficient to make CIT's claim against Petitioner timely; if it did not, CIT's claim was untimely.
The ultimate goal in construing and applying a statute is to "discern the actual intent of the [L]egislature in enacting it." Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443-44, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006). When the Court can ascertain the Legislature's intent from the plain meaning of the verbiage, the Court need not delve deeper. See Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Danner, 388 Md. 649, 659, 882 A.2d 271, 277 (2005) (quoting Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998)) ("When the plain meaning is clear and
This is the Court's first opportunity to construe the phrase "petition in insolvency." This language underwent a series of cosmetic enhancements over the two centuries since the original enactment of the tolling provision. In 1814—the tolling provision's inception—the statute provided that "the time intervening between the petitioning of any of said debtors and the time that any of said petitions may be dismissed, shall not be computed on any plea of limitation...." Chapter 122, § 3 of the Acts of 1814 (emphasis added). The use of the adjective "said" refers to Chapter 122, § 1 of the Acts of 1814, which provided, "[t]hat no petition for the benefit of the original act for the benefit of sundry insolvent debtors"; thus, even at its inception, the tolling provision was triggered by the filing of the functional equivalent of a "petition in insolvency." The language underwent its first change when appearing in the Maryland Code of 1860. This codification changed the word "said" to "insolvent," but did not change the substantive meaning of the tolling provision. See Maryland Code of 1860, Art. 57, § 8.
Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 72, 935 A.2d 421, 428 (2007) (quoting Md. Div. of Labor and Indus. v. Triangle Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 422, 784 A.2d 534, 543 (2001)). We conclude that the changes to the statute have been purely cosmetic.
The early-19th century, however, is not the only time period relevant in determining the meaning of "petition in insolvency." In 1963, Maryland adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, at which time the Legislature adopted a definition for the term "insolvent" See Chapter 538 of the Acts of 1963. "Insolvent" was, and is currently defined, as codified at Md.Code (1975, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Commercial Law Art., § 1-201(23), as one "who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." Ten years later, in 1973, the tolling provision was recodified for the last time, moving from Art. 57 § 9, to § 5-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Considering that, "when the [L]egislature acts, it `is presumed to be aware of its own enactments'", Md. State Highway Admin. v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 324, 726 A.2d 238, 244 (1999) (quoting Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124,
Considering the foregoing, we conclude that, at the time the tolling provision was enacted, it was understood that a "petition in insolvency" was a petition filed by one in relation to his or her inability to pay off his or her debts in full. The next step in our analysis, then, is determining whether the filing of a modern-day federal bankruptcy petition falls within this definition. If so, § 5-202 operates to toll the statute of limitations; if not, Dr. Ali should prevail.
It seems to us incontrovertible that the filing of a Chapter 11 federal bankruptcy petition is a petition by one in relation to his or her inability to pay off his or her debts in full. The Supreme Court has defined "bankruptcy" as the "subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors...." Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1169, 1175, 71 L.Ed.2d 335, 344 (1982) (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513, 58 S.Ct. 1025, 1032, 82 L.Ed. 1490, 1499 (1938)) (emphasis added). Thus, at its core, bankruptcy is a "process by which certain qualifying individuals with substantial debts may cancel their debts and obtain a `fresh start.'" 145 CONG. REG. 28,415 (1999) (emphasis added). Numerous modern legal dictionaries (i.e. those published after the proliferation of federal bankruptcy proceedings) have included expressly the words "insolvent" or "insolvency" when defining "bankruptcy."
Notwithstanding our plain-meaning analysis, "even when language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts may look to a legislative purpose to support or confirm [the] plain meaning." Comptroller of the Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 571-72, 826 A.2d 467, 472 (2003) (citing Taylor v. Friedman, 344 Md. 572, 582, 689 A.2d 59, 63 (1997)). Further, "the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute." Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 276, 987 A.2d 18, 29 (2010). A survey of the statutory context and legislative purpose underlying § 5-202 ratifies and confirms our conclusion that the filing of a federal bankruptcy petition constitutes a "petition in insolvency."
At one time, the terms "bankruptcy" and "insolvency" referred to two entirely different systems of debt liquidation. See Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 188 Md.App. 269, 277, 981 A.2d 759, 764 (2009) (citing CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 7 (1935)). At the time our relevant tolling provision was enacted, however, "there was no clear line of demarcation between bankruptcy and insolvency as there had been in England." Ali, 188 Md.App. at 278, 981 A.2d at 764; see Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 667-68, 55 S.Ct. 595, 602, 79 L.Ed. 1110, 1123-24 (1935) ("While attempts have been made to formulate a distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency, it has long been settled that ... the terms are convertible."); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 194, 195, 4 Wheat. 122 4 L.Ed. 529, 548 (1819) ("[T]he subject is divisible in its nature into bankrupt and insolvent laws; though the line of partition between them is not so distinctively marked as to enable any person to say, with positive precision, what belongs exclusively to one, and not to the other class of laws.... Although the two systems have existed apart from each other, there is such a connection between them...."); Ex Parte Hull, 12 F. Cas. 853, 856 (S.D.N.Y.1842) ("[T]here is no sound distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency."); WARREN, supra, at 7 ("Nowhere in the States, other than Pennsylvania, however, does there seem to have been a clear line of demarcation which existed in England between a
Also buttressing the conclusion that a federal bankruptcy petition is a "petition in insolvency" within the meaning of § 5-202 is the fact that Petitioner's reading of the tolling provision—if we were to favor it— would undermine the legislative purpose in enacting (and recodifying) the provision. We agree with the intermediate appellate court that, like 11 U.S.C. § 108, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5-202 was enacted "to address the public's complaint that debtors manipulated the bankruptcy and insolvency processes to avoid paying creditors by entering bankruptcy, waiting for the statute of limitations to expire, and subsequently dismissing the bankruptcy proceeding." Ali, 188 Md.App. at 283-84, 981 A.2d at 767; see JOHN L. DORSEY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF INSOLVENCY; CONTAINING A COMPILATION OF THE INSOLVENT LAWS OF MARYLAND, AND THE LAWS IN RELATION TO INSOLVENT DEBTORS OF THE UNITED STATES 15 ("An objection has been made to the adoption of a bankrupt system, that it may be abused and perverted to the means of fraud upon the creditor."). Because the Legislature has repealed most of Maryland's insolvency laws, if § 5-202 is read to only apply to state insolvency laws (or their scant remains), the tolling provision—reenacted and/or recodified in 1814, 1860, and 1973—and its accompanying policies preventing debtor abuse, would be rendered largely meaningless. Accordingly, we refuse to give § 5-202 such a reading. See Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006) ("We avoid a construction of [a] statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.").
Petitioner gasps for one last breath of air from City of Saco v. Pulsifer, 749 A.2d 153 (Me.2000). In Pulsifer, the City of Saco assessed nearly $20,000 in property taxes on Pulsifer's property over a two-year period. Pulsifer, 749 A.2d at 154. Thereafter, Pulsifer filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine, at which time 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)'s automatic stay took effect. Id. Because the City did not protect its interest by filing a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court, it did not receive a distribution pursuant
To the extent that Pulsifer is on point, of course, we are not bound by its holding or its rationale, and would reject its reasoning, if it came to that. See Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 490, 830 A.2d 450, 467 (2003) ("[D]ecisions of our sister jurisdictions are not binding on this Court and ought not dictate the course of jurisprudence in the State of Maryland."). There are, however, a few poignant differences between the Maine statute and the one in the present case. For one, the court in Pulsifer noted that its tolling provision only applies when: "(1) a creditor with a claim against the debtor has `proven' that his debts are recoverable, and (2) the debtor has been `adjudged an insolvent debtor.'" Pulsifer, 749 A.2d at 155. Noting that there were no such requirements under the current federal system, the court in Pulsifer adjudged Maine's tolling provision was inconsistent with federal bankruptcy law. See id. In Maryland, however, neither proving recoverable debts nor being adjudged insolvent are prerequisites to the application of § 5-202, and, in this sense, our tolling provision is entirely consistent with federal bankruptcy law. Furthermore, the court in Pulsifer noted that it was left with no guidance as to the tolling period; that is, it was "left to speculate at whether the statute should be tolled during the entire proceeding, or just during the automatic stay, while creditors' rights to sue are actually hindered." Pulsifer, 749 A.2d at 156. The Maryland statute, however, is entirely clear; the tolling period commences upon the filing of the petition, and it is terminated at the dismissal of that petition.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the plain-meaning, legislative history, and the legislative purpose of § 5-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article mandate the conclusion that a federal